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The Market for Hedging Services: A Marketing-Finance Approach 
1. De verschillen in de wijze waarop de handel in termijncontracten 
plaatsvindt zijn terug te voeren op het verschil in de informatie die 
wordt gegenereerd. 
2. Handelsvolume is een slechte maatstaf voor het vergelijken van het 
succes van termijncontracten. 
3. Het is niet altijd mogelijk te zeggen dat termijnmarkt A meer liquide is 
dan termijnmarkt B, aangezien liquiditeit uit verscheidene dimensies 
bestaat. Dit proefschrift 
4. Aan de huidige belangstelling voor de "ketenkunde" kan tegemoet 
gekomen worden met de reeds lang in de marketing aanwezige 
literatuur, in het bijzonder de channel anddistribution literature. 
5. Naarmate de hedging service van de termijnmarkt beter wordt 
afgestemd op de wensen van de gebruikers, zal de behoefte aan 
verticale integratie afnemen. 
6. Het tijdstip van introductie van nieuwe termijncontracten is een 
belangrijke factor in het welslagen van het contract, vanwege de 
betekenis van het prijsniveau van het termijncontract in relatie tot de 
psychologische referentie prijs in de besluitvorming van de potentiële 
hedger. Dit proefschrift 
7. De grootste concurrentie voor een termijnraarkt komt niet van die 
andere termijnmarkt maar van andere prijsrisico management 
instrumenten. 
8. Voor de marketeer van een agrarische termijnmarkt is de moeilijkste 
opgave niet de landbouwer tot daadwerkelijke plaatsing van een order 
te bewegen, maar het instrument termijncontract geïncorporeerd te 
krijgen als wezenlijk element in de bedrijfsvoering van de landbouwer. 
Dit proefschrift 
9. De makelaar op de termijnmarkt is het gezicht van de termijnmarkt en 
bepaalt daarmee voor een belangrijk gedeelte het succes van het 
termijncontract. 
10. De onafhankelijkheid van de wetenschapper ten opzichte van het 
bedrijfsleven is in het grootste belang van het bedrijfsleven. 
11. In het geval dat termijncontracten het aantal vrijheidsgraden van de 
landbouwer vergroten en daarmee de mogelijkheden tot zelfstandig 
ondernemerschap verruimen, wordt de attitude van de boer jegens de 
termijnhandel positiever (minder negatief). Dit proefschrift 
12. Termijnmarkten hebben de neiging een overmatig belang te hechten 
aan de specificatie van het termijncontract, daarbij het belang van de 
convenience needs van de klanten onderschattend. Dit proefschrift 
13. Een betere uitwisseling van ideeën en samenwerking tussen marketeers 
en financieel economen is een low-risk/high-return investment voor de 
bedrijfswetenschappen. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Scope and Outline of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs in the food and agribusiness run price risks 
on their stocks of inputs and outputs. To cover these price risks, 
several price risk management instruments are available, such as 
cash forward contracts, options and futures contracts. In this study 
we focus on the latter. Futures markets are characterized by well 
organized trading methods with a standardization of terms, 
resulting in widespread and low-cost access of buyers to sellers and 
great integrity of the contract. 
Agricultural futures markets are and have been very 
important institutions in commodity pricing. These markets have 
been prominent in the United States for more than a century. 
Recent changes within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 
the European Union, as part of proposed reductions in financial 
support for agricultural products, have stimulated price volatility 
for agricultural raw materials, increasing price risks for both the 
primary agricultural producer and the agricultural industry. For a 
risk averse farmer or manager of an agribusiness company, an 
increased price volatility on the markets for agricultural raw 
materials will increase the need for price risk management 
instruments, such as futures markets. 
Not only does a reduction of agricultural price support 
create a new dynamism in existing agricultural futures markets, it 
also advances the introduction of entirely new types of futures 
contracts. Furthermore, new market developments, such as the 
introduction of production rights, may stimulate the development of 
new futures contracts. The latter development will be analysed in 
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more detail in this study. The European Union has introduced many 
different production rights, such as sugar rights, starch rights and of 
course the widely known milk rights. Only when a farmer possesses 
production rights, is he allowed to produce the underlying product. 
Next to production rights, an important role in agriculture seems 
now reserved for environmental rights as well. Trade volume for 
rights is not to be underestimated, with milk rights trade in the 
Netherlands and Great-Britain alone at an annual volume of two 
thousand million Dutch Guilders. A farmer holding no production 
rights, or striving to expand his business, will have to either 
purchase or lease them. The market for these rights is not 
transparent, causing the absence of any clear-cut reference price. 
Hence, large regional price differences and price fluctuations 
appear over time. This, too, exposes both farmers and agricultural 
industry to price risk. 
The dynamics of futures exchanges is also stimulated by 
technological developments. Of increasing importance in this 
respect is the use of automatic computer-guided trading systems. 
There are several types of electronic trade systems, the differences 
between which can be reduced to differences in the type of 
information they generate. Information regarding high price, low 
price, last price, size of bid and ask, identification of executors, 
other markets and volume is relevant to the participants in the 
futures trade. Because an electronic trading system requires trades 
to be entered via the terminal, the trader's primary clearing member 
can monitor the risk position of its traders in real time. Trades 
executed on the electronic trading system are routed electronically 
to the exchange's clearing house for processing. Outtrades are 
virtually impossible. Moreover, an electronic market order book 
contains information on off the market bids and offers which may 
give the hedger some indication of his or her ability to unwind his 
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or her position at low market depth costs. These developments in 
trading systems will increase the attractiveness of futures as price 
risk management instruments. 
Also political developments advance the importance of 
futures markets in the EU. The influence of the changing CAP in 
this respect has been discussed already. Also the introduction of the 
single European currency may stimulate futures markets. It will 
give an extra impulse to futures contracts (on raw materials), since 
one of the difficulties with futures contract specification, 
standardization with respect to currency, will be eliminated, making 
national futures markets more attractive for hedgers and speculators 
from other European countries. 
All these developments mentioned above, higher price 
volatility in the cash market for agricultural raw materials, the 
introduction of transferable production and environmental rights, 
the upsurge of computerized trade systems and the arrival of a 
single European currency, contribute to financial institutions' 
interest in agricultural futures markets. They have led several 
European futures markets, like the Amsterdam Exchanges, the 
London International Financial Futures & Options Exchange and 
the Marché à Terme International de France, to develop new 
agricultural futures contracts, e.g. for rapeseed and wheat. 
While realising that the analysis of the market for hedging 
services has to be further elaborated, both from the marketing 
approach and the finance approach, it is our point of view that both 
approaches should be integrated by futures exchanges when 
developing and marketing hedging services. In this study we 
contribute to the understanding of futures markets by analysing 
hedging services both from the finance and the marketing 
perspective and by integrating both approaches. 
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1.2 Outline of the Book 
The outline of the book is as follows. In the introductory 
Chapter 2 a conceptual framework for analysing futures markets is 
proposed. Subsequent chapters can be placed within this 
framework. The book consists of three parts, each of which has 
been subdivided into chapters that each cover a specific research 
topic. 
Part I, taking the finance approach, deals with the problem 
of risks in futures markets. Part II, taking the marketing approach, 
analyses the price risk management behavior of entrepreneurs. 
Part HI discusses the characteristics and feasibility of rights futures. 
The book closes with a chapter on the marketing-finance approach. 
Parti starts with an outline in Chapter3 of the risks a 
futures contract may carry. Yet, while much research has been done 
on the valuation of futures contracts, little is known about the risks 
of using futures contracts. Next, Chapter 4 studies the market depth 
of the futures market. In the final chapters of Parti, futures 
markets' hedging effectiveness is analysed thoroughly. First, in 
Chapter 5, a hedging effectiveness measure is developed which 
takes market depth risk into account when evaluating hedging 
effectiveness. Secondly, in Chapter 6, a concept of hedging 
efficiency and a measure of hedging efficiency are proposed. In 
contrast to the previous hedging effectiveness measures, this 
measure does not focus on the performance of a portfolio but on the 
hedging service of the futures contract. 
Risk perception and risk attitude are important concepts 
concerning the hedging behavior of entrepreneurs. Therefore, in the 
first chapter of Part II, Chapter 7, two major approaches for 
measuring the risk attitude of small and medium-sized 
entrepreneurs in the domain of financial risk are investigated: 
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measures based on the expected utility model used in economics 
and measures based on marketing scales used in marketing research 
and psychology. It is endeavoured to test their applicability and use 
in futures markets research. Afterward the decision process of 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) for making use of 
hedging services is analysed in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, the 
importance of promotion and distribution for the success or failure 
of futures contracts is demonstrated by analysing the information 
dissemination of new futures contracts. 
Part HI is devoted to rights futures contracts. First, in 
Chapter 10, we develop a theoretical framework for classifying 
rights. This enables a better understanding of the many rights 
existing today. In Chapters 11 and 12, we show that rights futures 
have some features that differ from those of traditional commodity 
futures. These features advance the usefulness of rights futures as a 
tool for managing price risk. The opportunities and constraints for a 
British and Dutch milk quota futures market and environmental 
rights futures market are discussed. In Chapter 13, the use of 
production rights futures for commodity spread hedging is 
investigated and illustrated for a dairy industry whose production is 
restricted by rights. 
This book closes with Chapter 14 which offers a reflection 
on the research results of the forgone chapters, and focused in 
particular on the synthesis between the finance and the marketing 
approach in the analysis of futures markets, as advocated in the 
proposed framework of Chapter 2. 

CHAPTER 2 
Conceptual Framework of Analysing 
Futures markets 
In this chapter we develop a framework for the different 
approaches to the analyses of futures exchanges. It is argued that 
futures markets research basically can be distinguished in either 
taking the marketing approach or the finance approach. A framework 
integrating the marketing and finance approach to the analysis of 
futures markets is developed. First, we present an overview of both 
approaches to the hedging services provided by futures exchanges. 
Both approaches are complementary. The finance approach 
furnishes relevant information about the technical feasibility of 
futures trading. The marketing approach, on the other hand, provides 
information about whether futures contracts meet the customer's 
needs. For this reason, we argue that an integration of both methods 
would lead to more insight into the functioning of futures markets 
and hence to better ways of optimizing futures contract trading 
volume. 
Note that a futures market provides two different kinds of 
services: speculation services and hedging services. It does so by 
organizing a market where futures contracts are traded. The futures 
contract serves, as it is, as the medium through which the hedging 
and speculation service is provided. In this book, we focus on the 
hedging services provided by futures exchanges. 
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2.1 Finance Approach Towards Hedging Services 
Financial management is concerned with the raising and 
allocation of financial funds (e.g. van Home, 1986, p.2). Norms for 
efficient financial management can be derived once the financial 
environment and the functioning of financial instruments have been 
understood. This approach to financial services, such as the price 
risk management services of futures markets will create the 
necessary conditions for success. The financial approach to 
financial services is therefore a normative one: what necessary 
technical conditions have to be fulfilled for a financial service to be 
viable? 
In the financial literature on futures contracts, the 
commodity characteristics approach and the contract design 
approach can be distinguished. 
The commodity characteristics approach defines feasible 
commodities for futures trading, based on an extensive list of 
required commodity attributes, and, in so doing, focuses on the 
technical aspects of the underlying commodity. The following 
attributes were considered crucial for qualifying a commodity for 
futures trade: 1) the commodity should be durable and it should be 
possible to store it; 2) units must be homogeneous; 3) the 
commodity must be subject to frequent price fluctuations with wide 
amplitude; supply and demand must be large; 4) supply must flow 
naturally to market and there must be breakdowns in an existing 
pattern of forward contracting (Black 1986, Tashjian 1995). The 
first attribute has received a lot of attention from the field of 
(commodity) finance, since one of the economic functions often 
attributed to futures markets in commodity marketing is the 
temporal allocation of stocks. The uncertainty of the value of 
commodities in the portfolio causes problems for firms to make 
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optimally economic efficient decisions. The futures market is an 
integral part of this storage scenario through provision of a hedge 
against price risk for the carrier of stocks. Since futures contracts 
are standardized contracts, this approach requires the underlying 
product to be homogeneous, so that the underlying commodity as 
defined in the futures contract corresponds with the commodity 
traded in the cash market. This makes possible to actually deliver in 
the futures market, which keeps basis risk at the lowest level 
possible. The fluctuating price attribute is of great importance, 
since a hedger will feel little incentive to insure himself against 
price risk if the possible price changes are small. The broad cash 
market criterion is important, because a large supply of the 
commodity will make it difficult for someone to establish 
dominance in the market place and a broad cash market will tend to 
provide for a continuous and orderly meeting of supply and demand 
forces. The last crucial attribute of this commodity approach 
indicates that cash market risk will have to be present in order that 
a futures market will come into existence; should all parties decide 
to eliminate each and every price fluctuation by using cash forward 
contracts, a futures market would not be interesting. This 
commodity approach has received a lot of attention and has 
increased our insight into the factors determining viable futures 
trade. However, the attributes considered to be necessary in this 
approach have proven themselves too strict to be used as criteria for 
futures market success. After all, different types of futures contracts 
have been developed (like the financial and other exotic futures) 
that do not have the attributes mentioned above, but are successful 
anyway. 
The contract design approach views the contract 
specification (standardization process of the contract) as the critical 
factor determining the viability of a futures market and hence 
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focuses on the technical aspects of the contract. Gray (1978) 
identified the importance of contract design. He argued that a 
contract must reflect the commercial movement of a commodity 
both closely and broadly enough, such that price distortions will not 
be a result of specifications in the contract. To warrant hedging, the 
contract must be as close a substitute for the cash commodity as 
possible (Thompson, Garcia and Dallafior 1994). Johnston and 
McConnell (1989) have shown that the hedging effectiveness is an 
important determinant in explaining the success of futures contracts 
and as a result considerable attention has been paid to the hedging 
effectiveness of futures contracts. Authors who have proposed 
measures of hedging effectiveness include Chang and Fang (1990), 
Ederington(1979) and Pennings and Meulenberg (see Chapters 5 
and 6). However, high hedging effectiveness does not form any 
guarantee for success, since entrepreneurs may very well evaluate 
the hedging service provided by futures exchanges along other 
criteria than performance (that is hedging efficiency) alone, e.g. 
ease of use. 
2.2 Marketing Approach Towards Hedging Services 
The marketing approach tries to provide an answer to the 
question whether the hedging services provided by the futures 
exchange are able to satisfy the needs of potential customers. Often, 
alternative products or services will be available to meet the needs 
of the entrepreneur, which is why the marketing pays a lot of 
attention to the customer's decision making process. In this book 
we concentrate on the entrepreneur's decision making process 
regarding price risk management instruments. Knowing how the 
customer reaches a decision and why he or she decides the way he 
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or she does, gives the marketer clues as to how to market the 
hedging service. Since needs constitute the starting point in 
marketing, we shall first elaborate on the needs for hedging. 
The total set of customer needs with respect to a futures 
contract can be differentiated into instrumental needs and 
convenience needs (see Figure 1). The customer will choose that 
"service-product" (futures, options, cash forwards, etc.) which best 
satisfies his or her total set of needs, both instrumental and 
convenience, at an acceptable price. 
Instrumental 
needs 
• price risk reduction (hedging) Total set of 
needs 
Convenience 
needs 
• efficient clearing 
• flexibility 
Figure 1 Total set of needs 
Instrumental needs are the hedgers' needs for price risk 
reduction. Hedgers wish to reduce, or, if possible, eliminate 
portfolio risks at low cost. There are several different ways of 
managing price risks. The instrumental needs are related to the core 
service of the futures market, which consists of reducing price 
variability to the customer. These instrumental needs express 
themselves through hedgers, taking a hedge position in the futures 
market. An entrepreneur who is highly risk-averse may satisfy this 
need by hedging systematically, that is hedging all products that 
carry risk (therewith choosing a hedge ratio of 1). Not only do 
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hedgers wish to reduce price risk, they also want things like 
flexibility in doing business and an efficient clearing system. These 
needs are called convenience needs. They reflect the customer's 
need to be able to use the core service provided by the exchange 
with relative ease. The extent to which the futures exchange is able 
to satisfy the convenience needs determines the process quality 
(Gronroos 1990). The service offering is not restricted to the core 
service, but has to be complemented by so-called peripheral 
services. The core plus peripheral services constitute the augmented 
service offering (Gronroos 1990; Kotler 1988; Ozment and Morash 
1994). An example of a futures market's peripheral service is the 
efficient and correct conclusion of transactions. 
Both types of needs can be met by the futures market. In 
order to indicate which futures market division mainly satisfies the 
instrumental needs and which the convenience needs, we will first 
review in a nutshell the business organization of the futures market. 
The futures market can be divided into two identities, namely: the 
"floor" and the "clearing house". The "floor" is where the actual 
transactions take place. The word "floor" has been put between 
quotation marks, because futures markets exist that literally do not 
have a floor anymore, the traditional trading place having been 
replaced with an electronic trading system. On the floor, the 
brokers execute customers' orders. Therefore, the floor can be seen 
as the place where mainly instrumental needs are being met. After 
all, the execution of an order means a hedge position has been 
taken in the futures market, which reduces the customer's price 
risk. After the execution has taken place, the clearing house takes 
care of the financial settlement and, in the case of actual delivery, 
makes sure that the commodities that are delivered meet the 
contract specifications. Therefore, the clearing house can be said to 
meet mainly convenience needs. 
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After having analyzed the customer's needs marketing will 
engage in designing the service and in developing the service 
delivery process. Both the service design and the service delivery 
process affect the nature of the customer's service experience (Rust 
and Oliver 1993; Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham 1996). 
Discriminatory features of services as compared to 
commodities have a substantial impact on the service design 
process (de Brentani 1989; 1991). Intangibility presents a challenge 
to new service development, because it requires the management of 
the futures exchange to cooperate closely with customers and to 
stress the use of tangible cues to make the service more physical 
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1985). Tangible cues in the 
futures industry are the trading floor, the information provided by 
the trading system and the clearing system. Furthermore, 
intangibility may reduce the time needed to complete the new 
product development process for services. As a result, the futures 
industry may be able to respond more quickly and effectively to 
customers' needs. However, since services can be easily imitated 
("me-too" products) there is a proliferation of similar services in 
the futures industry (de Brentani 1991; Easingwood 1986). Specific 
to futures as a financial service is the time between the placement 
of the order and the actual execution of the order, which determines 
the financial result of a service (Pennings et al. 1998). 
In the services sector, the personal interaction between 
service provider and customer lies at the heart of most operations 
and therefore service delivery plays an important part. (Bitner and 
Booms 1996; Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham 1996). This interaction 
is sometimes referred to as the service encounter (Czepiel, 
Solomon, Surprenant and Gutman 1985) or "moment of truth" 
(Norman 1991). Simultaneous production and consumption entails 
that both customers and futures exchange interact closely at the 
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time of the first service encounter and on subsequent service 
encounters in later stages of the relationship (Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml and Berry 1985; Shostack 1984). The interactions 
between the brokers of the exchange and customers influence the 
quality of the service delivery process in the futures industry 
(Pennings 1998). 
In most cases, more than one instrument will be available to 
meet the entrepreneur's needs for price risk reduction. This makes 
it interesting to know how the entrepreneur chooses between these 
alternatives. In order to gain insight into this, the entrepreneur's 
choice behavior concerning price risk management instruments 
must be investigated. Insight into the choice process provides the 
marketer with clues about the characteristics a futures contract has 
to have in order to be preferred over the other alternatives. The 
entrepreneur compares the alternatives on the basis of different 
attributes or dimensions like e.g. the alternative's risk reduction 
capacity. The entrepreneur's choice for any particular alternative 
depends on the importance placed by the entrepreneur on these 
attributes as well as on how the alternatives differ with respect to 
these attributes in the entrepreneur's evaluation. Insight into these 
attributes and the variables influencing them, provide the 
management of the futures exchange with a framework for 
improving service design and service delivery. Moreover, insight 
into why the entrepreneur chooses the way he or she does provide 
valuable information in efficiently identifying certain target groups 
and customizing services. Because the entrepreneur is confronted 
with alternatives during the choice process, the choice process may 
well bring to the surface latent needs (often convenience needs). 
This, in turn, influences service design and service delivery, be it 
indirectly (see the left branch of Figure 3). 
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2.3 Marketing and Finance Approach Towards Hedging 
Services 
We hold that an integration of both approaches, the 
marketing and finance approach, is necessary for a full 
understanding of the ftmctioning of a futures market. The financial 
approach defines the necessary conditions which financial services 
have to meet. This approach focuses on the necessary technical 
characteristics of hedging which have to be fulfilled, in order to 
obtain a viable futures contract. In that sense it takes a normative 
approach. However, fulfilling these necessary conditions does not 
guarantee the market success of financial services. The success or 
failure of these services also depends on the extent to which 
financial services satisfy the needs of potential customers at 
competitive prices. It is a point of view familiar in marketing: 
products and services are determined on the basis of the customers' 
needs (Churchill and Peter 1995). Next, it is investigated which 
criteria and attributes underlie the decision process of the 
entrepreneur. These underlying dimensions provide the exchange 
with valuable information for adjusting service design and service 
delivery in such a way that the entrepreneur will prefer the service 
offered over the other alternatives. 
A combination of the marketing approach, "which service is 
desirable from the customer point of view and what is the 
customer's choice behavior" and the financial approach, "which 
service is feasible from the technical point of view" seems a useful 
route when developing new hedging services. The type of 
information used is characteristic for both approaches and therefore 
crucial to understanding in what respect the financial approach 
differs from the marketing approach (see Figure 2). The financial 
approach makes use of technical information. Technical 
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information consists of prices, rates of returns, volumes of 
transactions and historical data on all these items at different 
locations and on different markets. 
Finance a p p r o a c h 
Technical 
information 
Financial 
service 
Technical 
feasibility 
M a r k e t i n g a p p r o a c h 
Customer 
specific 
information 
Customer 
Financial needs 
and 
customer 
choice behavior 
In teg ra t ion 
Economic 
feasibility? 
Technical 
feasibility? 
Marketing 
issue 
T 
Marketing-Finance 
approach 
Finance 
issue 
Figure 2 The marketing- finance approach 
The marketing approach draws on customer-specific 
information. The latter type of information includes time 
preferences, choice criteria, investment opportunities, and the risk 
preferences of individual economic agents. Customer-specific 
information is essential for determining market needs and profit 
opportunities. A problem of financial institutions vis-à-vis 
customers may be information asymmetries, such as hidden 
information and hidden action, which might result in adverse 
selection and moral hazard (see Dietrich 1996). The cost of 
information asymmetry can be reduced by marketing research if the 
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expected value of perfect information is positive (Dietrich 1996; 
Lovelock 1996). Customer-specific information is also useful in 
selecting target markets. Targeting market segments and designing 
effective positioning strategies require managers to have an insight 
into how the attributes of a service-product are valued by current 
and prospective customers. Customer-specific information can 
provide that insight (Lovelock 1996). 
It is often difficult to derive from the marketing approach 
alone the successful functional and technical properties of financial 
services. On the other hand, it remains unclear whether the feasible 
properties of financial services as determined in the financial 
approach generate sufficient demand. It seems, therefore, that the 
financial and marketing approach to financial services, whether 
from the perspective of supply- or demand side, complement each 
other in the process of developing, producing and marketing 
financial services. 
Figure 3 presents a conceptual framework that contains both 
approaches to help acquire a better understanding of the factors that 
contribute to the success of futures markets. It also shows the 
subjects that need deepening within both approaches. 
In order to optimize futures exchanges policy, the financial 
and marketing approach will have to be integrated. Both 
approaches nourish each other with information, thus producing 
feedbacks from one approach to the other, as represented in 
Figure 3. Thus, the marketing approach will furnish information 
about the characteristics that the futures contract needs to be chosen 
by the entrepreneur, whereas the finance approach will determine 
the technical feasibility of such a contract and e.g. deduct the 
implications for the optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness. 
This information, then, is important for service design and service 
delivery. Moreover, this information can indicate where and how 
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the characteristics of a futures contract need adaptation on technical 
grounds. 
Needs 
• instrumental 
• convenience 
Alternative 
price risk 
management 
instruments 
Choice 
behavior 
of customers 
liquidity *~ cash market size 
hedging 
efficiency • homogeneity 
Technical 
feasibility 
Underlying 
commodity 
characteristics 
Service design 
Service delivery 
Futures exchange 
Figure 3 A Synthesis of the financial marketing approach: a conceptual 
framework for hedging services 
Within the domain of these two partial approaches much 
research has to be done in order to improve our understanding of 
futures markets. In this book we consider three subject fields worth 
understanding in more detail: risks associated with futures (i.e. 
hedging efficiency), discussed in Parti, the decision making 
process of entrepreneurs regarding futures contracts, discussed in 
Part U and the characteristics and viability of an innovative futures 
contract, in our case rights futures, discussed in Part III. 
P A R T I 
PART I RISKS IN FUTURES 
MARKETS: A FINANCE APPROACH 
There is a vast literature which takes the financial approach 
to futures markets. However, the fact that hedging not only lifts 
risks, but also may introduce risks has received limited attention 
yet. In fact, next to reducing risk, hedging on futures markets also 
introduces risks that cannot be covered. Therefore, in this part of 
the book we analyze the different sources of risk in hedging. Our 
research focuses on two aspects: the lack of market depth and 
measures of hedging effectiveness. Despite the fact that the finance 
literature has paid much attention to the bid-ask spread, it is the 
price path due to order imbalances which determines the costs a 
hedger incurs when trading in a market with a lack of market depth. 
The problem of market depth risk is particularly important for 
relatively small commodity futures markets. Due to their small 
scale, they often lack market depth, which results in relatively high 
hedging costs, inhibiting the growth of futures contract volume. 
Analysis of the price path due to order imbalances can provide us 
with information about the underlying dimensions of market depth. 
Insight into these dimensions can give the management clues to 
improve market depth. 
The risks originating from trading at futures markets also 
influence the futures market's hedging effectiveness. However 
current measures do not take into account these risks, such as 
market depth risk. Therefore, we extend the existing hedging 
effectiveness measures by the market depth component, enabling 
the hedger to evaluate better the different futures markets along 
their over-all risk-reduction capacity. We propose a measure which 
looks at hedging effectiveness from a hedger's perspective. However, 
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this measure holds relatively little information for a futures 
exchange management on how to improve hedging effectiveness. 
For this reason we also develop another hedging effectiveness 
measure taking the futures exchange management perspective. This 
measure is able to divide the distance between the perfect hedge 
and the actual hedge into a systematic part, which is controllable by 
the futures market, and a random part, which cannot be influenced 
by the futures exchange. The two hedging effectiveness measures 
developed are complementary. The first measure focuses on the 
performance of a portfolio, whereas the second measure is 
concerned with the quality of the hedging service provided by the 
futures exchange. 
CHAPTER 3 
Hedging Risk in Agricultural Futures 
Markets 1 
3.1 Abstract 
Futures contracts are potential price-risk management 
instruments for hedgers. While much research has been done on the 
valuation of these instruments, little is known about the risks of using 
futures contracts. Hedgers must be aware of the risks associated with 
hedging which we analyze in this chapter. By analyzing the capacity of 
futures contracts for reducing risk, we provide the management of the 
futures exchange a better understanding of the pros and cons of futures 
contracts as instruments for price-risk reduction. 
3.2 Introduction 
There are two general sources of risk to hedgers2, quantity 
risk and price risk. Quantity risk is a farm-specific phenomenon 
caused by a myriad of random factors such as disease and weather 
conditions. Price risk is a market phenomenon caused by random 
changes in the aggregate quantity of a good demanded or supplied 
(Dwight 1985). This chapter focuses on price risk. This type of risk 
has become more relevant to hedgers in both the United States (US) 
and the European Union (EU) because of the free-trade policy of 
1 This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.T.G. Meulenberg 
(1997), "Hedging Risk in Agricultural Futures Markets", in: Wierenga, B., 
K. Grunert, J.B.E.M. Steenkamp and M. Wedel (eds), Agricultural Marketing 
and Consumer Behavior in a Changing World. Boston, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers pp. 125-140. 
2 Note that the words hedger and farmer are used interchangeably. 
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the GATT and the reforms of the common agricultural policy of the 
EU. 
Because of increased fluctuations in agricultural prices, 
some exchanges are creating new futures contracts. Recently, the 
Marche" a Terme International de France in Paris has introduced 
rapeseed futures contracts. On the one hand, price risk in the cash 
market can be decreased using futures, while on the other hand, 
futures generate additional risks. Understanding the capacity of 
futures to reduce overall risk is important. (Jolly 1983; Bosch and 
Johnson 1992). Actually, the lack of understanding by hedgers and 
firms, in general, about how to use futures has caused many failures 
in price-risk management (Figlewski, Landskroner and Silber 1991; 
Edwards and Canter 1995). 
The contribution of this chapter on price-risk management 
by hedgers is twofold. First, in contrast to other studies, this chapter 
takes into account that futures not only reduce cash price risk but 
also introduce hedging risk3. This element of hedging efficiency has 
a great influence on the capacity of the futures contract to eliminate 
overall risk. Second, hedging risk is analyzed in all of its 
components. Furthermore, the influence of the interaction between 
those components on the hedging risk is examined. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, a general 
framework of hedging efficiency is proposed. Second, the risks 
introduced by futures are analyzed. In order to illustrate how large 
the hedging risk can be for hedgers using futures, the hedging risk 
for the potato futures contract traded on the Amsterdam 
Agricultural Futures Exchange is measured. 
3 Note that the words hedging risk and futures trading risk are used interchangeably. 
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3.3 Hedging Efficiency 
Three hedging theories can be distinguished. First, 
traditional hedging theory emphasizes the potential of futures 
markets to avoid risk: cash positions are hedged by taking an equal 
but opposite position in the futures market. A second theory 
(Working 1962) suggests that hedgers operate like speculators, 
being primarily interested in relative prices rather than absolute 
ones. According to Working, holders of a long position in the cash 
market hedge if they expect the basis to fall, but not if a rise is 
expected. The latest and the most common theory nowadays is the 
portfolio approach. In this approach the risk of price changes is 
introduced into the hedging model by a variance function. 
Moreover, a frontier is traced, showing a relationship between 
variance and expected returns. 
These measures are concerned with the minimization of the 
risk of the portfolio of the spot commodity and the futures contract 
or with finding some optimal balance between risk and return. All 
these measures implicitly assume that the futures contract is 
perfect, i.e., introduces no risks. However, futures contracts do 
introduce risks which have an impact on the variance of the 
hedger's returns. Furthermore, these risks have an impact on the 
success of a futures contract and are, therefore, of great interest 
both to the management of the futures exchange and the hedger. 
A futures contract which is able to set a certain price 
without introducing other risks best fulfills the hedger's need for 
hedging. However, the hedger will not always use this particular 
futures contract, since the decision is also influenced by the cost 
involved in futures trading, i.e., commission costs and margin 
requirements. The hedger will weigh the costs involved in futures 
trading against the satisfaction he or she derives from the futures 
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contract. Therefore, we propose to define hedging efficiency as the 
capacity of the futures contract to reduce the overall risk in relation 
to the cost involved in futures trading (because we include the costs 
we speak of hedging efficiency as opposed to hedging effectiveness 
which does not include the costs). For both the futures exchange 
and the hedger it is important to know how well the services 
provided by the futures contract meet the needs of the hedger. The. 
proposed concept of hedging efficiency assesses how well the 
futures exchange is able to achieve this goal. Figure 1 illustrates our 
concept of hedging efficiency. 
The capacity of the futures contract to reduce total risk in 
relation to the trading costs involved is the hedging service which 
the futures exchange provides. Two factors are important for the 
futures exchange: whether it meets the need of the hedgers with 
respect to overall risk reduction, and whether it can compete with 
competitive futures exchanges on that point. In this chapter, we 
elaborate on the futures trading risk, i.e. the upper-left part of 
Figure 1 denoted by the dotted line. In Chapter 6 we will derive a 
hedging efficiency measure, on the basis of the proposed concept of 
hedging efficiency. 
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Figure 1 Proposed concept of hedging efficiency 
3.4 Risks in Futures Trading 
Because the futures market offers a price-risk-management 
service, this service preferably should not generate additional risk. 
When the futures market introduces no hedging risk, we refer to the 
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futures contract as a perfect futures contract which generates a price 
for the short hedger in period t + 1 of: 
ARPt+1 = CPM + {PFt - PFt+i - TC) = PFt - TC (1) 
where ARP is the actual realised price, CP the local cash price, PF 
the futures price, PFt - PFt+1 the liftings value and TC the 
roundturn brokerage costs4. 
However, in practice we observe that the actual price 
realized ARP1+l is often not equal to the net futures price 
PFt - TC for which the hedger enters the futures market. Hence, 
the hedger is exposed to hedging risk, where hedging risk is defined 
as the distance between the price for which the hedger enters the 
futures market corrected for transaction costs, PFt - TC, and the 
actual price after the hedger has liquidated the futures position, 
ARPt+l, regardless of whether this distance is positive or negative. 
Hedging risk can be broken down into the following 
elements: basis risk, lumpiness, market depth risk and margin risk 
(Perinings 1997). These elements are analyzed for hedging price 
risk for hedgers. 
3.4.1 Basis Risk 
It is generally recognized that futures markets can be used 
by hedgers to hedge the risks associated with price fluctuations in 
the underlying spot market (Grossman 1986). Any deviation in the 
cash-futures-price relationship at the settlement date will be 
4 We could equally well have used a long hedger in this example, because a 
distinction is not essential for the derivation of the hedging risk. 
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eliminated. However, if the arbitrage transaction costs are high, the 
necessary convergence of the cash and futures prices will be 
countered, thereby introducing a risk to the hedger and negatively 
affecting participation in futures markets. The basis between a 
futures contract and its underlying commodity is an important 
measure of the cost of using the futures contract to hedge. In a 
cross-hedge, the relative size of the basis of alternative hedging 
vehicles often plays a decisive role in the selection of the optimal 
hedging vehicle (Castelino et al. 1991). Basis risk is attributed to 
location, quality and timing discrepancies between commodities 
traded in the cash market and those deliverable on futures (Paroush 
and Wolf 1989). In the case of futures indexes, unanticipated 
variation in dividends may involve basis risk (Figlewski 1984; 
Brennan and Schwartz 1990). The unpredictability of the basis 
presents hedgers with a risk that is unhedgable, as is outlined by 
Figlewski (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1990). Explanations 
for the variability in the basis include the marking-to-market 
requirement for futures contracts, the differential tax treatment of 
spot and futures, as well as the difficulties in arbitrating between 
large cash positions and futures. Kumar and Seppi (1994) find that 
arbitrage reduces basis volatility. 
The existence of basis risk, which is specific to futures 
markets and does not exist in cash forward markets, introduces an 
element of speculation in the sense that hedgers are still exposed to 
this risk while hedging their physical commodity. In a recent 
article, Netz(1996) shows that basis risk not only affects the 
futures position but also the cash-market position for all hedging by 
risk-averse agents. Numerous articles provide statistical models for 
predicting the basis (Naik and Leuthold 1988; Trapp and Eilrich 
1991; Liu etal. 1994), although researchers find it difficult to 
forecast. 
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3.4.2 Lumpiness 
Hedgers can specify forward contracts which correspond 
with the quantity they have available for sale, in contrast to futures 
contracts which are traded in standard quantities. Therefore, a 
futures hedge may not exactly match the amount of the desired sale 
or purchase, and lumpiness causes a proportion of the cash position 
to remain exposed to uncertain changes in price. Note that if the 
quantity to be hedged increases, the relative importance of 
lumpiness declines and ultimately approaches zero. 
3.4.3 Market Depth Risk 
Market depth risk is the risk the hedger faces from a sudden 
price decrease or increase due to order imbalances; this risk seems 
important to systematic hedgers, particularly in thin markets. Kyle 
(1985) defines market depth as the volume of unanticipated order 
flows which move prices by one unit. Sudden price changes may 
occur in cases of both long and short hedges. If a relatively small 
market sell (buy) order arrives, the transaction price is the bid (ask) 
price. For a relatively large market sell (buy) order, several 
transaction prices are possible, at lower and lower (higher and 
higher) prices, depending on the size of the order and the number of 
traders available. If the sell order is large, the price should keep 
falling to attract additional traders to take the other side of the 
order. Given a constant equilibrium price in a deep market, 
relatively large market orders result in a smaller divergence in 
transaction prices from the underlying equilibrium price than in a 
thin market. The generally known factors which determine market 
depth, and in general liquidity, include: the amount of trading 
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activity5 or the time rate of transactions during the trading period; 
the ratio of trading activity by speculators and scalpers to overall 
trading activity; equilibrium price variability; the size of a market 
order (transaction); expiration-month effect; and market structure6 
(Black 1986; Thompson and Waller 1987; Christie and Schultz 
1994; Chan and Lakonishok 1995; Christie and Schultz 1995). 
According to Lippman and McCall (1986) the deepness of the 
market for a commodity increases with the frequency of offers. 
Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) report a relation between market 
depth and trading strategies of market participants. Passive 
participants wait for the opposite side of their trade to arrive, but 
the active ones seek immediate transaction. Passive participants 
may avoid depth costs, whereas active ones generally incur depth 
costs. Some exchanges monitor temporary order imbalances, i.e., 
market depth risk, and slow down the trade process if these are 
present (Affleck-Graves, Hegde and Miller 1994). For example, an 
order-book official issues warning quotas when trading results in 
price changes that are larger than maximums allowed by the 
exchange and halts trading when order execution results in price 
changes that exceed exchange-mandated maximums (Lehmann and 
Modest 1994). In general, an individual hedger who manages a 
family farm needs only a few futures contracts to hedge his 
underlying cash position because of the large size of the futures 
contract relative to the cash position. For that reason the market 
depth costs are probably relatively small. However, for traders or 
cooperatives that wish to hedge price risks on behalf of a group of 
3 In the literature, trading activity is often used as an indicator for market 
liquidity. However, Park and Sarkar (1994) showed that, in the case of the S&P 
500 index futures contract, changes in trading activity levels may be poor 
indicators of changes in market liquidity. 
6 This is not meant to be exhaustive. 
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hedgers, market depth costs may be large. Hedgers can eliminate 
market depth costs if they give orders with limit prices to a broker. 
However, if they use limit prices, hedgers may run the risk that 
their trade cannot be executed. 
3.4.4 Margin Risk 
The net cost arising from futures margin requirements 
consists of the opportunity costs of the initial margin requirement 
and the opportunity cost of marking to market (i.e., marking to 
market means that if futures prices fluctuate, those who hold losing 
positions must add to their margin accounts, while winners may 
withdraw their surpluses). Hedgers holding losing positions incur 
actual and opportunity interest costs. These income and cost flows 
compound over the span of the futures hedge. The margin cost is 
more significant if the time horizon of the hedge increases. Thus, 
futures in agricultural commodities with relatively long growth and 
storage periods, such as potatoes (time horizon of about one year), 
incur more margin costs than hogs, where there is no storage period 
and the growth period is short (time horizon of about three 
months). 
3.5 Model 
In order to gain insight into the consequences of hedging 
risk for the hedger, a microeconomic approach is adopted towards 
hedging. In this chapter, risk is measured by the variance. The 
variance is a measure of how much the outcomes vary or differ 
from one another. Note that in this chapter risk is represented by the 
variance of returns. 
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Consider a hedger who systematically hedges his output and 
intends to sell the output in period T on the cash market. The 
hedger can now use futures based on different strategies to manage 
price risk. The strategy of a hedger depends on whether the desired 
time period T equals the maturity of the futures M. If T = M, 
the hedger offsets his position and sells the commodity in the cash 
market or he holds the position and makes delivery7. Whether the 
hedger offsets his position or makes delivery depends on the 
standardization requirements, the search cost in the cash market, 
and the market depth cost in the futures markets. If T * M, the 
hedger can only liquidate his position by offsetting the original 
futures contract. Figure 2 depicts the decision tree of the hedger for 
hedging output with futures. 
Temporal situation T = M T*M 
Possible futures 
liquidation 
Offset and sell 
in cash market 
81(1) 
Offset and sell 
in cash market 
Sl(3) 
Figure 2 Hedging strategies in the case of futures 
The revenue of a hedger who hedges his output when the 
delivery date for the commodity equals the maturity date of the 
futures can be expressed as: 
7 Making delivery on a futures contract is only possible when the cash position of 
the hedger is equal to the underlying commodity of the futures contract, which is 
seldom the case. 
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U, = n(PFt - CPT) + (q - n)CPT+ nCPr ( 2 ) 
+ rS? - nMDC - nTC - T - n7mm 
where Ilx is the revenue at the end of the period when the delivery 
date for the commodity equals the maturity of the futures, n is the 
futures quantity sold, q is the output produced, BsTq is the spatial 
and quality dimensions of the basis at the end of the period, MDC 
the market depth costs, Ie is the initial margin costs and Imm is the 
marking-to-market costs. A tilde (~) denotes a random variable. 
Lumpiness is expressed as q - n, i.e., the quantity which cannot 
be hedged because of the standardized units of the futures contract. 
We assume that the hedger wishes to hedge his underlying 
cash position completely. It can be shown that a full hedge is not 
always optimal for the hedger. However, for simplification, we 
assume a full hedge, which does not affect our conclusions. 
The revenue of a hedger who hedges his output when the 
delivery date of the commodity is unequal to the maturity date of 
the futures can be expressed as: 
n 2 = Sj+ n4em (3) 
where n 2 is the revenue at the end of the period when the delivery 
date for the commodity is unequal to the maturity date of the 
futures contract, and B*m is the temporal dimension of the basis. 
To determine the hedging risk, it is necessary to determine 
the covariance matrix of the stochastic variables contributing to the 
hedging risk. The covariance matrix can be represented by: 
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where a] represents the variance of the random variable x, and 
G x y represents the covariance between the random variables x and y. 
By letting b' = (q - n, n, n, -n, -n), the variance of the 
revenue can be expressed as: a n = b'Qb. 
The covariance matrix provides insight into the underlying 
structure of hedging risk. If there is no lumpiness, i.e., n equals q, 
the influence of cash-price uncertainty can be entirely eliminated. 
Thus, for large hedgers (i.e. farmers) and cooperatives which represent 
a group of farmers, the lumpiness will not be large. However, if a 
large farmer or cooperative enters the market with many contracts, 
in contrast to a small farmer who enters the futures market with 
only a few futures contracts, they may face market depth-cost risk. 
Knowing the characteristics of the underlying structure of market 
depth cost is helpful in order to reduce this risk (see Chapter 4). 
The interaction between the components of the hedging risk 
are represented by the covariances. For the hedger it is important to 
understand the interactions between the hedging risk components. 
For example, from a theoretical point of view, it is expected that 
the covariance between the basis (both the temporal dimension and 
spatial and quality dimension) and the market depth influence the 
variance of the revenue when the futures market is relatively thin 
and the underlying commodity of the futures contract is not exactly 
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equal to the cash position of the hedger. An example makes this 
clear. Suppose a potato producer goes short the April 1996 contract 
traded on the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange at 
30 Dutch Guilders. Now, suppose that in April 1996 when he enters 
the market to lift his hedge, the current basis is 0.5 Dutch Guilders. 
He buys to cover bis short position, and because of a lack of market 
depth, the transaction pushes the price upward, so that the actual 
basis is 0.1 Dutch Guilders. Thus, the market depth risk has 
actually decreased the hedging risk and, hence, improved the 
hedging effectiveness (Pennings and Meulenberg 1997). 
The covariance matrix not only provides information for 
hedgers but also for the management of the futures exchange. The 
futures exchange has tools, such as the futures contract 
specification and the trading system, which may affect the elements 
of the covariance matrix thereby affecting the hedging efficiency 
(Pennings and Meulenberg 1997). For example, the basis may, to 
some extent, be managed by the futures exchange. A futures 
contract specification which resembles the cash position reduces 
basis risk. The futures exchange can also reduce market depth risk 
by using a mechanism to slow down the trading process if order 
imbalances occur and to attract market depth by reporting these (cfr 
earlier this chapter). Also, order book information may be 
improved; one mechanism that allows potential participants to view 
real-time limit orders, by displaying the desired prices and 
quantities at which participants would like to trade, affects market 
depth because participants can now observe how many contracts 
can be traded at the quoted price. We may conclude that insight into 
the covariance matrix provides the hedger with information about 
the risk he is facing when using futures and provides the 
management of the futures exchange with insight into their hedging 
services. To determine the hedging risk for potato growers, a 
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simulation was conducted by applying our model to data from the 
Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
3.6 Illustration 
The hedging risk is measured using data on the potato 
futures contract traded at the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures 
Exchange (ATA). The potato futures contract is a relatively 
successful futures contract. In fact, the volume generated is large 
relative to competitive potato futures contracts in Europe. With the 
aid of transaction-specific data, it was possible to measure the 
hedging risk run by trading potato futures contract for delivery 
April 1996. Because only transaction-specific data for period 
February 1995 to June 1995 were available, the time horizon of the 
simulation was limited. Thus, no distinction could be made 
between the temporal basis and the spatial and quality basis. The 
period captured the preharvest period for potato growth and the 
marketing cycle. This implied that the basis between the cash prices 
for February to June 1995 and the price of futures for April 1996 
included the full storage costs for the harvest period of 
September 1995 to April 1996. Therefore, changes in the basis in 
the sample period are not due to changes in storage costs. It is 
assumed that the estimated variance of the cash price and the 
variance of the basis in the sample were constant over time, 
because these are characteristics of the market. 
The covariance matrix Q was calculated using the Rotterdam 
potato cash prices, the closing prices for potato futures and on the 
basis of transaction-specific data collected by the clearing corporation. 
The market depth costs for an order selling imbalance were 
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calculated as the area between the downward-sloping price path and 
the price for which the hedger enters the futures market, 
MDC = PF1 • N - £ (PF') (4) 
where PFl is the futures price for which the hedger enters the 
market and N the total order flow. 
The market depth costs for an order buying imbalance were 
calculated as the area between the upward-sloping price path and 
the price for which the hedger enters the futures market, 
MDC = £ (PF1) - PF1 • N (5) 
¡=1 
From the data, it was impossible to infer the exact split 
between an increasing and decreasing price path, since prices are 
constant for several contracts in the local minimum or maximum. 
Therefore, we followed the following procedure: for an odd number 
of intersecting contracts we used the middle contract, whereas for 
an even number of constant contracts a random assignment with 
equal probabilities was used to determine the split. Subsequently, 
all order-specific market depth costs were converted into daily 
market depth costs per futures contract. The margin costs depend 
on the price of the futures contracts sold. The margin costs were 
calculated for several prices on the basis of a debit interest rate of 
5% and a credit interest rate of 4%. 
The amount of output which the farmer wishes to hedge q 
the output produced n and the price which the farmer has locked in 
the futures market PF were specified ex ante (see Table 1). 
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Four combinations of n and q were examined to investigate 
the sensitivity of the results for lumpiness. For every combination 
of n and q eventeen different futures price levels for which the 
farmer enters the futures market were looked at. Table 1 
summarizes the combinations of n, and PF ed in the analysis. 
Table 1 Research design for calculating the variance of returns in case of price 
risk management by futures for different values of the futures position n, cash 
position q and futures price PF 
n <7 PF 
*h = 1 01 = 1 PF, = 23, 24, 25 
26, 27, 29,31, 33, 
35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 
60, 65, 70, 75 
n2 = 1 11 = 1.5 PFt idem 
n3 = 10 = 10 PF, idem 
« 4 = 10 = 10.5 PFi idem 
Chapter 3 
55^ 
45-
3 5 -
25 L r r ^ , , , , 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
PF 
Figure 3 Variance of revenues (see Equations 2 and 3) introduced by the potato 
futures contract traded at the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange 
The results of our simulation suggest that the effect of 
lumpiness on the hedging risk of the potato futures contract 
decreases when the output that a farmer wishes to hedge increases. 
Furthermore, the hedging risk does not significantly depend on the 
price at which farmers enter the futures market. Thus, the market 
depth risk in the potato futures market is relatively low compared 
with the cash-price risk and basis risk. This result is in accordance 
with previous research where it was concluded that the potato 
market is relatively deep with respect to other futures contracts, 
such as hogs futures, which are also being traded on the ATA (see 
Chapter 4). The covariance matrices suggest that the variance 
introduced by the potato futures can be attributed mainly to the 
basis. 
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3.7 
n = 1 ; q = 1.5 
n=10;q=10.5 
n = l ; q = l 
n=10;q=10 
Results 
The variance per futures contract is given in Figure 3 . 
65 i 1 
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From the empirical results, we conclude that futures 
introduce risk, which must be taken into account by farmers who 
manage price risks. Farmers can reduce those risks, especially risks 
due to lumpiness, by not hedging their cash position individually, 
but by jointly hedging their cash positions. An agricultural 
cooperative could do so by trading futures for a group of farmers. 
Although the benefits associated with risk reductions are 
important factors in motivating the farmers to engage in futures 
trading, we are aware that potential users may also be heavily 
influenced by their subjective assessments of the performance and 
reliability of a futures market (see Chapter 8). 
3.8 Conclusions 
As agricultural markets become freer, price volatility will 
increase, and thus, the need for hedging will also increase. The 
increased opportunities for farmers to manage risk by using futures 
require a better understanding of the risks involved. In contrast to 
earlier research, we examined the decrease in price risk through 
hedging as well as risks that futures introduce. Hedging with 
futures may lead to temporal basis risk, spatial and quality basis 
risk, market depth risk, marking-to-market risk and lumpiness. 
These risks are particularly important to farmers hedging their 
output on new and small futures exchanges. The empirical results 
show that the hedging risk in the potato futures market in 
Amsterdam decreases when more futures are used. Hence, farmers 
who cooperate in hedging their potatoes bear less risk than farmers 
who trade separately. The price for which the farmers enter the 
market has almost no effect on hedging risk, i.e., marking-to-
market risk was relatively low. Further research which includes 
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other price-risk-management instruments is clearly called for in 
order to deepen the understanding of the risks introduced by those 
instruments and, hence, to provide insight into the optimal price-
risk management strategies for farmers. Research taking subjective 
performance into account is in progress. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Price Path Due to Order Imbalances: 
Evidence from the Amsterdam 
Agricultural Futures Exchange 1 
4.1 Abstract 
The lack of sufficient market depth, particularly in many newly 
initiated futures markets, results in relatively high hedging costs, and this 
inhibits the growth of futures contract volume. In this chapter the price path 
due to order imbalances is analyzed and a two-dimensional market depth 
measure is derived. Understanding the underlying structure of futures 
market depth provides the management of the futures exchange with a 
framework for improving their market depth and gives hedgers a better 
understanding of market depth risk. The managerial implications of our 
findings are demonstrated empirically, using data from the Amsterdam 
Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
4.2 Introduction 
A key aspect of futures market performance is the degree of 
liquidity in the market (Cuny 1993). The relationship between 
market depth and futures contract success has been thoroughly 
investigated in the literature (Black 1986). A futures market is 
considered liquid if traders and participants can buy or sell futures 
contracts quickly with little price effect resulting from their 
1 This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E., W.E. Kuiper, F. ter 
Hofstede and M.T.G. Meulenberg (1998), "The Price Path Due to Order 
Imbalances: Evidence from the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange", 
European Financial Management, 4 (1), 27-44. 
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transactions. However, in thin markets, the transactions of 
individual hedgers may have significant price effects and result in 
substantial 'transaction costs' (Thompson et al. 1993). 
These transaction costs are the premiums that traders are 
forced to pay or the discounts they are forced to accept in order to 
establish or close out futures positions (Ward and Behr 1983). 
Although, to some extent, hedgers can take positions mat offset 
each other, a futures market, if it is to be successful, should 
normally create more market depth in the form of attracting 
additional traders. 
In the literature, liquidity is often synonymous with width, 
represented by the bid-ask spread for a given number of futures. 
The bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity has some limitations. 
The price may change between the moment the market maker buys 
and sells, and the trader can earn much more or much less than the 
spread quoted at the time of the first transaction suggests. Hence, 
the trader faces costs due to changes in the bid-ask spread. Yet 
these costs are the essence of market liquidity (Grossman and 
Miller 1988). The concept of market depth (the number of 
securities that can be traded at given bid and ask quotas), an aspect 
of market liquidity, does not suffer from the limitations of the bid-
ask spread, however (Berkman 1993; Harris 1990; Kyle 1985). 
Therefore, we turn to an examination of market depth as a measure 
of liquidity. 
The objective of our study is to improve insights into 
market depth and the effect it may have on the performance of 
futures contracts and, in consequence, on the success of futures 
exchanges (Pennings and Meulenberg 1997). In the literature, 
measures of market depth have not explicitly considered the price 
path produced by temporary order imbalances. Often there is an 
implicit assumption of linearity and they allow only a limited 
The Market for Hedging Services 57 
understanding of the costs associated with lack of market depth. 
Thus the management of the exchange gets only a limited insight 
into how the problem of a lack of market depth should be dealt 
with. In this chapter, we propose and parameterize a model that 
pays explicit attention to the price path caused by temporary order 
imbalances. When we have more information about these price 
paths, we will be able to distinguish two dimensions of market 
depth that can be related to the toolbox of the futures exchange (the 
trading system and trading rules). Evaluating different (competing) 
futures contracts and futures exchanges along these dimensions can 
shed light on the performance of the futures contract as a price-risk 
management instrument. In addition, different trading systems and 
different trading rules can be evaluated along these dimensions. By 
doing so we can gain some insight into the performance of trading 
systems and trading rules. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.3 the 
measures of liquidity - and in particular the measures of market 
depth - are examined and Section 4.4 presents a hypothesis of the 
underlying structure of market depth from which a market depth 
price path model is then derived. The remainder of the chapter is 
concerned with the application of our model. Section 4.5 describes 
the dataset and gives some data transformations. Section 4.6 
presents an analysis of market depth for three selected futures 
contracts. In Section 4.7 the managerial implications for the 
management of the futures exchange are discussed and the results 
and main conclusions are summarized in Section 4.8. 
58 Chapter 4 
4.3 Measures of Liquidity, Particularly Market Depth 
Previous research developed measures of liquidity on the 
basis of indices usually represented by some weighting of trading 
activity (Working 1960; Larson 1961; Powers 1979; Ward and 
Behr 1974; Ward and Dasse 1977). An important element in these 
measures is the proportion of hedging to speculative trading 
volumes. Several researchers (Roll 1984; Gloston and Milgrom 
1985; Thompson and Waller 1987; Stoll 1989; Smith and Whaley 
1994) propose methods for an indirect estimation of liquidity costs. 
A liquidity cost proxy based on the estimated covariance of prices 
has been introduced by Roll (1984). Another accepted proxy for the 
bid-ask spread has been proposed by Thompson and Waller (1988), 
who argue that the average absolute value of price changes is a 
direct measure of the average execution cost of trading in a 
contract. Smith and Whaley (1994) use a method of moments 
estimator to determine the bid-ask spread. This estimator uses all 
successive price change data, and assumes that observed futures 
transaction prices are equally likely to occur at bid and ask. 
Market depth measures are rather scarce. Brorsen (1989) 
uses the standard deviation of the log price changes as a proxy for 
market depth. Lehmann and Modest (1994) study market depth by 
examining the adjustment of quotas to trades and the utilization of 
the chui kehai trading mechanism on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
where the chui kehai are warning quotas when a portion of the trade 
is executed at different prices. Utilizing the chui kehai trading 
mechanism can give an indication of market depth, but cannot be 
used to measure it. Other researchers such as Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1993) use both price volatility and open interest as a proxy 
for market depth. Common to all these market depth measures is 
the fact that they are based on transaction price variability (Huang 
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and Stall 1994, 1996) and implicitly assume that the price path due 
to temporary order imbalances is linear (see, for example, Kyle 
1985). Presumably, the price path will not be linear and particularly 
so where large orders are concerned. Therefore, we propose a non-
linear function which relates the futures price to successive trades. 
In the literature there are no measures that reflect the shape 
of the price path due to order imbalances, while it is this shape that 
provides insight into the underlying structure of market depth. The 
underlying structure of market depth is especially relevant to new 
commodity exchanges in Western and Eastern Europe because of 
the smaller scale of these exchanges (Kilcollin and Frankel 1993). 
Furthermore, the underlying structure of market depth is an 
important issue for the clearing houses with respect to the system of 
margining (Gemmill 1994; Goldberg and Hachey 1992). Insight 
into the underlying structure of market depth in combination with 
improvements in computer and telecommunications technology 
will lead to improvements in the structure of futures markets and 
financial institutions in general (Merton 1995). 
4.4 A Market Depth Model 
4.4.1 Conceptual Model 
Market depth is usually analyzed by determining the slope 
dPF 
, where PF is the futures price and Q is the quantity traded. 
As outlined in the previous section, current market depth measures 
are based on transaction price variability and implicitly assume the 
price path due to order imbalances to be linear. In this section we 
hypothesize that the price path arising from order imbalances can 
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be characterized by an S-shaped curve. During the occurrence of 
such an S-curve, the equilibrium price change is assumed to be 
constant.2 The price path is downward-sloping in the case of a sell 
order imbalance and upward-sloping in the case of a buy order 
imbalance (Working 1977; Kyle 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; 
Bessembinder and Seguin 1993). 
We conjecture that the market depth price path consists of 
four sequential phases, namely I) a sustainable phase, JJ) a lag-
adjustment phase, HI) a restoring phase, and IV) a recovery phase. 
Although we assume this four phase structure to hold for both 
upward- and downward-sloping price paths, we confine our 
discussion to a downward-sloping price path. 
Figure 1 depicts the price path of a sell order. On the vertical 
axis the fiitures price per contract traded is given. On the horizontal 
axis the successive contracts traded are given, where the serial 
number of the futures contract is denoted by i. i = 1 is the first 
contract traded, i = 2 is the second contract traded and so on. 
In the sustainable phase (Phase I) the first contracts are sold 
at or near the bid price because of outstanding bids in the brokers' 
order books. In this phase the already existing bids are almost or 
completely equal to the first bid price. For that reason, the initial 
price decline due to order imbalances is very moderate. However, 
2 There is a large volume of research in the literature (for example, French and 
Roll 1986; Fama 1991; Stein 1991; Foster and Viswanathan 1993; Holden and 
Subrahmanyam 1994; Oliver and Verrechia 1994; Hiraki et al. 1995) on 
information, market efficiency and market liquidity. In these articles, information 
refers to information relating to fundamental economic factors (supply and 
demand factors of the underlying 'commodity' of the futures contract traded). 
Theoretically, we can split price changes into changes due to fundamental 
economic factors and changes due to the fact that there is a temporary order 
imbalance. In this study, we concentrate on the latter. 
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after these bids have been 'used', the price must fall in order to 
match the next bid in the order book: this point will be called the 
'breaking point'. If the price path depicted in Figure 1 is denoted by 
PF(i), then the breaking point is located where the curvature 
d2PF 
(—Y~ (0) is maximized over i, where i = 1 is the first contract 
d r 
traded, i = 2 is the second contract traded and so on. 
Figure 1 Price pattern of a sell order in a thin market 
In the lag-adjustment phase (Phase II) it is not possible to 
find enough market depth at a justifiable price. The price falls 
because bids that have been in the order book for some time (and 
thus relatively low price bids) are now matched. This gives rise to 
substantial (compared with Phase I) opportunity costs, gains 
forgone, because the hedger cannot execute the order at the first bid 
price (Wagner and Edwards 1993). Important for the length of this 
interval and the scale of the price fall is the information provided 
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by the trading system (Keim and Madhavan 1995). The lag 
adjustment phase is situated in between the breaking point and the 
point of inflexion, the latter being located where the slope 
(dPF ..... . . . 
( (j)) is maximized over i. 
di 
During the 'lag-adjustment phase' the traders process the 
price decrease information. They will gradually enter the market 
after the price has fallen sufficiently (Grossman 1992). At that 
moment the restoring phase (Phase HI) begins. In this phase the 
prices fall further, but at a decreasing rate. Phase HI is situated in 
between the point of inflexion and the point where the curvature is 
minimized over i. 
In the recovery phase (Phase IV) the rate of price decrease 
slows down fast because more opposite orders enter the market as a 
consequence of information acquired by the participants. The recovery 
phase starts at the point where the curvature is minimized over i. It 
ends where the price reaches the resistance price level.3 Because the 
rate of price decrease is slowing down and the price gets close to 
the resistance price level, the participants gradually recognize that 
fundamental economic factors (supply and demand factors of the 
underlying commodity of the futures contract) cannot be causing 
the price change. This leads them to conclude that the price change 
is caused by order imbalances. In this phase participants tend to 
expect that the price will not fall any further or at least expect that 
the price will not decrease by more than the minimum tick size 
(Chordia and Subrahmanyam 1995). After the resistance price level 
has been reached, the price will not decrease further because the 
orders are now balanced. 
3 The resistance price level marks the upper and lower boundary between which 
the price fluctuates according to the participants if the equilibrium price is 
constant. The equilibrium price is determined by fundamental economic factors. 
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The market depth price path is caused by frictions in the 
market structure which includes the trading system and the rules of 
the exchange. The quality of the market information generated by 
the trading system regarding high price, low price, last price, size of 
last trade etc., is crucial for such frictions and hence, for the market 
depth price path (see Domowitz (1993a,b) for a description of 
trading systems and their impact on market depth). 
The S-shaped price path can only be identified ex post. 
Recognized market efficiency theory would suggest that the price 
would not adjust in a predictable way (Fama 1991). However, at the 
moment the price changes, the participants are not able to identify 
whether the price movement is due to fundamental economic 
factors causing a change in the equilibrium price or whether it is 
due to a lack of market depth generated by market frictions caused 
by the trading system itself. 
A priori we do not assume that the downward-sloping 
S-shaped price path is exactly the reverse of the upward-sloping 
price path. It is possible, for example, that there are many stop-loss 
buy orders and hardly any stop-loss sell ones and vice versa, thus 
causing dissimilarity between upward-sloping and downward-
sloping price paths (Chan and Lakonishok 1993). Nor do we 
assume the length of the four phases to be equal. In a market that is 
unable to absorb orders near the equilibrium price, for example, the 
sustainable phase will become rudimentary. 
4.4.2 Mathematical Specification of the Model 
In the mathematical model showing the conceptual model of 
market depth portrayed in Section 4.4.1, both sell and buy orders 
(downward- and upward-sloping price paths) are taken into 
account. An upward-sloping S-shaped path may well be 
64 Chapter 4 
approximated by a Gompertz curve, since this curve has a non-
symmetrical S-shape and thus, does not impose restrictions on the 
length of the different phases. The Gompertz model is a growth 
curve and can therefore only be used to describe an upward-sloping 
price path. However, subtracting a downward-sloping price path 
from an appropriate constant may establish an upward-sloping price 
path which will cover the four phases. Consequently, after 
transforming the data, the price path will always be upward-
sloping. We can describe the transformed price series using the 
Gompertz model given by 
TPF, = aexp(-pexp(-8/)) (1) 
where TPF, is the transformed price of futures contract i 
(i = 0,1,2,...,«) and a, P and 8 are positive parameters. Since the 
price path is restricted to start in the minimum tick size, TPF0 is 
equal to the minimum tick size. The parameter p is determined by 
both a and TPF0: p = In 
a . The parameters a and 8 of the 
Gompertz model capture two dimensions of market depth. The first 
dimension, represented by a minus the minimum tick size, 
indicates how far the price rises (falls) as a consequence of a lack of 
market depth. The second dimension, presented by 8, has a one-to-
one relation with the rate of adjustment, which, as we will show 
below, is equal to [1 - exp(-8)], see Chow (1967) and Franses 
(1994a,b). This rate of adjustment may be translated into costs in 
terms of price risk; the futures price may change before actual order 
execution. 
Taking natural logarithms of (1) yields 
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In (TPFt) = In a - P exp(-8z) (2) 
A convenient representation of the Gompertz process is obtained by 
subtracting In (TPF,^) from (2) which after some rewriting using 
(1), gives 
D In (TPFt) = [1 - exp(-8)][ln a - In (7PF M ) ] (3) 
where D is the first order differencing filter defined by 
Dz( = zt - z,_x. Equation (3) is of particular interest because it 
can be interpreted as a partial price adjustment model. In order to 
see this, note that 0 < [1 - exp(-8)] < 1. As a consequence, 
although a will always exceed TPFt, In (TPF,) is rising toward 
In a at a constant rate of adjustment [1 - exp(-8)]. For instance, 
if [1 - exp(-8)] = 0.1, it will take many more contracts to 
achieve a particular price rise than in the situation where 
[1 - exp(-8)] = 0.5, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if In a exceeds 
ln(TPF,) by one per cent of hx(TPFt), then ]n(TPFt) will 
increase by [1 - exp(-8)] x 100 per cent. In addition, exp(-8) is 
the elasticity of TPF, with respect to TPFt_x. 
In terms of the parameters of our model representing two 
dimensions, this means that an increase (decrease) of both a and 8 
implies a decrease (increase) of the market depth. Where a and 8 
have opposite signs we have two counter acting forces. If the order 
is relatively large the first dimension a is particularly relevant as 
far as incurring execution costs are concerned. For relatively small 
orders the second dimension 8 is relevant. Table 1 summarizes the 
effects of changes in the two dimensions on market depth. 
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Table 1 Effects of changes in the two dimensions on market depth 
a 
increases 
8 
increases 
a increases 
and 8 decreases 
a increases 
and 8 
decreases 
Lack of market depending depending 
depth (in terms of increases increases on on 
execution costs) magnitude order magnitude 
flow order flow 
The model in (3) may be extended on three fronts. First, 
Equation (3) is an approximation to the transformed price series. 
Hence, we add a disturbance term u{ to (3) under the assumption 
that ut ~ ITD(0, CT2I„) . Second, notice that the transaction-specific 
price observations cannot be described by a single curve such as the 
curve depicted in Figure 1, but by a sequence of such curves where 
an upward-sloping curve is always succeeded by a downward-
sloping one and the other way round. As a consequence, the data 
series on the transformed price consists of a panel (not restricted to 
being balanced) of upward-sloping curves in chronological order. 
Third, as discussed in section 3.4.1, to allow upward- and actually 
downward-sloping curves to have dissimilar shapes, (3) is extended 
to: 
D In (TPFci) = K, - T . In {TPFci_x) + uci (4) 
s.t. u~ HD(0, a2IN) 
where T C , = [1 -exp(-8,)]Incc„ xs = [1 -exp(-8,)] , i = 1,..., » c 
with c = l,...,H and ^ is an index for actually upward- (s = 1) 
The Market for Hedging Services 67 
and downward-sloping (s = 2) curves. H denotes the number of 
curves. Notice that our dataset on TPFct consists of N = Zf=1 nc 
observations (i.e., traded contracts), where nc is the number of 
contracts per curve c. In the next section more details are given on 
how we obtain these observations. 
4.4.3 Estimation of the Model 
In our theoretical model we assume that during the 
occurrence of an S-shaped price path, the equilibrium price is 
constant and, therefore, the S-shaped price path is attributed solely 
to temporary order imbalances. However, actual price changes in 
the futures market result from both temporary order imbalances and 
from supply and demand factors of the underlying commodity of 
the futures contract. Consequently, estimation of the model on the 
basis of real futures market data might invalidate the assumption of 
a constant equilibrium price during every separate S-shaped price 
path. However, S-shaped price paths due to temporary imbalances 
occur in a very short period of time, say within a matter of minutes. 
Since the effect of fundamental economic factors occurs over a 
much longer period of time than a few minutes, we might expect 
that during such a downward-sloping or upward-sloping price path 
the price change due to fundamental economic factors, i.e. the 
change of the equilibrium price, is negligible compared to the price 
change due to order imbalances. 
After identifying the individual price paths, we subtract the 
observations of each downward-sloping price path from the price at 
which the price path started, such that all curves become upward 
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sloping.4 In order to eliminate the general price level effect, we 
shift the curves downward, such that each curve starts at the 
minimum tick size. Thus, each S-curve, after being transformed to 
become upward sloping, is shifted downward to the minimum tick 
size. In doing so we correct for differences in equilibrium price 
between S-curves. Using the resulting data series, estimates of the 
dimensions of market depth a and 8 are obtained by the following 
procedure. First, maximum likelihood estimates of ns and are 
obtained by applying ordinary least squares to (4). The maximum 
likelihood estimates of the relevant parameters a s and 8S are 
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computed by as = exp(—) and 8 5 = -In (1 - x j . Second, the 
standard errors of as and $ s are computed by the square root of 
the diagonal elements of var(r|) = [—] var(0)[—]' (see Cramer 
90 90 
1986), where n = (ax a2 8, 8 2) ' and 0 = (TCJ TC2 T, T 2 )' are four-
dimensional parameter vectors. Since the maximum likelihood 
estimators have asymptotic normal distributions, /-values may be 
used to test if the parameters are significantly different from zero. 
To see whether one single market depth price path for both upward-
and downward-sloping curves suffices, i.e. whether or not the 
upward-sloping price path is exactly the reverse of the downward-
sloping price path, we test the hypothesis H0: {a, = a 2 = a and 
8, = 8 2 = 8}. In terms of Equation (4) this implies testing 
4 From the data it is not clear where the exact split between an increasing and 
decreasing price path should be imposed when two or more contracts in between 
are traded at the same price. Therefore, to determine the split we apply the 
following procedure: for an odd number of contracts traded at the same price we 
use the middle contract, and for an even number of constant contracts we employ 
a random assignment with equal probabilities. 
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H0: {TC, = TC2 = 7t and T, = x2 = t} . Since the restrictions are 
linear we use an F-test of which the test statistic has an 
F(2, N - 4) distribution, under H0. 
4.5 Data 
In order to illustrate the contributions of the model 
presented above, we apply it to data from the Amsterdam 
Agricultural Futures Exchange (ATA). This exchange is one of the 
largest agricultural futures exchanges in Europe. The trading 
system employed by the ATA is the open outcry system. There are 
no scalpers on the trading floor and all orders enter the trading floor 
via brokers. Brokers are only allowed to trade by order of a 
customer. There is no central order book on the ATA. The broker 
only has insight into his/her own order book. The customer (hedger 
or speculator) has no information on outstanding orders. 
Potatoes and hogs are traded on the ATA. The potato 
futures contract is a relatively successful one in the sense that the 
volume generated (about 200,000 contracts annually) is large 
relative to competitive potato contracts elsewhere in Europe (such 
as the potato futures traded on the London Commodity Exchange 
and on the Marche a Terme International de France). The annual 
volume is small, however, when compared with agricultural futures 
traded in the United States. Hog futures are not successful as far as 
their volume (about 30,000 contracts annually) is concerned. The 
minimum tick size for the potato and hog futures contracts equals 
0.10 Dutch Guilders and 0.005 Dutch Guilders, respectively. 
We use real-time transaction-specific data for three futures 
contracts: potato contract delivery April 1996, and hog contract 
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deliveries August and September 1995.5 Descriptive statistics for 
both the potato and hog futures price and volume series are 
presented in Table 2. The average number of contracts per trading 
day is relatively large for the potato market compared with the hog 
markets. The latter market faces severe problems of market depth 
which inhibits its contract growth. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the real-time transaction-specific futures prices 
Futures Contracts 
Potato delivery 
April 1996 
Number of observations 46791 
(i.e. contracts traded) (April '95 
Average number of 
contracts per trading 
day 
Average price per 
contract* 
Standard deviation of 
the price 
Minimum price 
Maximum price 
- August '95) 
503 
43.4 
18.0 
21.7 
79.0 
Hog delivery 
August 1995 
Hog delivery 
September 1995 
2742 
(February '95 
- August '95) 
24 
2.330 
0.150 
2.065 
2.655 
2317 
(February '95 
- August '95) 
22 
2.265 
0.120 
2.060 
2.650 
* The futures price for potatoes is quoted in Dutch Guilders per 100 kilogram 
whereas the hogs are quoted in Dutch Guilders per kilogram live weight. 
5 The reason that we investigate these three futures contracts is a practical one. In 
order to estimate the model we had to obtain transaction-specific data. These data 
were gathered by the exchange on our request. Normally the exchange only saves 
the daily close price, high price, low price and traded volume. We were able to 
receive transaction-specific prices only for the three futures contracts investigated 
in the chapter. 
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4.6 Empirical Results 
In this section we apply ordinary least squares to (4) and express 
the estimates of % and T in those of a and 8. 
In Table 3 the estimation results for the potato futures 
contract, delivery April 1996, are displayed. 
Table 3 Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of 
market depth of the potato futures contract, delivery April 1996 
Contract Parameter 
estimates 
Gompertz curve* 
a S 
Potatoes futures contracts, 
delivery April 1996 
downward sloping 
upward sloping 
1.374 
(0.057) 
1.013 
(0.053) 
0.053 
(0.002) 
0.060 
(0.002) 
Number of observations 46790 
R2 0.099 Probability of F(3,46786) < 0.001 
F(3,46786) 638 Durbin - Watson statistic 1.914 
F(2, 46786) for H0: {a{ = cc2 = a and 8j = 8 2 = 8} 7.760 
Probability of F(2,46786) < 0.001 
standard errors in parentheses. 
It can easily be seen that all parameter estimates are 
significantly greater than zero when using a one-sided /-test and a 
0.05 level of significance. The Durbin-Watson statistic does not 
indicate any mis-specification. In spite of its low value, the R2 is 
significantly greater than zero, as indicated by the F(3, 46786) 
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statistic. The hypothesis H0: {ax = a2 = a and 8X = 8 2 = 8} is 
rejected. Therefore, the market depth for the potato futures 
contracts, delivery April 1996, significantly differs between periods 
of price rise and price fall. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the hog futures 
contract, delivery August 1995. Since the hypothesis HQ cannot be 
rejected, we conclude that the market depth for this contract is 
characterized by a single Gompertz curve. So, the upward sloping 
price path is the reverse of the downward sloping price path. 
Compared with Table 3, the statistics in Table 4 lead to similar 
conclusions with respect to the performance of the regression. 
Table 4 Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of 
market depth of the hog futures contract, delivery August 1995 
Contract Parameter estimates 
Gompertz curve' 
a 5 
Hog futures contracts, 
delivery August 1995 
0.039 0.159 
(0.016) (0.009) 
Number of observations 2741 
0.249 Probability of F{\, 2739) < 0.001 
F(l,2739) 348 Durbin - Watson statistic 1.811 
F(2,2739) for H0: {a, a and 5, = 5 2 = 5} 0.217 
Probability of F{2,2739) 0.805 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5 shows the estimation results for the hog futures 
contracts, delivery September 1995. The results are quite similar to 
those in Table 4. Again, we cannot reject H0. 
Table 5 Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of 
market depth of the hog futures contract, delivery September 1995 
Contract Parameter estimates 
Gompertz curve* 
a 
Hog futures contracts, 
delivery September 1995 
Number of observations 
R2 
F(l,2312) 
0.044 0.115 
(0.022) (0.008) 
2314 
0.200 Probability of F(l, 2312) < 0.001 
348 Durbin - Watson statistic 1.855 
F(2,2312) for H0: {a, = a 2 = a and 6j = 8 2 = 5} 0.136 
Probability of F(2,2312) 0.873 
* standard errors in parentheses. 
4.7 Discussion 
We will now discuss how the management of the exchange 
can use our empirical results to improve the performance of the 
futures exchange with regard to its market depth. For this purpose, 
we draw the Gompertz curves for the upward-sloping and 
downward-sloping potato futures price path (see Figure 2) and for 
the hog futures price paths (see Figure 3), using the parameter 
estimates in Tables 3,4 and 5. 
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Figure 2 The Gompertz curves for the potato futures contract delivery April 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curves for increasing and 
decreasing price paths. On the vertical axis the futures price per 
contract traded is given. On the horizontal axis the prices of 
successive contracts traded are given, where the serial number of the 
futures contract is denoted by i. i = 1 is the first contract traded, 
/ = 2 is the second contract traded and so on. 
In each of the two figures both dimensions of market depth 
are visualized simultaneously. Note that since the upward-sloping 
price paths for both deliveries of hog are the reverse of the 
downward-sloping price paths, we only depict the upward-sloping 
price paths for both hog series in Figure 3. 
The Market for Hedging Services 75 
PF 
0.04^ September 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 3 The Gompertz curves for hog futures contracts deliveries August and 
September 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curves for hog delivery 
August and hog delivery September. No distinction is made 
between upward- and downward-sloping price paths, because the 
upward sloping price path is exactly the reverse of the downward 
sloping price path. On the vertical axis the futures price per contract 
traded is given. On the horizontal axis the successive contracts 
traded are given, where the serial number of the futures contract is 
denoted by i. i = 1 is the first contract traded, i = 2 is the second 
contract traded and so on. 
The upward- and downward-sloping Gompertz curves for 
potato futures have dissimilar shapes. The first dimension 
- indicating how far the price falls or rises due to order imbalances -
is quite large compared with the general price level. This might be 
due to the absence of scalpers. In order to improve the absorption 
capacity, the ATA might consider allowing scalpers on the floor. 
The second dimension - the rate of price change - is higher for the 
upward-sloping price path than for the downward-sloping price 
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path. This can be explained by the fact that there are differences 
between the number of stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell orders. The 
difference between the numbers of stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell 
orders can be explained by the fact that participants in the potato 
futures market consist of relatively large firms (potato processing 
industry) who are the net buyers of potato futures contracts on the 
one hand and relatively small firms (potato farmers and small 
potato traders) who are net sellers of potato futures contracts on the 
other. The former participants often use stop-loss buy orders 
especially because they normally make cash forward contracts with 
retailers regarding potato products (such as chips and French fries). 
When the price rises we observe a trigger effect: a considerable 
number of stop-loss buy orders are executed which push the price 
upwards and thereby reinforce the stop-loss buy order effect which 
causes an acceleration of the price of futures. The potato farmers 
and small traders usually do not use stop-loss sell orders, but wait 
until the price is satisfactory and men enter the futures market.6 
Since the curves in Figure 2 do not intersect, we may 
conclude that the futures market is deeper in the case of a sell order 
imbalance than in the case of a buy order imbalance. The problem 
of the high rate of (adverse) price changes at the ATA might be 
solved by implementing a mechanism for slowing down the trade 
process if order imbalances do occur and to improve market depth 
by reporting these. Also the order book information can be 
improved. At the ATA, the order books of the different brokers are 
not linked and the customer has no information with regard to 
outstanding orders. An order book mechanism that allows potential 
participants to view real-time limit orders, displaying the desired 
6 We acknowledge the information we received on this subject from the brokers 
at the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
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prices and quantities at which participants would like to trade, will 
improve the rate of adjustment and the distance between the lower 
and upper bounds. 
The upward- and downward-sloping price paths are similar 
for both hog deliveries. In the hog futures market we observe a 
symmetry between stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell orders in 
contrast to the potato futures market.7 Tables 4 and 5 show that a 
is smaller for delivery August than for delivery September 
indicating that the delivery August performs better on the first 
dimension. However, on the second dimension delivery September 
performs better than delivery August (i.e, 8 for delivery September 
is smaller than for delivery August). Consequently we observe in 
Figure 3 that the price paths intersect, indicating that for relatively 
small orders September delivery is deeper than August, whereas for 
large orders August delivery is deeper (see also Table 1). 
4.8 Conclusions and Further Research 
In contrast to the existing market depth measures, we 
conjecture that the market price depth path has an S-shape in which 
four phases can be distinguished: the sustainable price phase, the 
lag-adjustment phase, the restoring phase and the recovery phase. 
This S-shaped price path may well be approximated by the 
Gompertz curve, which allows for a non-symmetrical S-shape and 
hence, does not impose certain restrictions on the length of the 
different phases. The two parameters of our model represent two 
dimensions of market depth. The first dimension represents the 
7 We acknowledge the information we received on this subject from the brokers 
at the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
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distance between the upper and lower bounds, i.e. indicates how far 
the price falls (rises) due to a lack of market depth. The second 
dimension indicates the rate at which price falls or rises. Our 
market depth measure has convenient characteristics. First, it 
provides insights into the underlying structure of market depth and 
gives guidelines for improving market depth. Second, our measure 
can be used to compare competitive futures contracts. Third, the 
market depth model is estimated with simple regression techniques. 
Furthermore, since our measure can be presented in a graphical 
way, it is relatively easy to interpret. 
We applied the model to the potato and hog futures traded 
on the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. We found that 
both the distance between the upper and lower bounds of the price 
path and the rate of the price change is high, indicating a lack of 
market depth. The current trading system - no scalpers and no 
central order book information- contributes to this situation. 
Redesigning the trading system in order to lower the distance 
between the upper and lower bounds of the price path and the rate 
of the price change is recommended. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to be aware of 
the following points. First, as we have indicated, our model 
requires transaction-specific data. Transaction-specific data enable 
us to identify individual downward-sloping price paths and 
individual upward-sloping price paths by assuming that each of 
these price paths ends when the traders expect that price will not 
change by more than the minimum tick size, and that during each 
price path, which takes place over the space of a few minutes, price 
change due to fundamental economic factors will be negligible 
compared to the price change due to order imbalances, i.e. we may 
expect that over such a short period of time the equilibrium price 
does not change. 
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Second, our research is restricted to one futures trading 
system. In order to draw conclusions with respect to the relation 
between the two distinguished market depth dimensions and the 
futures market structure, other futures trading systems should be 
incorporated into the analysis. Measuring the market depth 
dimensions for different kinds of trading systems provides more 
information as far as the relationships between the market depth 
dimensions and the different elements of trading systems are 
concerned. Research addressing these two points should be an 
interesting avenue to explore in the future. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Hedging Performance in New 
Agricultural Futures Markets 1 
5.1 Abstract 
Agribusiness companies and farmers must cope with the risk of 
price changes when buying or selling agricultural commodities. Hedging 
price risk with agricultural commodity futures offers a way of 
minimizing this risk. Information is needed on the hedging effectiveness 
of these futures. Since many new agricultural futures markets, especially 
those in Europe, are thin markets, hedgers face liquidity risks which have 
to be taken into account when evaluating hedging effectiveness. Contrary 
to the next chapter which introduces a new hedging efficiency measure 
by taking a futures exchange management perspective, this chapter will 
adopt a hedger's perspective (cfr. Chapter 6, Table 3). 
5.2 Introduction 
Price risk has become a more immediate issue for both 
farmers and agribusiness companies in the United States (US) and 
European Union (EU) due to GATT free trade policies and the 
agricultural policy reforms made by the EU. Owing to increased 
agricultural price fluctuations, some exchanges in Europe such as 
the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange, the London 
Commodity Exchange, the WarenterminbSrse in Hannover and the 
Warsaw Board of Trade, are planning to introduce new agricultural 
1 This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.T.G. Meulenberg 
(1997), "The Hedging Performance in New Agricultural Futures markets: 
A Note", Agribusiness: An International Journal, 13(3), 295-300. 
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futures contracts. These new futures markets are thin, meaning that 
the size of the transaction of an individual hedger may have a 
significant effect on the price and may therefore result in 
substantial 'transaction costs'. 
In recent articles Conley(1994) and Ennewet. al. (1992) 
draw conclusions about the hedging performance of a futures 
market without recognizing this price effect. This chapter proposes 
a new method to measure hedging effectiveness which also 
considers how the taking and unwinding of a large position may 
affect the futures price in thin futures markets. Therefore, the 
proposed measure is particularly appropriate for thin markets, such 
as some of the European agricultural futures markets. The proposed 
measure also includes basis risk and trading costs. These have been 
discussed in previous research. 
5.3 Literature Review 
Recently proposed measures of hedging effectiveness 
express the usefulness of trading a futures contract, based on the 
results of a combined cash-futures portfolio relative to the cash 
position alone (e.g. Ederington 1979, Franckle 1980, Hill and 
Schneeweis 1982, Wilson 1984, Howard and D'Antonio 1984, 
Chang and Shankerl986, Overdahl and Starleaf 1986, Lindahl 
1989, Chang and Fang 1990, Gjerde 1987, Pirrong, Kormendi and 
Meguire 1994, Hsin, Kuo and Lee 1994). The researchers' 
conclusions about the hedging performance of futures markets 
depend on the method used to measure the hedging effectiveness. 
Ederington (1979) and Hill and Schneeweis (1982) measured 
hedging effectiveness as the percentage reduction in the variance of 
returns achieved by an optimally hedged position as opposed to an 
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unhedged position. Their hedging effectiveness measures assume a 
hedging strategy to minimize price variance. The objective of these 
effectiveness measures is to measure hedging effectiveness for a 
risk-minimizing hedge which can be represented by the minimum 
risk hedging ratio. 
The hedging performance measures frequently cited do not 
explicitly take into consideration the liquidity risk involved in 
trading futures. However, thin agricultural futures markets do 
introduce liquidity risk which will have an impact on the variance 
of returns. For a detailed description of liquidity see Chapters 3 and 
4 of this book. 
5.4 A New Measure of Hedging Effectiveness 
Following the method of Ederington (1979) let R represent 
the return on a portfolio which includes both spot market holdings, 
Xs, and futures market holding, Xf, where Xs and Xf have 
opposite signs. A hedger who uses the futures market to manage 
his/her price risk and is aware of the basis and liquidity cost will 
take this into account. The expected return on a portfolio can now 
be written as: 
E{R) = XsE[Ps ~ P]\ + XfE[PJ - Pi] - XfE[LC] - K(Xf) (1) 
The variance of the return is given by: 
var(R) = 
+ 2XsXf(3^ 2XsXfo sLC - 2XfGjLC 
(2) 
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where E(R) is the expected return on a portfolio, [P/ - P/] is the 
gain or loss on a spot position, [Pj - Pj] is the gain or loss on the 
futures position, LC are the liquidity costs, K(Xf) are the 
brokerage costs and the cost of providing margin, o], a2f, a # , 
a^c and asLC represent the subjective variances and the 
covariances of the possible price and liquidity cost changes from 
Time 1 to Time 2. 
Xf 
Let b = J— represent the proportion of the spot position 
hedged. Since in a hedge Xs and Xf have opposite signs, b is 
usually positive. The variance can now be expressed as: 
var(i?) = 
Xfe2 + b2G2f + b2a\c - 2*ov + 2basLC - 2b2v^] ( 3 ) 
Holding Xs constant, let us consider the effect of a change in b, the 
proportion hedged, on the expected return and variance of the 
return P.. 
8 ^b^ = X°[2b°2f + 2 b ° 2 l c " 2 a ^ + 2°sLC " 4 6 a ^ c ] ( 4 ) 
So the risk minimizing b, b* is 
The Market for Hedging Services 85 
Substituting (5) in (3) yields: 
X2b*2(o2f + c4 - 2 a ^ ) + X2sb\-2<5sf + 2 a s i C ) + X2a2s 
where var(iT) denotes the minimum variance on a portfolio 
containing futures. 
Let U represent the return on an unhedged position, 
E(U) = XSE[P2 - I*] (7) 
varOT) = X2a2s (8) 
In line withEderington (1979) our measure of hedging effectiveness 
is the percentage reduction in the variance of the return on the 
portfolio and can be given by: 
H E = ^ ^ 1 (9) 
var(C7) 
Consequently, 
H E =
 b*(p/ + a l c ~ 2 c W + 6 V 2 c V + 2asw) ( 1 0 ) 
It can easily be shown that in liquid markets, i.e. markets with no 
liquidity risk, the proposed measure HE equals the Ederington 
measure. 
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Our measure will be a particularly valuable tool in 
evaluating the hedging effectiveness of new agricultural futures 
which will, initially, be traded in thin markets. In order to illustrate 
the usefulness of the proposed measure and the difference between 
this measure and the Ederington measure (the latter is widely used 
by practitioners and researchers), we have applied both hedging 
effectiveness measures to data from the Amsterdam Agricultural 
Futures Exchange. 
5.5 Data 
The Ederington measure and the proposed measure are 
calculated using data on the potato futures contract traded at the 
Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. The annual volume 
(200,000 contracts in 1995) is small compared with agricultural 
futures traded in the United States. The sample covers the period 
from September 1995 up to April 1996. This period equals one 
potato storage year, i.e. potatoes harvested in 1995. The 
transaction-specific futures contracts data were obtained from the 
Clearing Corporation (NLKKAS) of the Amsterdam Agricultural 
Futures Exchange. The cash price data were obtained from the 
Rotterdam potato cash market. This is the central spot market for 
potatoes in the Netherlands. 
The transaction-specific data consist of the price quoted of 
every futures contract traded in chronological order. Liquidity costs 
can be calculated using these data. In the case of an order selling 
imbalance liquidity costs were calculated as the area between the 
downward-sloping price path and the price for which the hedger 
enters the futures market, hence 
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N 
LC = PF1 • N - £ (PFl) (ID 
where PFi is the futures price for which the hedger enters the 
market, PF' is the price of the r'-th futures contract and N the total 
order flow. 
The liquidity costs in the case of an order buying imbalance 
were calculated as the area between the upward-sloping price path 
and the price for which the hedger enters the futures market, hence 
Having determined the liquidity costs, the spot prices and the 
closing prices of the futures contract, the proposed measure can be 
calculated according to Equation (10). In this chapter we test the 
hedging performance of hedges held over one week, hence 
P/ - Pi in Equation (1) covers one week. 
We hypothesize that the proposed measure shows a relative 
less effective hedge than the Ederington measure because the latter 
does not include liquidity risk. 
5.6 Results 
N 
LC = Yd (PF') -PF1 • N (12) 
Table 1 tabulates the value of the hedging performance 
measured by the Ederington measure and the value of the proposed 
measure. 
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Table 1 Hedging performance ofpotato futures contract delivery April 1996. 
Ederington measure Proposed measure 
0.94 0.89 
b* = 0.47 b* = 0.44 
Note that both measures range from 0 to 1, indicating the 
reduction in the variance of the return. From Table 1 it appears that 
the hedging effectiveness of the potato futures contract is higher 
according to the Ederington measure than according to the 
proposed measure, which corresponds with our expectations. This 
result is due to the fact that the proposed measure takes basis risk 
and liquidity risk into account, whereas the Ederington measure 
only takes basis risk into account. 
To see whether the hedging effectiveness using the 
Ederington measure is statistically different from the proposed 
measure, we test the hypothesis H0: {var(i?*) = var(i?*)e} where 
var(i?*) and var(i?*)e denote the minimum variance on a portfolio 
containing futures based on the proposed measure and the 
Ederington measure respectively. We expect that 
var(i?*) > \ar(R*)e because, in our approach, we take liquidity 
risk into consideration. To make this test we calculate 
F = var(i?*)/varCR*)e = 1.83 with 116 df. Under H0 the 5% level 
1 S ^ o . o 5 = 1-36. Hence, H0 is rejected (p = 0.00063), meaning 
that the minimum variance on a portfolio containing futures is 
significantly greater for our approach than the Ederington approach. 
Therefore, the inclusion of liquidity risk makes our measure of 
hedging effectiveness statistically significantly different from the 
Ederington measure. 
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Table 1 shows that the Ederington measure recommends 
hedging 47% (b* = 0.47) of the spot position whereas the 
proposed measure recommends hedging 44%. Our empirical 
application illustrates that in thin markets, the Ederington measure 
may overestimate hedging effectiveness and therefore recommends 
hedging more than in the case that liquidity risk is taken into 
account. Therefore, we propose using the hedging effectiveness 
measure as it is given in Equation (10), if we suspect a thin futures 
market. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Unlike other studies on the measurement of futures contract 
performance we emphasize that futures markets not only introduce 
basis risk but also liquidity risk. This is particularly relevant in thin 
markets such as the present European agricultural futures markets. 
We propose a more comprehensive measure than the Ederington 
measure by including liquidity risk. If there is no liquidity risk our 
measure equals the Ederington measure. So, whenever we suspect 
that the futures market might be thin because, for example, the 
volume traded is small or there are no scalpers on the floor to 
absorb temporary order imbalances, we recommend using the 
proposed hedging effectiveness measure. The application of this 
measure requires transaction-specific data and cash market data. 
Because of the evolution of information technology these data 
become easy to obtain. Therefore, it seems that our measure can be 
useful in managing the futures exchange and to assist agribusiness 
companies in evaluating the performance of futures contracts in 
order to minimize risk. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Hedging Efficiency: A Futures Exchange 
Management Approach 1 
6.1 Abstract 
In studies of futures markets much attention has been paid to the 
hedging effectiveness of futures contracts because it is an important 
determinant in explaining the success of futures contracts (Tashjian and 
McConnell 1989). The authors who have proposed measures of this 
effectiveness include Chang and Fang (1990), Ederington (1979), Gjerde 
(1987), Hsin, Kuo, and Lee (1994), Lasser(1987) and Nelson and 
Collins (1985). All these measures have in common that they try to 
indicate to what extent hedgers are able to reduce cash price risk by using 
futures contracts. In these studies hedging effectiveness refers to returns 
on portfolios. A particular futures contract can have different values with 
respect to hedging effectiveness, depending on which measure is used 
and on the hedger's utility function. Futures contracts, themselves, 
introduce risks for hedgers. Therefore, the extent to which a futures 
contract offers a reduction in overall risk is an important criterion for the 
management of the futures exchange to evaluate the hedging 
performance. Actually, the smaller the basis and market depth risks of a 
futures contract, the greater the risk reduction. The preference for one 
hedging vehicle over another is given after considering both the risk and 
the cost of the alternative hedges (Castelino, Francis and Wolf 1991). 
' This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.T.G. Meulenberg 
(1997), "Hedging Efficiency: A Futures Exchange Management Approach", 
Journal of Futures Markets, 17 (5), 599-615. 
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6.2 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a new concept of hedging efficiency 
and a measure of this efficiency, indicating the quality of the 
hedging service provided by the futures contract (including both the 
risks and the costs of the hedge). The proposed measure is an 
extension and a supplement to existent measures, and has a 
different purpose, a different interpretation and a different target 
group. It assesses futures contracts from the perspective of the 
management of the futures exchange. The futures market is 
assumed to be predisposed towards creating a superior value for 
customers (Narver and Slater 1990), thereby generating a high 
trading volume. The chapter's goal is to provide a measure which is 
able to give the management of the futures exchange insight into 
the performance of the exchange. The proposed hedging efficiency 
measure appraises the distance between the actual hedge and the 
perfect hedge. This distance can be divided into a systematic part, 
which can be managed by the futures exchange, and a random part 
which is beyond its control. Hence, the measure is a useful tool for 
the management of the futures exchange, because it allows for a 
quality evaluation of the actual hedge. 
This chapter is organized as follows. After having reviewed 
frequently used measures of hedging performance, that is hedging 
effectiveness, the conceptual aspects of hedging efficiency are 
discussed, and a new measure is presented. An empirical 
application of the proposed hedging efficiency measure reveals its 
usefulness for the management of the futures exchange. The final 
section summarizes the findings. 
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6.3 Measures of Hedging Effectiveness: a Brief Review 
The latest and the most common hedging theory nowadays 
is the portfolio approach. In this approach the risk of price changes 
is introduced into the hedging model in a variance function. 
Moreover, a frontier is traced, showing a relationship between 
variance and expected returns. 
Table 1 Mathematical formulas of measures of hedging effectiveness currently in 
use* 
Measures 
Ederington 
(1979) 
Howard and 
D'Antonio 
(1984) 
Hsin, Kuo 
and Lee 
(1994) 
O s f 2 2 2 
e = 2 J 2 = p where as, af and CTs/ represent the 
subjective variances and covariance of the possible price change 
from time 1 to time 2. p 2 is the population coefficient of 
determination between the change in the cash price and the change 
in the futures price. 
Q 
HE - •— where 6 is the excess return per unit of 
<?. - 0/er, 
risk, rs the expected one period return for the spot position, i the 
risk free return and as the standard deviation of one period 
return for the spot position. 
HE = r^ - r™ where and r s c e denote the certainty 
equivalent returns of the hedged position H and the spot position 
5, respectively. 
This list does not pretend to be exhaustive. 
The recently proposed measures of hedging effectiveness 
are based on this hedging approach. Several studies (e.g. 
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Ederington 1979, Franckle 1980, Hill and Schneeweis 1982, 
Wilson 1984, Howard and D'Antonio 1984, Chang and Shanker 
1986, Overdahl and Starleaf 1986, Lindahl 1989, Chang and Fang 
1990, Gjerde 1987, Pirrong, Kormendi and Meguire 1994, Hsin, 
Kuo and Lee 1994) express the usefulness of trading a futures 
contract, after comparing the results of a combined cash-futures 
portfolio and the cash position only. Table 1 summarizes the 
mathematical formulas of the different measures of hedging 
effectiveness currently in use. 
Ederington (1979) defines hedging effectiveness as the 
reduction in variance. The objective of a hedge is to minimize the 
risk of a given position. This risk is presented by the variance of 
returns. Howard and D'Antonio (1984) define hedging 
effectiveness as the ratio of the excess return per unit of risk of the 
optimal portfolio of the spot commodity and the futures instrument 
to the excess return per unit of risk of the portfolio containing the 
spot position alone (e.g. Chang and Shanker 1986; Lien 1993). 
Hsin, Kuo and Lee (1994) measure hedging effectiveness by the 
difference of the certainty equivalent returns between the hedged 
position and spot position. This approach considers both risk and 
returns in hedging. They argue that the advantages of their measure 
are that it considers both risk and expected returns and that it is a 
consistent measure regardless of the empirically expected changes 
in spot prices. 
The measures reviewed are concerned with optimizing the 
payoff of the portfolio, under the condition that the variance in 
returns is minimized or that some optimal balance is found between 
risk and return. All these measures implicitly assume that the 
futures contract is perfect, i.e. introduces no risks. However, futures 
contracts do introduce risks, which will have an impact on the 
variance of the hedger's returns. These risks have an impact on the 
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success of a futures contract and are therefore of great interest to 
the management of the futures exchange. Table 2 summarizes and 
classifies the hedging performance of the measures described 
above, including the proposed measure. 
Table 2 Hedging effectiveness measures and their characteristics* 
Measure Based on 
minimum 
variance hedge 
Based on risk-
return 
Including cost 
involved in 
futures 
trading2 
Including 
basis risk and 
liquidity risk 
Ederington yes no no no 
Howard and 
D'Antonio 
no yes no no 
Hsin, Kuo and 
Lee 
no yes no no 
Proposed 
measure 
yes no yes yes 
* This list does not pretend to be exhaustive. 
In the next section a concept and a measure of hedging 
efficiency are proposed. 
6.4 Conceptual Aspects of Measuring Hedging Efficiency 
A hedger who wants to manage price risk will weigh the 
futures trading risk, as outlined in Chapter 3, against the need to 
eliminate the cash price risk. In this section these two components 
will be integrated into a concept of hedging efficiency from which a 
2 Brokerage costs and margin requirements. 
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measure of hedging efficiency is derived. The assessment has been 
made from the perspective of the management of the futures 
exchange, that is interested in the quality of the hedging service. 
The proposed measure informs the management of the 
futures exchange about the efficiency of a specific futures contract 
by confronting the ideal hedge (where all risk, cash price risk and 
futures trading risk, is eliminated) with the actual hedge (see 
Figure 1). The proposed measure assesses the distance between the 
actual hedge and the perfect hedge. Furthermore, the proposed 
measure is able to divide the variance of a hedge into a systematic 
part, which can be controlled by the management of the exchange, 
and a random part, which is beyond its control. 
Hence, the proposed measure is a complement rather than 
an alternative to the existing measures. A futures contract that is 
able to set a certain price without introducing other risks will best 
fulfill the hedger's need for hedging. In this case the hedger will not 
always use that particular futures contract, because the decision will 
also be influenced by the cost involved in futures trading, i.e. 
commission costs and margin requirements. The hedger will weigh 
the cost involved in futures trading against the satisfaction derived 
from the futures contract. Therefore, the concept of hedging 
efficiency is defined as the capacity of the futures contract to reduce 
the overall risk (basis risk, cash price risk and market depth risk) in 
relation to the cost involved in futures trading. For the futures 
exchange it is important to know how well the services provided by 
the futures contract meet the needs of the hedgers. The proposed 
concept of hedging efficiency assesses how well the futures 
exchange is able to achieve this goal. Figure 1 illustrates this 
concept of hedging efficiency. 
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Basis Market 
risk depth risk 
Cash price Risks in 
risk futures trading 
The overall 
risk reduction capacity 
of the futures contract 
Costs involved 
in 
futures trading 
The overall risk reduction capacity of 
the futures contract in relation to the costs involved 
(hedging efficiency) 
Needs of 
hedgers 
Competitive 
futures contracts 
Ideal futures 
contract 
Figure 1 Concept of hedging efficiency 
This overall risk reduction capacity of the futures contract in 
relation to the trading costs involved is the hedging service which 
the futures exchange provides. Two factors are important for the 
futures exchange: whether it meets the need of the hedgers with 
respect to overall risk reduction, and whether it can compete on that 
point with competitive futures exchanges. 
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Table 3 shows the conceptual difference between the 
measure of hedging effectiveness reviewed and the proposed one. 
Table 3 Conceptual differences between the measures of hedging effectiveness 
reviewed and the proposed measure 
Measures of Hedging 
Effectiveness 
Reviewed 
Proposed Measure of 
Hedging Efficiency 
Related to: hedgers futures contract 
Focus on: cash market risk cash market risk and 
futures trading risk 
Concerned with: performance of 
portfolio 
hedging service of 
futures contract 
Way of measurement: measuring reduction in 
variance in portfolios 
measuring distance 
between actual and 
perfect hedging 
services 
Instrumental variables: means and variances 
Sharpe index 
variances divided into 
a systematic part and 
random part 
Information for: hedgers management of futures 
exchange 
6.5 Measure of Hedging Efficiency 
In this section a measure of hedging efficiency will be 
derived that is in accordance with the proposed concept of hedging 
efficiency. Each step will be described, in order to understand the 
components which are combined in the measure (see Figure 1). 
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Because the futures market offers a risk management 
service, this service preferably should not introduce additional risk 
itself. For an ideal futures contract, two conditions have to be 
satisfied. The first is that when the futures contract matures that 
there is no basis.3 The second that there is no market depth risk. 
The basis can be measured by the difference between the cash price 
and the futures price, whereas the market depth can be measured by 
the price difference between the prices at which hedgers enter the 
market PFi and the prices of successive contracts traded, PFk, as 
is shown in Equation (1). 
DC ^^-(Pf-PF*) (1) 
where DCj is the market depth costs of futures contract j,PFk the 
price of the k-th futures contract with k the number of changes in 
transaction prices with k = I...K, K the total number of 
transaction prices, Vk the volume of futures contracts sold at PFk 
and V the total volume. The proposed depth measure assesses the 
average depth costs per futures contract. 
If the futures market introduces no additional risk, the 
futures contract is a perfect or ideal one. Let IPR,+1 be the price the 
hedger would realize for time t + 1 if an ideal futures contract is 
used, Pl+l the commodity price in the cash market at maturity and 
PF1+l the futures price at maturity. If the futures contract is a 
perfect one, a short hedger will realize a price of:4 
3 The hedging efficiency measure is also applicable to the situation where the 
futures position is offset before maturity. 
4 Because it is not essential for the derivation of the measure of hedging 
efficiency, a long hedger could well have been used in this example. 
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IPR, = PF, 
t ' 
(2) 
which implies that PFt+x = Pl+l. 
The price actually realized will differ from Equation (2) 
because of the basis, market depth cost and trading costs (i.e. 
where PF? is the futures price at the moment of entrance, ARPt+l 
is the actual price realized, BM the basis of the futures contract and 
DC, + ] the market depth cost when initiating the futures position 
and offsetting the futures position. The service of risk reduction by 
futures contracts is not free; the hedger has to pay for it. Therefore 
C is the cost involved in futures trading per futures contract, 
represented by the commission. 
ARPt+x is a stochastic variable because of the stochastic 
nature of the basis and the market depth costs. The expected value 
and the variance of ARPt+x can be expressed as: 
\iA = E(ARPt+l) = PFtl - C - E(Bl+{ + DCt+l) respectively 
a2A = E(ARPt+1 - \xA)2. Defining FTR = Bt+1 + DCt+1 and 
u. = E(Bt+l + DCt+l) the variance of ARPt+l can now be written 
as: 
commission) and can be expressed a s 5 
ARPt+1 = PF; - Bl+l - DCl+l - C, (3) 
5 Note that the basis and liquidity cost should not be a problem for the price the 
hedger wants to realize, if the hedger is able to internalize this basis and liquidity 
cost. 
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rj 2 = E(FTR - n) 2 = E(FTR2 - u 2 ) , (4) 
subsequently E(FTR2) = a\ + u.2. 
To interpret the measure of futures trading risk u 2 can be 
looked upon as the systematic deviation of a futures contract at 
time period t + 1 from the ideal futures contract and a2A the 
random deviation. Knowledge of the systematic part is very 
important to the futures exchange because this part of the total 
deviation is caused by contract specification and futures exchange 
structure (trading system, kinds of traders allowed etc.) and, 
therefore, can be managed by the futures exchange. For example, a 
hedger in Jacksonville will know that (s)he has to discount the 
transportation costs if the futures contract specifies delivery in 
Chicago and that because of those costs the price set by a hedge 
will deviate from the price locked into with the help of a Chicago 
exchange, i.e., the systematic deviation. The exchange in Chicago 
could reduce this systematic deviation by allowing delivery in 
Jacksonville (see Pirrong, Kormendi and Meguire 1994). The 
random deviation is dependent on factors that are beyond the 
control of the futures exchange. 
Similar to the coefficient of variation6, the futures trading 
risk measure (FTRM) is measured as the square root of the futures 
trading risk E(FTR?+1) relative to the net price for the hedger if an 
ideal futures contract is used: 
6 The standard deviation is expressed as a fraction of the mean. For data from 
different sources, the mean and standard deviations often tend to change together, 
so that the coefficient of variation is relatively stable. Furthermore, being 
dimensionless the coefficient of variation is easy to remember (Snedecor and 
Cochran 1994). 
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FTRM = 
<sJE(FTRl+])2 
(5) 
PF} - c 
where the net price is the futures contract price minus the cost of 
commission, PFTL - C. 
6.5.1 Hedging Efficiency 
Risk in futures trading does not indicate, per se, how well a 
futures contract will meet the hedger's need. The hedger's need to 
reduce, if not to eliminate, cash market risk without introducing 
futures trading risk implies that both the risks of futures contracts 
and of the cash market have to be included in a measure of hedging 
efficiency. 
Analogous to the measure of futures trading risk, the 
measure of cash price risk is defined as: 
where CP is the mean of the cash price over the period from 
initiating the futures position to the time of liquidation of the 
futures position. 
A hedger will tend to use a futures contract if the value of 
the futures trading risk measure (5) is low compared with that of 
the measure of cash price risk (6). In that case the hedger is 
exchanging high risk in the cash market for low risk in the futures 
market. For this reason the following measure of hedging efficiency 
is proposed: 
CPRM = 
Et(CP) 
JE(CPt - CP)2 
CP 
(6) 
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£=FTRM 
CPRM 
where E > 0. 
The value of the proposed measure ranges from zero to 
irifinity. If the proposed measure is smaller than 1, hedgers will 
reduce their risks, because they exchange a larger cash price risk for 
a smaller futures trading risk. Note that if the value of the proposed 
measure increases, the hedging efficiency decreases. 
Equation (7) can be rewritten as: 
E = ^E(FTR,+l)2CP^ = + y.2)CP^ ( g ) 
(PFl - C)^E(CPt - CP)2 (PFtl - C)^E(CPt - CP)2 
where ^a2A + u 2 represents the distance between the actual 
hedging service and the perfect service, divided into a systematic 
and a random part. 
The intuition behind Equation (8) is the following: if the 
futures trading risk increases compared with the cash price risk, the 
hedging efficiency decreases. Furthermore, if the commission costs 
increase, the hedging efficiency decreases. 
6.6 Empirical Test of the Ederington Measure and the 
Proposed Measure 
Because the Ederington measure is still the most used 
measure in practice as well as in research, the Ederington measure 
will be compared with the proposed measure of hedging efficiency. 
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However, as has been outlined before, these measures are in no way 
substitutes, because they serve different purposes. 
6.6.1 Data and Methodology 
The Ederington measure and the proposed measure are 
calculated with the use of data on the potato futures contract traded 
at the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange (ATA). The 
annual volume (200,000 contracts in 1995) is small compared with 
agricultural futures traded in the United States. The sample covers 
the period from September 1995 up to April 1996. This period 
equals one potato storage year, i.e. potatoes harvested in 1995. The 
data on transaction-specific futures contract are obtained from the 
Clearing Corporation (NLKKAS) of the ATA. The cash price data 
are obtained from the Rotterdam potato cash market, being the 
central spot market for potatoes in the Netherlands. 
The transaction-specific data consist of the price quoted of 
every futures contract traded in a chronological order. With these 
data the market depth costs can be calculated. The market depth 
costs in the case of an order selling imbalance were calculated as 
the area between the downward-sloping price path and the price for 
which the hedger enters the futures market. The market depth costs 
in the case of an order buying imbalance were calculated as the area 
between the upward-sloping price path and the price for which the 
hedger enters the futures market. Having determined the market 
depth costs, the spot prices and the closing prices of the futures 
contract, the proposed measure can be calculated according to 
Equation (8). 
Because the time series data are limited, this study can only 
test the hedging performance of hedges held over two short periods: 
1) one-day period and 2) one-week period. This type of hedging, 
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offsetting the contract within one day or one week seems more 
relevant to a speculative transaction than a systematic hedging 
transaction, because the period of harvesting and storing the 
potatoes covers about one year. Therefore, this empirical analysis 
must be viewed as illustrative only. 
It is well known that the hedging effectiveness tends to 
increase as the investment horizon increases (Castelino 1992; 
Geppert 1995). Therefore, it can be expected that both measures 
indicate that situation 2 is more effective than situation 1. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the proposed measure shows a 
relatively lower efficiency than the Ederington measure because the 
latter does not include market depth costs and commission costs. 
The empirical analyses will also reveal the managerial implications 
of the proposed measure, i.e. providing information about what part 
of the hedging inefficiency can be managed by the exchange. 
6.6.2 Results 
Table 4 tabulates the value of the hedging performance 
measured by the Ederington measure and the proposed measure for 
the two different periods of hedges, one day and one week 
respectively. Furthermore, Table 4 presents the systematic 
deviation, u 2 , and the random deviation, a2A. Both measures 
indicate that the hedging performance increases (the proposed 
measure decreases and the Ederington measure increases) as the 
period of hedges held increases.7 This result confirms the results of 
previous research (Castelino 1992; Geppert 1995). 
7 Note that a low value of the Ederington measure indicates a low hedging 
effectiveness, whereas a low value of the proposed measure indicates a high 
hedging efficiency. 
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Table 4 Hedging performance ofpotato futures contract April 1996 measured by 
the proposed hedging Efficiency Measure (E) and the Ederington Measure (EM) 
Day Hedging Week hedging 
E = 1.3800 EM = 0.92405 E = 1.28916 EM = 0.94006 
U 2 = 63.303 U 2 = 63.620 
CT2 = 65.398 G2A = 59.359 
From Table 4 it also appears that the hedging effectiveness 
for both hedge periods is high according to the Ederington measure. 
This in contrast to the proposed measure, which indicates mat the 
hedging efficiency is relatively low, i.e. the futures trading risk 
measure exceeds the cash price risk measure. This different result 
between both measures is due to the fact that the proposed measure 
takes basis risk, market depth costs and commission costs into 
account, whereas the Ederington measure only takes the basis risk 
into account. 
One can derive from the proposed measure that for both the 
one-day hedge and the one-week hedge the systematic deviation u 2 
accounts for about 50% of the total distance between the perfect 
and the actual hedges. 
The data indicate that both the basis and the market depth 
risk contribute to the relatively inefficient hedging possibilities of 
the potato futures contract. 
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6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter a concept of overall risk reduction and a 
measure of hedging efficiency have been described. In contrast to 
the existing measures, this one does not focus on the performance 
of a portfolio but on the hedging service of the futures contract. 
Therefore, unlike other researchers measuring futures contract 
performance, this measure takes into account that futures contracts 
not only reduce cash price risk, but also introduce additional futures 
trading risk, consisting of basis risk and market depth risk. 
Furthermore, the proposed measure takes commission costs into 
account. The measure expresses the distance between the hedging 
service provided by the exchange and the perfect hedge. This 
distance is divided into a systematic part, which can be managed by 
the futures exchange, since this is caused by futures contract 
specification and structure of the futures exchange, and a random 
part, which is dependent on factors beyond the influence of the 
futures exchange. The hedging efficiency measure provides the 
hedger with a tool for comparing the competitive strength of 
alternative futures contracts. Not only the characteristics of the 
futures contract are incorporated in the measure of hedging 
efficiency, but also those of the cash market risks, because both the 
quality of hedging service and the need for this service (i.e. the 
price risk in the cash market) are relevant to the success of the 
hedging service rendered by the futures exchange. The futures 
trading risk component of the measure indicates the hedging quality 
of the futures contract. The cash price risk component emphasizes 
the potential need for the futures contract. The empirical results 
indicate the usefulness of the measure for the futures exchange 
management. Further research, in which the proposed measure is 
applied to different futures markets, is clearly called for. 
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PART II 
P A R T II E N T R E P R E N E U R S ' C H O I C E 
F O R H E D G I N G S E R V I C E S : 
A M A R K E T I N G A P P R O A C H 
In Chapter 2 we have stressed the importance of a 
marketing approach to the development and sales of hedging 
services. It has been argued that the basic need of an entrepreneur, 
who is using futures, is the reduction of price risks. In fact, an 
entrepreneur who perceives price risk will feel the need to reduce it 
and therewith make use of the hedging services only when he is 
risk-averse. Therefore risk attitude is an important concept in the 
entrepreneurs' decision making behavior concerning price risk 
management instruments. Much research has to be done on the 
measurement of risk attitude and its influence upon the choice of a 
risk management instrument. This part of our study will be devoted 
to this topic. It starts with methodological research into measuring 
risk attitude of entrepreneurs in the financial domain. We analyze 
two major approaches used in the past for measuring the risk 
attitude of entrepreneurs of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the domain of financial risk. Measures based on the expected utility 
model, used in economics, and measures based on marketing 
scales, used in marketing research and psychology. Specifically, we 
are interested in their convergent validity, whether the measures 
developed within either discipline have common elements, that is 
whether the investigated risk attitude measures are measurements 
of the same construct risk attitude. Moreover, we are interested in 
the nomological validity of these measures. 
After having gained insight into the risk attitude construct, 
we model the choice behavior of entrepreneurs (in our empirical 
study hog farmers) regarding futures. Insight is gained into how hog 
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farmers decide and why they decide the way they do. Based on this 
decision model, aspects related to service design and service 
delivery by futures exchanges will be discussed. 
Due to the nature of a futures market's organization, the 
information dissemination process of futures contract innovations is 
of great influence on the success of a futures contract. For this 
reason it is interesting to investigate which tools available to the 
futures exchange might accelerate this process. 
CHAPTER 7 
Measuring the Risk Attitude of 
Entrepreneurs in the Domain of 
Financial Risk 1 
7.1 Abstract 
Two major approaches of measuring the risk attitude of 
entrepreneurs are compared with respect to nomological validity and 
convergent validity. One set of risk attitude measures is based on the 
expected utility model, dominant in economics, and is derived from 
responses to lotteries. Another stems from the psychometric approach, 
dominant in marketing, and is based on Likert statements. We study the 
strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and their use in marketing 
and management science. The empirical context concerns the use of price 
risk management tools, i.e. futures contracts. Data from 
346 entrepreneurs were obtained in computer-assisted interviews. The 
intrinsic risk attitude was measured by means of the certainty 
equivalence and rating technique. A unidimensional psychometric risk 
attitude scale was developed by performing CFA on a set of statements 
selected from the literature. Behavioral data concerned the use of futures 
contracts, the frequency of trading in the risky market, and the choice of 
the marketing channel (risky vs. safe). The risk attitude based on lotteries 
was found to predict actual market behavior much better than the 
psychometric risk attitude scale. In contrast, the psychometric scale 
showed more coherence with self-report measures of innovativeness, 
market orientation, the intention to secure profit margin and the intention 
to reduce income fluctuations. When interested in actual (market) 
1 This chapter is based on: Pennings, J.M.E. and A. Smidts (1998), "Measuring 
Risk Attitude of Entrepreneurs in the Domain of Financial Risk" Working Paper, 
Wageningen Agricultural University, Department of Marketing and Marketing 
Research. 
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behavior and given the apparently higher predictive validity of the 
intrinsic risk attitude, we recommend making use of revealed preference 
methods concerning decision making under risk, such as lotteries in 
marketing and management science. 
7.2 Introduction 
The markets in which entrepreneurs operate are often 
turbulent. The unpredictability of e.g. the market price exposes 
entrepreneurs to (price) risk. The way in which entrepreneurs 
handle these risks depend largely on the entrepreneur's risk attitude 
(Robison and Barry 1986). Thus, in many models, rooted in 
economics, finance and marketing, risk attitude plays an important 
role in understanding decision making behavior (Kahl 1983; Smidts 
1990; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In empirical studies two 
major approaches towards risk attitude measurement can be 
differentiated: measures derived from the expected utility 
framework, dominant in economics and finance (Fishburn 1988; 
Savage 1954; Schoemaker 1982; Stone and Mason 1995; von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
1986), and measures derived from psychometrics, dominant in 
marketing and psychology (Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse 
1982; Stone and Mason 1995). Since we may anticipate that the 
way in which risk attitude is conceptualized and measured affects 
our understanding of decision making under risk, it is of the utmost 
importance to gain insight into the construct validity of the different 
risk attitude measures derived from both approaches. Research into 
the construct validity of risk attitude is still lacking. One aspect of 
construct validity is convergent validity (Churchill 1995): if the risk 
attitude measures from both approaches are indeed measuring risk 
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attitude then the different measures should highly correlate. A 
second aspect of construct validity is nomological validity 
(Churchill 1995): if the different risk attitude measures actually 
measure risk attitude, they will have to be related to variables to 
which risk attitude is theoretically related, such as the attitude 
towards innovation. In this study we are particularly interested in 
the relationship between the different risk attitude measures and 
actual market behavior. In other words: what can be said about the 
predictive validity of the risk attitude measures derived from both 
approaches concerning actual market behavior? 
The expected utility model has been used for many years for 
the analysis of behavior under risk. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) are the major contributors to a large body of work that forms 
the justification for the use of the expected utility model by a 
rational decision maker. The expected utility model views decision 
making under risk as a choice between alternatives. Decision 
makers are assumed to have a preference ordering defined over the 
probability distributions. For this preference ordering a number of 
axioms hold (Fishburn 1983). Risky alternatives can be evaluated 
under these assumptions using the utility preference function, u(x). 
The curvature of the utility function is a measure of risk attitude 
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976). The utility function and hence the risk 
attitude measure is assessed by means of lotteries. The well-known 
Pratt-Arrow coefficient of risk aversion then provides a local 
measure of risk attitude. Within the expected utility approach, a 
number of researchers suggest to correct the utility function 
obtained by lotteries for the strength of preference (Bell and Raiffa 
1982; Dyer and Sarin 1982; Sinn 1983; Currim and Sarin 1983). 
The strength of preference refers to the intensity of a decision 
maker's preference for an alternative. These researchers argue that 
the outcomes in a lottery are transformed into subjective values 
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under certainty by the strength of preference function (see Dyer and 
Sarin 1982 and Smidts 1997). For this reason, they suggest to 
transform the utility function u(x) by means of the strength of 
preference function v(x), that is u{x) = f(y(x)). According to 
these researchers, the difference between the utility and the strength 
of preference function can be attributed to the influence of risk 
preference. The difference is therefore the true risk attitude, also 
denoted as the intrinsic risk attitude or relative risk attitude, since it 
is defined relative to the strength of preference function (Bell and 
Raiffa 1982; Dyer and Sarin 1982; Schoemaker 1980). Thus, one 
may expect the intrinsic risk attitude to perform better on 
nomological validity than the risk attitude obtained by lotteries 
only. 
WitWn the psychometric approach, constructs such as risk 
attitude are measured by means of scales which consist of a number 
of statements (multi-item measurement). The respondent has to 
indicate the extent to which he/she agrees with a particular 
statement (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Several researchers have 
developed risk attitude scales (Childers 1986; Harnett an 
Cummings 1980; Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Miller, Kets de Vries 
and Toulouse 1982; Raju 1980). The different risk attitude scales 
all pertain to a specific domain. Hence, risk attitude here is rather 
seen as a state variable (i.e. context-specific variable) than as a trait 
(personality characteristic). For example, Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) developed a risk attitude scale measuring top-management 
risk aversion. The risk aversion scale was composed of six items 
(e.g. top managers in the business unit like to "play it safe"), and 
tapped top managers' disposition toward risk and uncertainty. 
In this study we thus investigate the construct validity of 
risk attitude by differentiating three measures: two measures are 
derived from the expected utility framework, risk attitude based on 
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the curvature of the utility function u(x) and the intrinsic risk 
attitude, and one measure is derived from psychometrics. We 
concentrate on risk attitude measures in the domain of financial risk 
faced by entrepreneurs, specifically price risk when selling output. 
A personal computer-guided interview conducted with 
346 entrepreneurs of SME's enabled us to study the individual 
decision behavior of entrepreneurs of SME's. 
Within the expected utility framework we use lotteries to 
obtain the utility function u(x) on the basis of which we derive the 
Pratt-Arrow risk attitude measure. The strength of preference 
function v(x) is measured using the rating technique. By relating 
the utility function u(x) to the strength of preference function v(x) 
we are able to deduce the intrinsic risk attitude. Based on the risk 
attitude measures already present in the literature, we develop 
within the psychometric framework a one-dimensional risk attitude 
scale. The risk attitude measures are tested for convergent validity 
by investigating the correlation between the risk attitude measures. 
In order to test for nomological validity we relate the risk attitude 
measures to: the entrepreneur's attitude towards innovation, the 
entrepreneur's attitude towards market orientation, the 
entrepreneur's intention to reduce fluctuations in his/her income, 
and the entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit margin. 
Apart from these attitude and intention measures, we relate the risk 
attitude measures to behavioral variables. We gathered behavioral 
data on: the entrepreneurs' use of futures contracts (being the most 
relevant price risk management instrument for the entrepreneurs in 
our empirical study), the frequency of trading in the risky market 
and the marketing channel chosen (risky versus safe). By using both 
attitude or intention variables and revealed preference data, the 
nomological validity can be assessed in its broadest sense. 
116 Chapter 7 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.3 we 
present a framework for testing construct validity. We formulate 
hypotheses about the relationship between risk attitude and 
variables to which it is theoretically related. The research method of 
the study is described in Section 7.4, whereas in Section 7.5 
findings are given with respect to the risk attitude measures. Within 
the expected utility framework we present the results of the 
certainty equivalence technique and the rating technique. We 
measure the intrinsic risk attitude by relating the certainty 
equivalence technique with the rating technique. The utility curve, 
the strength of preference function and the relationship between 
them (i.e. the intrinsic risk attitude) is tested for exponential and 
power functions. Within the psychometric framework, we test the 
scale developed for reliability and validity using confirmatory 
factor analysis. In Section 7.6, the risk attitude measures developed 
are tested for construct validity by testing for convergent validity 
and nomological validity. We conclude by discussing our results 
and making suggestions for further research in Section 7.7. 
7.3 Framework for Testing Construct Validity 
The construct validity of the different risk attitude measures 
is investigated by testing for convergent and nomological validity. 
The convergent validity, defined by Churchill (1995) as the 
confirmation of a relationship by independent measurement 
procedures, will be tested by investigating whether the risk attitude 
measures show a positive significant correlation (cf. also Figure 1). 
If the different measures actually measure risk attitude, we may 
expect a correlation between them. Moreover, we expect the 
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strength of preference, measured with the rating technique, not to 
correlate too much with the risk attitude measures (the strength of 
preference, after all, measures the intensity of a decision maker's 
preference for an alternative, not his/her risk attitude), which would 
provide the discriminant validity of the risk attitude measures. 
In order to gain insight into the nomological validity of the 
risk attitude measures, we investigate how these measures are 
related to the variables to which risk attitude is theoretically related. 
In the nomological net, variables have been included which are on 
the attitude and intention level, along with variables which reflect 
the entrepreneur's actual market behavior (see Figure 1). In the 
empirical study, the variables on the attitude and intention level 
have been measured by self-report measures, whereas the variables 
which reflect the entrepreneur's actual behavior have been 
measured by registering past behavior. 
Figure 1 Nomological net of risk attitude 
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Based on literature we formulate several hypotheses 
reflected in the nomological net of Figure 1. First, we present the 
hypotheses which relate risk attitude to variables which describe the 
entrepreneur's attitude towards innovation, market orientation and 
intention to reduce risk. Then, we present the hypotheses which 
relate risk attitude to actual market behavior. Note that we define 
risk attitude to be "positive" for risk-averse decision makers and 
"negative" for risk prone decision makers when formulating the 
hypotheses. 
7.3.1 Attitude and Intention Variables 
Innovativeness. The attitude towards innovation refers to 
the extent to which entrepreneurs are open to new experiences and 
novel stimuli, possess the ability to transform information about 
new concepts, ideas, products or services for their own use, and 
have a low threshold for recognizing the potential application of 
new ideas (Leavitt and Walton 1975, 1985). Innovators, compared 
to other members in the system, are relatively quick to adopt 
innovations. Adoption of products, services or ideas that are not 
generally adopted, implies risk-taking behavior (Bhoovaraghavan, 
Vasudevan and Chandran 1996). Because innovators adopt 
innovations earlier and hence expose themselves to a degree of 
uncertainty, we expect to find a risk-averse decision-maker to be 
less innovative. O'Reilly (1989) surveyed several hundred 
managers in diverse industries, concluding that taking risk is a key 
value in promoting innovation. Similarly, Goldhar, Bragaw and 
Schwartz (1976) identify taking risk as an characteristic of 
innovating firms. Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) argue that low 
levels of uncertainty avoidance facilitate the initiation phase of new 
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product developments through risk-taking and minimal planning 
and controls. We therefore hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS la. The entrepreneur's risk attitude is negatively 
related to the entrepreneur's attitude towards innovation. 
Market orientation. Following Narver and Slater (1990) a 
market oriented business continuously examines the alternative 
sources of sustainable competitive advantage to see how it can be 
most effective in creating sustainable superior value for its present 
and future target market. Market orientation consists in their study 
of three behavioral components: customer orientation, competitor 
orientation and interfunctional coordination. The organization's 
market orientation is shaped by its managers' attitude towards 
market orientation. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) argued that the 
greater the risk aversion of top managers, the lower the 
organization's market orientation. Indeed, they found that if top 
managers are risk-averse and intolerant of failures, subordinates 
will, for example, be less likely to be responsive to changes in 
customer needs. In another study Jaworski and Kohli (1993) found 
that responding to market developments entails some amount of 
risk. Thus we hypothesize that risk-averse entrepreneurs will be 
less market oriented than risk-seeking entrepreneurs. More 
formally: 
HYPOTHESIS lb. The entrepreneur's risk attitude is negatively 
related to the entrepreneur's attitude towards market orientation. 
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The entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit 
margin. We may expect risk-averse entrepreneurs to feel an 
incentive to secure their profits and to eliminate exposure to profit 
risk, while risk-seeking entrepreneurs will not feel an incentive to 
secure their profit margin, for example by means of cash forward 
contracts for both inputs and outputs. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS lc. The entrepreneur's risk attitude is positively 
related to the entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit 
margin. 
The entrepreneur's intention to reduce his/her income 
fluctuations. We may expect risk-averse entrepreneurs to feel an 
incentive to reduce income fluctuations, for example by means of 
income insurance, whereas risk-seeking entrepreneurs will not feel 
this incentive. Therefore we hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS Id. The entrepreneur's risk attitude is positively 
related to the entrepreneur's intention to reduce his/her income 
fluctuations. 
7.3.2 Revealed Market Behavior Variables 
We may expect risk attitude to be an important determinant 
of the entrepreneur's market behavior. A risk-averse entrepreneur 
will feel a need to reduce risk in the case of price risk (Stoll and 
Whaley 1993). The entrepreneur can meet this need by using price 
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risk management instruments such as futures and options, when 
available. Of course, the entrepreneur would not only have to be 
risk averse, he/she would also have to perceive a substantial price 
risk in order to feel the need to use price risk management 
instruments. We therefore hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. The entrepreneur's risk attitude is positively 
related to the incidence of using price risk management 
instruments. 
Usually, an entrepreneur will have the opportunity to sell 
his/her output via different market channels, such as the trader, the 
wholesaler, the retailer, or directly sell to the final customer. These 
market channels may differ as to the price risk they generate (spot 
price versus average price over certain period). When selling 
his/her output, we propose that a risk-averse entrepreneur will 
choose the marketing channel that fits his/her risk profile. We 
hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Entrepreneurs who are more risk averse will 
choose a marketing channel which exposes them to a lesser amount 
of risk 
A decision maker can spread his/her risk by frequently 
trading his/her output in a risk-bearing market. By trading in the 
market frequently and over a period of time, it will yield an average 
price. This strategy is attractive for a risk-averse entrepreneur, since 
it allows him to reduce his/her price risk. The more market risk 
he/she perceives, the more often he/she will enter the market. On 
the other hand, a less risk-averse entrepreneur will attempt to trade 
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less frequently in the market, because he/she is prepared to take 
more risk in particular if such a decision maker perceives low 
market risk. We therefore expect an interaction effect between risk 
attitude and risk perception and the number of trades in the risky 
market. We hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 2c. A risk-averse entrepreneur will trade more 
frequently. The more risk he/she perceives, the more frequent this 
trading behavior will be. 
1A Research Method 
7.4.1 Decision Context 
The subjects of the study are entrepreneurs of medium-sized 
and large hog farms in The Netherlands. The Dutch hog industry is 
among the largest exporters of slaughter hogs in the European 
Union and accounts for an important part of Dutch export. Contrary 
to practice with other agricultural products, the market for slaughter 
hogs in the European Union does not know any government 
intervention. Therefore, slaughter hog prices show heavy 
fluctuations. A hog farm is a specialized company with hog-
farming accounting for about 85% of the entrepreneur's total 
income. Its production process is pretty simple. The entrepreneur 
buys piglets and feed and raises the piglets to slaughter hogs within 
three months. Often, the entrepreneur has a number of so-called 
"rounds" within the company, each "round" representing a group of 
hogs of the same age. When buying the piglets and the feed, the 
entrepreneur runs a risk on that particular "round" (i.e. the slaughter 
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hogs), since the price of slaughter hogs three months from the 
moment of purchase (when the piglets will have been raised to 
slaughter hogs) is largely unknown. 
From depth interviews with 40 entrepreneurs it became 
clear that futures contracts were the most relevant price risk 
management instrument. 
7.4.2 Data Collection 
A questionnaire was developed on the basis of literature and 
40 test interviews to make sure that the questions would be 
interpreted correctly. The survey consisted of face-to-face 
interviews. The personal interview was computerized and care was 
taken to build a user-friendly interface. The software written for 
this interview was extensively tested and 15 test interviews were 
conducted to ensure that the interface was being understood by the 
entrepreneurs and perceived as "very user-friendly". The large-scale 
personal interview took place in the second half of 1996 at the 
entrepreneur's enterprise. Prior to the interview an appointment 
was made over the telephone. There was a high response rate: 60% 
of the entrepreneurs approached were prepared to be interviewed. A 
net total of 346 entrepreneurs were interviewed. All the 
interviewers had prior interviewing experience and had followed an 
extensive training program for the assessment procedures. 
Moreover, the training program ensured that the interviewers 
understood the questions posed to the entrepreneurs. The personal 
computer-assisted interview lasted for about 35 minutes. The 
sampling frame was stratified according to the variables 'region' 
and 'size of enterprise'. 
124 Chapter 7 
7.4.3 Measurement of Risk Attitude 
7.4.3.1 Assessment of the Utility Function: The Lottery Technique 
In the certainty equivalence method, the researcher asks the 
respondent to compare a lottery (xt, p, xh) with a certain outcome, 
where (x / 5 p, xh) is the two-outcome lottery that assigns 
probability p to outcome xt and probability 1 - p to outcome xh 
with Xj < xh. The researcher then varies the certain outcome until 
the respondent reveals indifference between the certain outcome 
denoted by CE(^>). Through application of the vonNeumann-
Morgenstern utility u we obtain: 
u(CE(p)) = pu(x{) + (1 - p)u(xh). 
When eliciting utilities, first, two outcomes are fixed such 
that the range of outcomes between them includes all outcomes of 
interest. Secondly, one may set u(xL) = 0 and u(xH) = 1 where 
xL and xH denote the upper and lower bound respectively of the 
outcome range. The certainty equivalence method used in this study 
concerns a bisection framework that only uses probability 0.5. First, 
the outcome CE(0.5) with utility 0.5 is found as above. Then the 
outcome CE(0.25) is obtained with utility 0.25 through an 
indifference CE(0.25) ~ (x„ 0.5, CE(0.5)). An indifference 
CE(0.75) ~ (CE(0.5), 0.5, xh) is used to obtain the outcome 
CE(0.75), with utility 0.75. So, former responses to lotteries are 
used in the assessment of subsequent responses. Subsequently, one 
can find a large number of CEs after a sufficient number of 
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questions in which every question involves a bisection of a 
particular interval (Smidts 1997). 
In the empirical study the lottery technique was 
computerized. The respondents were asked to imagine themselves 
selling their hogs. They were given a choice between three 
alternatives. Alternative A (the lottery) entailed receiving a 
relatively high price or a relatively low price with a 50/50 chance, 
Alternative B meant receiving a fixed price, while Alternative C 
represented indifference to alternatives A and B. The scenario was 
perceived by the respondents as very realistic, since the decision-
making problem thus presented is representative of the sales 
decision they have to make on a regular basis. Respondents saw the 
three alternatives depicted in rectangles on the computer screen. 
Alternative A consisted of a 50/50 lottery where the initial upper 
and lower bounds were set by the researchers. Alternative B 
consisted of a fixed price where the initial fixed price was 
randomly generated by the computer within the initial upper and 
lower bounds. Alternative C consisted of the statement that it did 
not matter to receive alternative A or B. The lotteries' outcomes 
were denoted in Dutch Guilders pro kilogram live weight of hogs. 
The first lottery presented to the respondents concerned a 50/50 
lottery with outcomes of 2.34 Dutch Guilder and 4.29 Dutch 
Guilder. These boundaries were chosen since we know the 
minimum and maximum price of hogs to lie between 2.34 and 
4.29 Dutch Guilders, based on historical prices. For each lottery the 
entrepreneur had to assess the fixed price (i.e. the certainty 
equivalent) by choosing A or B and again choosing A or B up to the 
point where the respondent chooses C, after which a new lottery 
started. The assessment of the certainty equivalent was an iterative 
process. If the respondent chose Alternative A, the computer 
generated a higher fixed price (Alternative B) than the previous 
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fixed price, hence making Alternative B more attractive. If the 
respondent chose Alternative B the computer generated a lower 
fixed price (Alternative B) than the previous fixed price, hence 
making Alternative A more attractive. At some point, the 
respondent indicated that it did not matter to receive Alternative A 
or B, and chose Alternative C. The next measurement (the next 
lottery) started after the respondent chose C. With this method, nine 
points of the utility curve were assessed, including two points to 
check the consistency of the measurements. The lottery task took 
about 20 minutes. Based on the assessed utility curve, we are able 
to derive the Pratt-Arrow coefficient as a measure of risk attitude. 
The exponential function and the power function are used to 
specify the utility function. After scaling the boundaries of the 
functions, the estimation of only one parameter suffices to 
characterize a decision maker's risk attitude. Since it is the certainty 
equivalents, not the utility levels, which are measured with error, 
the inverse function is estimated (see for a detailed description of 
the estimation functions Appendix A). 
7.4.3.2 Assessment of the Strength of Preference Function: The 
Rating Technique 
In order to assess the strength of preference function, we use 
the rating technique. The strength of preference function is assessed 
by asking the respondent to express the strength of preference 
towards a price level through assigning a value to it. The 
respondents had to value nine price levels on a scale of 1 up to and 
including 10. Apart from using round scale numbers, the 
respondent could specify the fractions 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, 
analogous to the performance rating system used in Dutch schools. 
Before the respondent started the task, the price range from which 
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the price levels were drawn were shown. The price levels were 
drawn between the same range as the lotteries, hence the 
respondents were asked to value price levels which lay between 
2.34 and 4.29 Dutch Guilders. This task took only a few minutes. 
As was the case by the lotteries the exponential function and the 
power function are used to specify the strength of preference 
function (see for a detailed description of the estimation functions 
Appendix A). 
7.4.3.3 Psychometric Risk Attitude Scale 
Several researchers have developed risk attitude scales. 
Raju (1980) developed a risk-taker scale with respect to restaurants, 
products, and brands. The scale was a nine-item, seven-point scale 
measuring the degree to which a person reports to be willing to take 
risk by trying unfamiliar restaurants, products and brands. Harnett 
and Cummings (1980) measured the risk attitude of 550 managers 
from Europe and the U.S. with "yes" and "no" answers to items 
like: "Do you like to invest money in a promising invention?". 
Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse (1982) measured risk-taking by 
two items. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to 
which there is a proclivity toward high-risk projects or low-risk 
projects and the extent to which it is best to explore by timid 
behavior or bold wide-range acts. Childers (1986) developed a risk 
aversion scale with respect to product usage. The scale measures a 
person's fear of doing something with a product that he/she has not 
tried before. Jaworski and Kohli (1993) developed a risk attitude 
scale measuring top management risk aversion. The risk aversion 
scale was composed of six items (e.g. top managers in the business 
unit like to "play it safe"), and tapped top managers' disposition 
toward risk and uncertainty. Items for each scale were scored on a 
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five-point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree". Risk attitude scales for the domain of financial risks faced 
by entrepreneurs of SMEs were not available in the literature. 
Therefore, the first step entailed the development of a new risk 
attitude scale, in which we used items from previous risk attitude 
scales. The following iterative procedure was adopted for that 
purpose. First, based on literature a large pool of items was 
generated. Care was taken to tap the domain of the risk attitude 
construct as closely as possible. Next, the items were tested for 
clarity and appropriateness in personally administered pretests with 
40 entrepreneurs. The respondents were asked to complete a 
questionnaire and indicate any ambiguity or other difficulty they 
experienced in responding to the items, as well as for any 
suggestions they deemed appropriate. Based on the feedback 
received from the respondents, some items were eliminated, others 
were modified, and additional items were developed. The final 
scale was composed of three items showing a close relationship 
with the Jaworski and Kohli scale (1993). 
7.4.4 Measurement of Variables Included in the Nomological Net 
7 AAA Operationalization of Attitude and Intention Variables 
The measures of the constructs on the attitude and intention 
level were developed from scales as used in studies in marketing, 
psychology, and management. An extensive list of the items 
included in each of the measures is provided in Appendix B. 
The Open Processing Scale (OPS) measure, first developed 
by Leavitt and Walton (1975, 1985), was utilized to measure 
innovativeness. The OPS is a psychometrically stable measure of 
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behavioral tendencies (Goldsmith 1984, 1991; Joseph and Vyas 
1984). See Appendix B for a detailed description of the 
psychometric properties of the scale. 
We utilized items of Narver and Slater (1990) in order to 
construct the market orientation measure and adapted those to the 
context of this study. The measure is composed of items measuring 
consumer orientation and cash market tracing. As the 
interfunctional coordination component of market orientation in the 
Narver and Slater (1990) scale is not relevant, since the 
entrepreneur unites all the functions in Wmself/herself, these items 
were left out in the measurement. See Appendix B for a detailed 
description of the psychometric properties of the scale. 
The entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit margin 
is operationalized by asking the entrepreneur to indicate on a nine 
point scale ranging from -4 ("I strongly disagree") to 4 ("I strongly 
agree") the extent to which he/she agrees with the postulate that 
he/she wants to secure his/her profit. 
The entrepreneur intention to reduce his/her income 
fluctuations is operationalized by asking the entrepreneur to 
indicate on a nine point scale ranging from -4 ("I strongly 
disagree") to 4 ("I strongly agree") the extent to which he/she 
agrees with the postulate that he/she wants to reduce income 
fluctuations. 
7.4.4.2 Operationalization of the Revealed Market Behavior 
Variables 
The frequency of trading in the risky market is measured by 
registering the number of times per year the entrepreneur usually 
enters the market to sell his/her hogs. From the depth interviews it 
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is known that the number of market entries lies between a 
maximum of once a week and a minimum of four times per year. 
This minimum is imposed by the nature of the production process 
since raising of piglets into hogs takes three months. A hog farmer 
with only one "round" at a time in his/her company would thus still 
have to enter the risky market four times per year. 
Whether or not the entrepreneur was using futures contracts 
as a price risk management instrument was measured by registering 
whether or not the entrepreneur had used futures as a hedging tool 
in recent years. 
The choice of marketing channel was measured by 
registering the marketing channel the entrepreneur uses when 
he/she sells his/her output. We were able to distinguish three 
marketing channels: 1) selling to the trader 2) selling to the 
slaughterhouse and 3) selling to a cooperative. When selling to the 
trader or directly to the slaughterhouse, the hog farmer receives the 
spot price and hence finds himself exposed to cash market risk. 
Hence, selling to a trader or slaughterhouse can be seen as choosing 
for a relatively risky marketing channel. When the hog farmer sells 
the hogs to the cooperative he/she receives an "average price" and 
consequently reduces his/her cash price risk. The word average has 
been put between brackets because the price the hog farmer 
receives from the cooperative is the spot price plus an amount of 
money, in proportion to the hog farmer's sales, that corresponds to 
the profit that the cooperative made. Moreover, the cooperative has 
a relatively low credit risk. Therefore, this is considered a relatively 
safe marketing channel. 
The entrepreneur's risk perception is measured by asking 
the entrepreneur to indicate on a nine point scale ranging from 1 
(very risky) to 9 (not risky at all) the extent to which he/she 
perceives the market for hogs as risky. 
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For descriptive purposes, some background variables were 
measured, such as the age of the entrepreneur and the size of the 
company (the number of slaughter hogs being raised). 
7.5 Results of Measurements 
7.5.1 Risk Perception and Trading Behavior 
During the interview, the entrepreneur was asked to indicate 
on a scale from 1 ("I do not know what the price will be") to 9 
("I know exactly what the price will be") the extent to which he/she 
felt that he/she could tell what the price level would be three 
months later, the time span between purchasing piglets and selling 
them as slaughter hogs. An average score of 1.84 and a standard 
deviation of 1.49 suggest that the entrepreneur feels that price 
fluctuations are hard to predict. Moreover, a question about the 
amount of risk in the hog market produced an average score of 7.5 
on a scale of 1 (very risky) to 9 (not risky at all) with a standard 
deviation of 2.1. This suggests that the entrepreneurs perceive the 
market in which they operate as risky. However, the entrepreneurs' 
perception of market risk does not lead to a frequent use of price 
risk management instruments. A mere 13% of the entrepreneurs 
interviewed used futures contracts and 3% used cash forward 
contracts to cover their price risk. This indicates that entrepreneurs 
are willing to incur risk in the sale of slaughter hogs, or, as one 
entrepreneur put it during one of the in-depth interviews: "we value 
markets with high price volatility, because they provide 
opportunities to gain". Also the fact that sixty-four percent of all 
hog farmers sell to traders or directly to slaughterhouses, where 
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they receive the spot price and hence are exposed to price risk, 
suggests risk taking behavior. Twenty-three percent of the 
respondents supply exclusively to a cooperative where they get an 
average price, thus spreading their risk. The remaining 13% sell 
their slaughter hogs through a combination of marketing channels, 
trader, slaughterhouse and cooperative. 
7.5.2 Results of Lottery Measurement 
In Table 1, some descriptive statistics are shown concerning 
the certainty equivalents assessed. The results in Table 1 are 
ordered by level of expected utility of the lotteries. The order in 
which the lotteries were presented to the respondent is indicated by 
the number in the first column of Table 1. The second column 
shows the outcomes used in each lottery. With the exception of the 
first lottery, in which the outcomes are 2.34 and 4.29 Dutch Guilder 
for all respondents, the outcomes of the lotteries depend upon the 
answers respondents have provided in former lotteries. As a 
consequence, the expected value of the lottery and range of the 
lottery for each level of expected utility vary between respondents. 
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Xi X] x h E(u(x)) Mean Median stdev. A RN S 
4 2.34 x 2 0.125 2.74 2.61 0.42 27 7 66 
2 2.34 X] 0.250 2.95 2.88 0.45 22 4 74 
5 x 2 xi 0.375 3.14 3.15 0.45 21 23 56 
1 2.34 4.29 0.5 3.35 3.34 0.44 42 0 58 
8 x 2 x 3 0.5 3.36 3.40 0.48 23 13 64 
6 Xi x 3 0.625 3.48 3.50 0.45 24 25 51 
9 x 5 x 7 0.625 3.55 3.60 0.43 25 11 64 
3 Xi 4.29 0.75 3.64 3.70 0.45 55 3 42 
7 x 3 4.29 0.875 3.88 4.00 0.28 42 17 41 
where x, is the relatively low price in the lottery, x h the relatively high price in the lottery, 
E(x) the expected value of the lottery, CE the assessed certainty equivalent, A is risk-
averse, RN is risk-neutral and S is risk-seeking. 
In Table 1 the measurements are classified for each level of 
expected utility into risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking 
responses by taking the difference between the lottery's expected 
value E(x) and the certainty equivalent CE. A positive difference 
indicates risk-averse behavior, while a negative difference points to 
risk-seeking behavior. On average, the entrepreneurs show risk-
seeking behavior in lotteries with relatively low utility. When 
expected utility is relatively high, (u(x) = 0.75 and 
u(x) = 0.875), we observe risk-averse behavior. We had two 
measurements at u(x) = 0.5 and two measurements at 
u(x) = 0.625 in order to test the internal consistency of the 
assessments. If entrepreneurs respond in accordance with the 
expected utility theory, the same certainty equivalents should result 
aside from random response error. When tested, the differences 
between the assessed certainty equivalents for the same utility 
levels are not significant (p > 0.99 (pairwise test) for both 
Table 1 Results of the assessment of the certainty equivalence technique (in Dutch 
Guilders/kg) 
Measurement Lottery Expected utility Certainty Response 
Equivalent E(Xi)-Xi (%) 
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consistency measurements). It is therefore concluded that 
respondents assessed certainty equivalents in an internally 
consistent manner. 
The power function and the exponential function are 
applied in the utility assessment because of their theoretical 
properties regarding absolute and proportional risk aversion. 
Moreover, after having scaled the boundaries of the functions, the 
estimation of only one parameter suffices to characterize an 
entrepreneur's risk attitude. In Table 2, the descriptive statistics of 
the parameter estimates are presented. The average mean squared 
error (MSE) for u(x) was 0.0256 for the exponential and 0.0268 
for the power function. This difference in fit is significant 
( t345 = 2.21, p = 0.028; pairwise test). The average mean absolute 
error (MAE) for u(x) was 0.1060 for the exponential and 0.1072 
for the power function. This difference in fit is not significant 
O345 = 1.43,/? = 0.152; pairwise test). In conclusion, the exponential 
function fits the data slightly better than the power function. 
Table 2 shows that, on average, the entrepreneurs are risk-
seeking decision makers, corresponding with the entrepreneur's 
revealed trading behavior. 
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Table 2 Results of estimating the risk attitude and strength of preference per individual 
for the exponential junction and the power function (sample statistics, N = 346) 
Lottery Rating 
exponential power exponential power 
Parameter" c d e g 
Mean -0.497 1.769 0.334 0.852 
Median -0.266 1.222 0.368 0.800 
stdev. 1.569 1.808 0.491 0.262 
Fit indicesb 
Mean MSE 0.026 0.027 0.012 0.011 
Median MSE 0.019 0.019 0.008 0.007 
Mean MAE 0.106 0.107 0.069 0.069 
Median MAE 0.102 0.101 0.064 0.060 
MeanR 2 0.891 0.892 0.908 0.908 
Median R2 0.922 0.923 0.939 0.941 
Percentiles parameter 
20th -1.322 2.338 -0.083 1.043 
40th -0.492 1.427 0.245 0.854 
60th -0.049 1.064 0.460 0.745 
80th 0.595 0.676 0.700 0.644 
Classification of respondents 
on the basis of the parameter value0 
Concave function 36% 38% 78% 77% 
Convex function 64% 62% 22% 23% 
Classification of respondents 
on the basis of the t-valued 
Concave function 35% 33% 74% 73% 
Linear function 4% 5% 4% 6% 
Convex function 61% 62% 22% 21% 
* See for the function specifications Tables Al and A2 in Appendix A. 
b MSE = Mean Squared Error; MAE = Mean Absolute Error; R 2 is calculated by squaring 
the Pearson correlation between actual values and the values predicted from the model. 
c If c > 0 the respondent is said to be risk averse and if c < 0 the respondent is said to be 
risk seeking. 
d A respondent is classified as risk neutral when the parameter is not significantly 
different from zero at the p = 0.1 level. Note that to test whether the parameter is 
significantly different from zero (risk neutral), we had to assume that the residuals are 
independently and identically distributed per individual and that the non-linear-squares 
estimator is distributed approximately normally. Since it is questionable whether the 
residuals per individual fit the assumptions, the analysis performed here shall serve 
illustrative purposes only. 
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7.5.3 Results of Strength of Preference Measurement 
From the rating technique it becomes clear that, on average, 
the entrepreneurs show decreasing marginal value (i.e. the strength 
of preference function v(x) is concave), that is, an entrepreneur 
values an increase from x Dutch Guilders in a relatively low price 
range more than the same increase in a relatively high price range 
(see Table 2). The MSE for v(x) was 0.0113 for the power and 
0.0116 for the exponential function. This difference in fit is 
significant ( t 3 4 5 = 2.76, p = 0.006; pairwise test). The MAE for 
v(x) was 0.0685 for the power function and 0.0689 for the 
exponential function. This difference in fit is not significant 
( t345 = 0.92, p = 0.357; pairwise test). This leads us to the 
conclusion that the power function fits the data slightly better than 
the exponential function. 
7.5.4 Results of Intrinsic Risk Attitude 
Regarding the intrinsic risk attitude, both functions fit the 
data equally well (see Table 3). The average mean squared error 
(MSE) for u(x) was 0.0124 for the exponential and 0.0122 for the 
power function. This difference in fit is not significant ( t345 - 0.74, 
p = 0.457; pairwise test). The average mean absolute error (MAE) 
for u(x) was 0.0648 for the exponential function and 0.0639 for 
the power function. This difference in fit is also not significant 
( t345 = 1.91,/? = 0.057; pairwise test). 
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Table 3 Results of estimating the intrinsic risk attitude per individual for the exponential 
function and the power function (sample statistics, N = 346) 
exponential power 
Parameter" 9 k 
Mean -1.724 2.231 
Median -1.251 1.620 
st.dev. 3.660 3.093 
Fit indices 
Mean MSE 0.012 0.012 
Median MSE 0.007 0.006 
Mean MAE 0.065 0.064 
Median MAE 0.055 0.055 
MeanR 2 0.909 0.911 
Median R 2 0.945 0.946 
Percentiles parameter 
20th -3.281 2.876 
40th -1.782 1.867 
60th -0.751 1.335 
80th 0.447 0.894 
Classification of respondents 
on the basis of the parameter value 
Risk-averse 27% 26% 
Risk-seeking 73% 74% 
Classification of respondents 
on the basis of the t-value 
Intrinsically risk-averse 26% 25% 
Intrinsically risk-neutral 1% 3% 
Intrinsically risk-seeking 73% 72% 
a See for the function specifications Table A3 in Appendix A. 
Note: in order to compare the parameter estimates of Table 2 with the parameter 
estimates presented in this Table the latter estimates have to be divided by 1.95 
(which is the range of the price levels, that is xh-xi). 
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Table 3 shows that the sample averages of both functions 
imply that the average respondent exhibits intrinsically risk-seeking 
behavior which corresponds to the findings of Smidts (1997). In 
order to test whether the group of respondents is significantly 
different from intrinsically risk-neutral, it is tested whether the 
parameter is zero is rejected. The f-test was rejected (for the 
exponential function t = -1.1 A, p < 0.001 and for the power 
function t = -6.60, p < 0.001). This result indicates once more 
that there is no linear relationship between u(x) and v(x), which is in 
line with previous studies (Krzysztofowicz 1983 and Smidts 1997). 
This confirms the proposition that u(x) and v(x) are different 
constructs, with only u(x) telling us something about risk. Figure 2 
provides further insight into the magnitude of the differences 
between entrepreneurs in risk attitude and strength of preference. 
2 . 3 4 4 . 2 9 
Figure 2 Utility and strength ofpreference curves corresponding to the 80th, 
50th and 20th percentile. 
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7.5.5 Results of Psychometric Risk A ttitude Scale 
We used the item-total correlation and exploratory factor 
analysis for purification of the initial scale of nine items. After that, 
the number of items was further reduced by selecting only high 
loading items following the procedure as described in Steenkamp 
and van Trijp (1991). A unidimensional risk attitude scale, labeled 
RiskAtt Scale, was composed of three items showing a close 
relationship with the items from the Jaworski and Kohli scale 
(1993). (See Appendix B for the psychometric properties of the 
scale.) Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with the given statements on a scale ranging from -4 
("I strongly disagree") to 4 ("I strongly agree"). We then conducted 
confirmatory factor analysis to assess the measurement quality of 
the RiskAtt Scale. All factor loadings were significant (minimum t-
value was 4.60, p < 0.001) and greater than 0.4. These findings 
support the convergent validity of the scale (Anderson and Gerbing 
1988). The composite reliability for the RiskAtt Scale was 0.72, 
which indicates reliable construct measurement. Note that we used 
the sum scores of the items included in the RiskAtt Scale in the 
correlation analysis. 
7.6 Construct Validity of Risk Attitude 
7.6.1 Convergent Validity 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for the different 
measurement methods. We find that all measurement methods for 
risk attitude show a significant positive correlation, implying 
convergent validity. Table 4 also stresses the discriminant validity 
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of our measures. While the RiskAtt Scale does correlate 
significantly with the risk attitude obtained from the lotteries 
(r = 0.1567, p = 0.003) and the intrinsic risk attitude ( r = 0.1344, 
p = 0.012), it does not correlate significantly with the strength of 
preference function (r = 0.0539, p = 0.299). Moreover, the 
correlation between lottery and the rating is lower than between the 
lottery and the RiskAtt Scale. After all, the strength of preference 
function does not measure risk attitude whereas the risk attitude 
obtained from the lotteries, the intrinsic risk attitude and RiskAtt 
Scale do. 
Table 4 Correlation matrix between the measurement method 
RiskAtt Scale Lotery Intrinsic 
risk attitude 
Rating 
RiskAtt 1.000 
Lottery 0.1567 
p = 0.003 
1.000 
mtrinsic 
risk attitude 
0.1344 
^ = 0.012 
0.7602 
p = 0.00 
1.000 
Rating 0.0539 
p = 0.299 
0.0934 
p = 0.072 
0.1331 
/? = 0.01 
1.000 
A correlation in bold indicates that the correlation is significant atp<0.05 
(two-tailed) 
7.6.2 Nomological Validity 
Nomological validity is assessed by testing the hypotheses 
as formulated in Section 7.3. The hypotheses which contain 
variables on the attitude and intention level (see Figure 1, left 
branch) are measured with self-report measures. These variables are 
latent variables and each such variable, or rather, construct, is 
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measured by a set of observable indicator variables (i.e. items). 
Observable variables may be assumed to be measured with error. 
Structural equation models permit the explicit modeling and 
estimation of errors in measurement (Baumgartner and Homburg 
1996; Bagozzi and Yi 1994 and Steenkamp and van Trijp 1991). 
Thus, the coefficients in the structural equation model represent 
theoretical cause and effect relationships among the attitude and 
intention variables and risk attitude, and as such they are the 
parameters of our interest (Baumgartner and Homburg 1996; 
Bagozzi and Yi 1994; Steenkamp and van Trijp 1991; Fornell And 
Bookstein 1982). Therefore structural equation modeling was 
conducted in order to test the hypotheses regarding the 
entrepreneur's characteristics. The model has been estimated using 
LISREL8. The input for the analysis consisted of covariance 
matrices based on N = 346. Table 5 summarizes the results. 
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Table 5 Results of structural equation models (using LISREL 8, N = 346) 
Construct RiskAtt Scale Intrinsic Risk Attitude Lottery H(+/-) 
Innovativeness 
p = -0.445 -0.037 -0.064 
t = -5.593 -0.597 -1.043 
X2/df= 2.467 2.376 2.267 
p = 0.002 0.036 0.045 
RMSEA = 0.065 0.063 0.061 
GFI = 0.974 0.987 0.988 
AGFI = 0.944 0.962 0.964 
CFI = 0.966 0.978 0.980 
TLI = 0.946 0.964 0.960 
Market orientation 
P = -0.178 0.053 -0.099 
t = -2.429 0.863 -1.612 
X2/df= 1.018 2.113 1.286 
P = 0.429 0.061 0.267 
RMSEA = 0.007 0.056 0.028 
GFI = 0.989 0.998 0.993 
AGFI = 0.977 0.964 0.979 
CFI = 0.999 0.976 0.994 
TLI = 0.971 0.956 0.987 
Intention to secure profit margin 
P = 0.255 0.096 0.164 
t = 3.925 1.782 3.085 
X2/df= 7.854 * * 
P = 0.003 * * 
RMSEA = 0.141 * * 
GFI = 0.977 * * 
AGFI = 0.886 * * 
CFI = 0.940 * * 
TLI = 0.933 * * 
H(-) 
H(-) 
Intention to reduce income fluctuations 
B = 0.184 0.065 0.090 
t = 2.872 1.213 1.676 
X2/df= 3.346 * * 
P = 0.035 * * 
RMSEA = 0.082 * * 
GFI = 0.990 * * 
AGFI = 0.952 * * 
CFI = 0.978 * * 
TLI = 0.969 * * 
where H(+/-) indicated the expected sign of B which is the standardized regression 
coefficient which shows the relation between the risk attitude and the latent constructs. 
A bold r-value indicates that the /-value is significant at the 5% level. 
* the model is saturated, therefore leading to a perfect fit 
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The estimation results for the intrinsic risk attitude and the 
risk attitude obtained from the lotteries, presented in Table 5, are 
based on the exponential function. Conducting the same analysis 
for the power function shows very similar results. From Table 5 the 
following conclusions may be drawn. 
Table 5 shows that the RiskAtt Scale is significantly related 
to the attitude and intention variables. Hence, the corresponding 
hypotheses, la to Id (see Figure 1, left branch), have been 
confirmed (t-values of p ' s are significant and model fit is good). 
The intrinsic risk attitude showed no significant relationship with 
the attitude and intention variables. Risk attitude, measured by 
lotteries, showed a significant relationship only with the 
entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit margin. Based on 
these results, we conclude that the RiskAtt Scale outperforms the 
measures derived within the expected utility framework regarding 
nomological validity based on the selected attitude and intention 
measures. 
Now we will turn to test the nomological validity of the risk 
attitude measures for actual, revealed, market behavior. 
In Hypothesis 2a we expected that the entrepreneurs' risk 
attitude is positively related to the incidence of using futures 
contracts. Since the choice to use or not to use futures contracts is a 
binary variable, we use logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1989) to model the probability of this choice. The model chi-square 
values resulting from the logistic regression are displayed in 
Table 6. The model, in which risk attitude was obtained by the 
lottery and the intrinsic risk attitude, significantly improve the fit 
when compared to the null model with only an intercept (p < 0.03) 
thereby confirming Hypothesis 2a. Moreover, the validity of the 
models is supported by the proportion of correctly classified 
choices. These proportions significantly exceed the proportion of 
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choices correctly classified by chance as derived from Huberty's 
test (p < 0.05). The model developed with the RiskAtt Scale has a 
very bad fit. Therefore, for this scale Hypothesis 2a is rejected, 
which indicates that the RiskAtt Scale is a bad instrument to predict 
the use of futures contracts. 
In order to gain more insight into the selling behavior of the 
respondents and the elicited risk attitude measures, we split the 
respondents in two groups. The first group sold slaughter hogs on 
the free market (i.e. directly to the slaughterhouse or the trader), the 
second group sold slaughter hogs to a cooperative, at an average 
price. The split shows the entrepreneur's preference for either a 
price risk-bearing market channel or a risk-reducing market 
channel. As expected, using the lottery and the intrinsic risk attitude 
(both the power and the exponential function), a significant 
difference in risk attitude was found between entrepreneurs who 
sell directly onto the free market and entrepreneurs who supply 
cooperatives, the latter being less risk-seeking (p< 0.025). This 
confirms Hypothesis 2a once more. For the RiskAtt Scale no 
significant difference in risk attitude was found between 
entrepreneurs who sell directly onto the free market and 
entrepreneurs who supply cooperatives. 
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Table 6 Results of logistic regression in which risk attitude predicts behavior 
RiskAtt Scale Intrinsic Risk Lottery 
Attitude 
Uses futures markets to cover risk: Yes (= 1) or No (= 0) 
B 0.0615 0.320 0.567 
Wald Statistic 1.8133 6.870 7.105 
significance 0.1781 0.009 0.007 
R 0.0000 0.186 0.190 
^-improvement 1.902 8.115 8.022 
Significance 0.168 0.004 0.005 
Marketing Channel Choice: sell to a trader or directly to a slaughterhouse (= 1) 
versus sell to a cooperative (- 0) 
B 0.023 0.080 0.192 
Wald Statistic 1.388 3.927 6.116 
significance 0.23 8 0.047 0.013 
R 0.000 0.064 0.093 
^-improvement 1.392 4.822 6.667 
Significance 0.238 0.028 0.010 
In Hypothesis 2b we expected that entrepreneurs who are 
more risk averse will choose selling to a cooperative (where he or 
she gets an average price) over selling to a trader or slaughterhouse 
(where he or she receives the spot price). Since the choice to sell to 
a trader/slaughterhouse or to a cooperative (i.e. risky vs. safe) is a 
binary variable, we use logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1989) to model the probability of this choice. The model chi-square 
values resulting from the logistic regression are displayed in 
Table 6. The model, in which risk attitude was obtained by the 
lottery and the intrinsic risk attitude, significantly improve the fit 
when compared to the null model with only an intercept [p < 0.03) 
thereby confirming Hypothesis 2b. Moreover, the validity of the 
model is supported by the proportion of correctly classified choices. 
These proportions significantly exceed the proportion of choices 
correctly classified by chance as derived from Huberty's test 
(p < 0.05). The model developed with the RiskAtt Scale has a very 
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bad fit. Therefore, for this scale Hypothesis 2b is rejected, which 
indicates that the RiskAtt Scale is a bad mstrurnent to predict the 
choice of the marketing channel (risky versus safe). 
In Hypothesis 2c we predict that a risk-averse entrepreneur 
will attempt to trade more frequently, that is, enter the market more 
often with a "round" of hogs, thereby spreading his/her risk. This 
behavior will be more prominent, the more risk he/she perceives. 
To investigate the relationship between the frequency of trading in 
the risky market and risk attitude, we have developed a model 
which includes a interaction between risk perception and risk 
attitude. Besides 'risk attitude' and 'risk perception' we included in 
the model 'size of enterprise'. Because of the technical aspects of 
the production process and the near-impossibility of transporting 
large numbers of slaughter hogs from the company to the purchaser 
at the same time, we expect in general a larger company to have 
more rounds. 
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Table 7 Results of multiple regression in which risk attitude predicts behavior 
Frequency of trading 
in the risky market 
P Standard error /-value /7-value 
Size of company 0.144 0.000 2.75 0.006 
Risk perception (RP) 0.159 0.026 3.01 0.002 
Intrinsic risk attitude (IRA) -0.067 0.153 1.22 0.220 
Interaction1 0.018 0.009 1.91 0.057 
(IRA*RP) 
Degrees of freedom 341 from 346 observations 
R2 = 0.07 
Adjusted R 2 = 0.06 
F(4,341) = 6.15 Probability of F(4,341) = 0.00 
'The variables risk perception and intrinsic risk attitude are centered prior to 
forming the multiplicative term (Cronbach 1987; Jaccard et al. 1990). 
Table 7 shows the regression results for the intrinsic risk 
attitude. As expected, the size of company shows a positive 
significant relationship with the frequency of trading in the market. 
In the regression, the interaction between risk perception and 
intrinsic risk attitude is significant. The positive sign of the 
interaction term can be interpreted clearly (see Figure 3). The 
interpretation of the interaction term is visualized in Figure 3 on the 
basis of the results of the multiple regression analysis as displayed 
in Table 7. In Figure 3, a split is made between intrinsically risk 
averse and intrinsically risk seeking subjects. 
A risk-averse entrepreneur will in general trade in the risky 
market relatively more often, in order to spread his/her risk than a 
risk-seeking entrepreneur. When he/she perceives much risk, this 
behavior will be more prominently present. So, for a risk-averse 
entrepreneur, high risk perception will lead to more trades, that is, 
taking relatively little price risk. In contrast, a risk-seeking 
entrepreneur will react to the same situation by trading less often 
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and thus exposing himself to more price risk. When he/she 
perceives little risk, that behavior will not be present this 
prominently. So, for a risk-seeking entrepreneur, high risk 
perception will lead to an even lower frequency of trades in the 
market. 
^ Low risk High risk 
perception perception 
Figure 3 Visualization of the interaction effect for risk attitude and risk 
perception on the number of trades in the risky market for risk seeking and risk 
averse subjects 
We estimated this model also for the RiskAtt Scale and the 
risk attitude obtained from the lotteries. In both cases this did not 
produce significant results for the risk attitude measure and/or the 
interaction term. 
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Our findings show a striking pattern for nomological 
validity. The risk attitude measure derived from the psychometric 
framework shows a clear relationship with the attitude and 
intention variables. The nomological validity of this set of variables 
(the left branch of Figure 1) is supported. However, we do not find 
any relationship between the risk attitude scale and variables which 
describe actual behavior (see right branch of Figure 1). Thus, the 
nomological validity of this set of variables is not supported. When 
we look at the risk attitude measures derived from the expected 
utility framework, however, we see the reverse pattern. These risk 
measures show a significant relationship with actual market 
behavior, but, for the most part, lack correlation with the attitude-
intention variables in the nomological net. Within the expected 
utility framework, the mtrinsic risk attitude performs slightly better 
than the risk attitude obtained from lotteries. In particular, the 
interaction between intrinsic risk attitude and risk perception is 
significantly related to the frequency of trading in the risky market. 
In conclusion, we may say that, pertaining to actual market 
behavior, the measures derived from the expected utility framework 
have a higher predictive validity. Moreover, we investigated the 
correlation between the attitude-intention variables (self-report 
measures) and actual behavior. In other words, we checked for 
correlation between the variables in the left and right branch of 
Figure 1. Like the risk attitude scale, the self-report variables do not 
correlate with actual behavior either. 
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1.1 Conclusions 
Risk attitude plays an important role in understanding 
decision making behavior. In empirical studies, risk attitude is 
conceptualized and measured in completely different ways. We 
may expect that the specific risk attitude measure used may 
influence the results and consequently our understanding of 
decision making under risk. For this reason, it is of great 
importance to gain insight into the construct validity of the different 
risk attitude measures. In this chapter, the construct validity of risk 
attitude measures, derived from the expected utility model, rooted 
in economics, and measures derived from psychometrics, rooted in 
marketing and psychology, have been tested. 
Within the expected utility model, the risk attitude was 
assessed by means of lotteries. The consistency checks show that 
the respondents have assessed the certainty equivalents in an 
internally consistent manner. The intrinsic risk attitude was 
assessed by measuring the strength of preference by means of the 
rating technique. Both the exponential function and the power 
function fit the data equally well. We find that there is no 
correlation between strength of preference and risk attitude, as 
measured by the certainty equivalence technique and the rating 
technique respectively. This confirms the theory claiming strength 
of preference and risk attitude to be two different constructs (Dyer 
and Sarin 1982; Smidts 1997). Thus the intrinsic risk attitude is a 
separate indicator of the risk taking behavior of a decision maker. 
Within the psychometric framework we developed a 
unidimensional risk attitude scale based on a number of Likert 
statements with good psychometric properties. 
The three different risk attitude measures correlate 
significantly and positively, indicating convergent validity. They 
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also show discriminant validity. Whereas the RiskAtt Scale does 
correlate significantly with the risk attitude scale obtained from the 
lotteries and the intrinsic risk attitude, it does not correlate with the 
strength of preference function, as the strength of preference 
function does not measure risk attitude. 
The tests on the nomological validity of the measures 
produce interesting results. Our nomological net contains self-
report measures which describe the attitude towards innovation and 
market orientation and the intention to reduce risk, and revealed 
preference data about market behavior. The psychometric risk scale 
performs especially well with respect to these self-report measures, 
contrary to the risk attitude measure obtained from the lotteries and 
the intrinsic risk attitude. The RiskAtt Scale showed coherence 
with innovativeness, market orientation, the entrepreneur's 
intention to reduce fluctuations in his/her income and the 
entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her profit margin. The 
intrinsic risk attitude showed no coherence with the constructs 
listed above, the risk attitude obtained from the lotteries showed 
coherence only with the entrepreneur's intention to secure his/her 
profit margin. 
In contrast, the lottery measure and the intrinsic risk attitude 
greatly outperform the psychometric scale when the relationship 
with actual behavior is concerned. The measures derived from the 
expected utility model showed themselves powerful predictors of 
the entrepreneur's choice of market channel (risky channel versus 
safe channel), the incidence of using futures contracts and the 
number of trades in the risky market (i.e. the number of times the 
entrepreneur was exposed to price risk). 
These findings presented above may be explained by the 
fact that the task of responding to lotteries elicits a mental set 
which closely resembles actual behavior, i.e. this task has 
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"behavioral" characteristics. After all in this task, the respondents 
made choices which resemble their daily decision making behavior 
very closely. The choice between receiving a relatively high price 
or a relatively low price with a 50/50 chance or receiving a fixed 
price shows many similarities with the choices these same 
entrepreneurs make in daily life: that is, to sell on the cash market 
and thus be exposed to price risks (the reader will perceive the 
analogy with the element of the 50/50 chance in the lottery) or to 
sell the forward in the futures market and hence fix the price in 
advance (the reader will perceive the analogy with the element of 
the fixed price in the lottery). Therefore the lottery task may be seen 
as a simulation of actual behavior. By correcting for strength of 
preference, intrinsic risk attitude slightly outperforms the lottery 
measurement. The risk attitude measures derived within the 
expected utility theory already incorporate the behavioral element, 
i.e. revealed preferences, making them much better predictors of 
actual behavior than the risk attitude scale. 
The psychometric scale performs better in the nomological 
net as far as the self-report scales are concerned. This may be 
explained by the fact that both the self-report scale measuring 
entrepreneurs' attitudes and intentions and the risk attitude scale are 
on the "opinion" level, i.e. the "I tiiink that" or "I feel that" level. 
The good performance of the risk attitude scale may also be 
attributed to self-consistency inherent to the use of scales, that is, 
the respondent's urge to score according to patterns considered 
logical. Several studies in psychology show this tendency (see 
Sherman 1980, McFadden 1986, Feldman and Lynch 1988, Lance, 
Lapointe and Fisicaro 1994). Note that a self-report measure can be 
valid in itself, e.g. someone may truly consider himself a risk taker. 
However, his/her behavior (as compared to that of others) may 
show that he/she is not an exceptionally risk-taking person. In such 
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a case, the attitude-behavior relationship will be relatively weak. It 
appears that the lottery task and rating task are much better suited at 
eliciting that mental state which occurs during a real decision to use 
futures contracts or about which marketing channel to choose. 
Hence, one behavior predicts the other. 
In marketing and management research, we are often 
interested in actual behavior. In that case we advise to make use of 
revealed preference methods instead of self-report measures. When 
specifically investigating decision making behavior under 
uncertainty, it is advisable to use lotteries as a revealed preference 
method. Unfortunately, this task is relatively time-consuming and 
can only be performed in (expensive) face-to-face interviews. A 
technical advantage of psychometric scales is that they can be 
completed relatively quickly. 
A researcher will have to weigh these disadvantages of the 
lottery technique against the advantage of probably higher 
predictive validity. In this study, intrinsic risk attitude appeared to 
perform slightly better on predictive validity than the risk attitude 
measures solely derived from lotteries. In order to deduct the 
intrinsic risk attitude, the lottery task alone is insufficient, we need 
the rating task as well. The latter task however, does not take much 
time. Therefore, if one decides to use lotteries, it seems wise to 
include the rating task in an empirical study as well. 
Our findings suggest several directions for further research. 
First, the nomological net used in this study could be broadened. 
Second, our research could be replicated across different domains, 
thereby testing for domain influences particularly regarding market 
behavior. Moreover, our research can be tested for other revealed 
preference methods, such as the tradeoff method for eliciting u(x) 
recently developed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) and the 
perceived risk attitude concept by Weber and Milliman (1997). The 
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current revealed preference method (CE-technique) has to its 
disadvantage that it takes relatively much of the respondent's time. 
Developing faster and therewith cheaper revealed preference 
methods might be an interesting avenue to explore in the future. 
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Appendix A 
E s t i m a t i n g r i s k a t t i t u d e b a s e d o n t h e l o t t e ry t e c h n i q u e a n d t h e 
in t r i n s i c r i s k a t t i t u d e b a s e d o n b o t h t h e lo t te r ies a n d t h e r a t i n g 
t e c h n i q u e 
The exponential function and the power function are used to 
specify the utility function and the strength of preference function 
derived from the lottery technique and rating technique 
respectively. After scaling the boundaries of the functions, the 
estimation of only one parameter suffices to characterize a decision 
maker's risk attitude. Because the certainty equivalents are 
measured with error and not the utility levels, the inverse function 
is estimated. In the rating technique the order of price levels 
presented to the respondent is random and therefore these 
measurements can be viewed as independent, which is why we do 
not need to estimate the inverse function. Tables A1-A3 present the 
mathematical representation of the different function specifications 
for the different methods. Since it is not possible to measure 
intrinsic risk attitude directly, the following procedure has been 
adopted. First, both the utility w(x) and strength of preference v(x) 
are measured for the price stimulus x. Secondly, u(x) and v(x) are 
related statistically (see Smidts 1997). 
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Table Al Function specifications of the utility function obtained by lotteries 
Certainty equivalence technique 
Exponential function Power function 
Function 
-c(x - X ) 
1 - . L 
u(x) = 
-c(x - X ) 
l - e H L 
Estimation function 
—cx, 
ln(0.5(e 1 +e h)) */ - xL d 
xi = • + et Xj = {xH - X£)(0.5(( ) + 
-c xH - xL 
( x ^ - ) d y ) + xL + e{ 
XH ~ XL 
where x; and xh represent the low and high outcomes of the 50/50 lottery 
respectively and x, stands for the assessed certainty equivalent. The respondent 
assesses x, for n lotteries, with varying outcomes x ; and xh. The exponential 
function implies a constant absolute risk attitude and an increasing proportional 
risk attitude, whereas the power function implies a decreasing absolute risk 
attitude and a constant proportional risk attitude. 
(x - xj)d 
(x) = ^ ^-j 
(xH - xL) 
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Table A2 Function specifications of the strength ofpreference function obtained 
by the rating technique 
Rating technique 
Exponential function Power function 
Function and estimation function 
e(x_Xi) (X-XTf 
v « = 7 v v(x) = — 
1 - e"<*H-*L> (xH- xL)* 
where x is the price level which the respondent had to value (by given it a rate), 
xH and xL are the highest and lowest price level given to the respondent 
respectively. 
Table A3 Specification of the functional relationship between strength of 
preference and utility function 
Intrinsic risk attitude 
Exponential function Power function 
Function and estimation function 
l - k 
u(x) = —-- u(x) = v(x) 
1 - e 
The parameters in the formulas as displayed in Tables 2-4 
are estimated using routine ZXMTN from the EMSL-library of 
FORTRAN programs. In ZXMIN the least squares estimate is 
obtained by Fletcher's Quasi-Newton Method. We followed Smidts 
(1990) in our estimation of the parameters. 
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A p p e n d i x B 
C o n f i r m a t o r y F a c t o r Ana lys i s for t h e M e a s u r e s 
To examine the measurement quality of the constructs, 
confirmatory factor analysis has been performed using LISREL 8 
(Steenkamp and van Trijp 1991). The input for the analysis 
consisted of covariance matrices based on JV= 346. 
RiskAtt Scale 
1) I am willing to take higher financial risks in order to realize 
higher average yields 
2) I like taking big financial risks 
3) I am willing to take higher financial risks when selling my 
hogs, in order to realize higher average yields 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their agreement with each 
item through a nine point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". Construct reliability = 0.72; model is saturated 
Innovativeness 
1) I buy new products before my colleagues (competitors) buy 
them 
2) I like experimenting with new ways of doing things 
3) I take more chances than others 
4) I generally like trying out new ideas in my enterprise 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate how well the statements fit 
their own views through a five point scale. Construct reliability = 
0.76; %2 = 8.37 (d/=2, /? = 0.01); RMSEA = 0.09; GFI = 0.99; 
AGFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.98 
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Market orientation 
1) I think it is important to understand the wishes of my 
customers 
2) I think it is important to know how my customers evaluate my 
product 
3) I adapt to changes in the market 
4) I think it is important to know a lot of the end-users 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their agreement with each 
item through a nine point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". Construct reliability = 0.72; %2 = 4.54 (df=2, 
p = 0.08); RMSEA = 0.06; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.99 

CHAPTER 8 
Modeling Choices of Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises for the Hedging Service 
Provided by Futures Exchanges 1 
8.1 Abstract 
We propose a model that explains the choice behavior of small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with respect to price risk 
management instruments, one of them being futures contracts. We relate 
the key components of the model to characteristics of SMEs, in this way 
explaining differences between the decision units' evaluations of the 
financial services provided by futures exchanges. The model is tested on 
data collected from 467 entrepreneurs of small and medium sized 
enterprises by means of computer-assisted personal interviews. We find 
that the difference between the futures price and the entrepreneur's 
reference price, and the components ease of use, performance and 
entrepreneurship are the key components in the entrepreneur's choice 
process with respect to financial services. These key components turn out 
to be related to the SMEs' characteristics innovativeness, market 
orientation and level of understanding of price risk management 
instruments. We discuss how these key components can be influenced 
through the marketing policy of futures exchanges and how our findings 
can improve the effective design of futures. 
' This chapter is based on: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.J.J.M. Candel (1997), 
"Modeling Choises of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for Financial 
Services", Marketing Science Conference in Berkeley CA, USA, 
21-24 March 1997. 
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8.2 Introduction 
The financial services industry is one of the fastest growing 
industries. In the case of financial derivatives markets, futures and 
options provide important services. The last decade has shown an 
almost exponential growth of both futures and options. In order to 
assure survival, futures exchanges show a rapid product innovation 
(Carlton 1984; Miller 1990). However, for futures contracts the risk 
of failure is considerable (Davey and Maguire 1996; Tashjian 
1995). Futures contracts are traded on futures exchanges and make 
it possible for those who want to manage price risk, hedgers, to 
transfer risk (hedging service of the exchange) to those who are 
willing to accept it, the speculators (speculation service of the 
exchange). In this chapter we investigate the decision process of 
entrepreneurs towards hedging services. This chapter corresponds 
to the marketing approach as outlined in Chapter 2. To get some 
insight into the failure and success of futures contracts we want to 
examine how choices between different financial services are made 
by entrepreneurs of SMEs, and what criteria are used in the 
evaluation of these financial services. In particular, we examine 
SMEs' choices between competitive financial services, one of 
which is futures contracts. To deepen our understanding of the 
choices between financial services, several hypotheses are 
formulated concerning characteristics of SMEs that may be related 
to the evaluation of these financial services. Knowledge about this 
makes it possible to introduce futures contracts successfully. 
Although the functioning of Price Risk Management 
Instruments (PRMs) such as futures contracts and options, has 
been the subject of extensive academic research in the financial 
literature, the issue of identifying who uses these markets and for 
what reasons has received little attention. Neither do relatively 
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recent studies (e.g. Boot and Thakor 1993; Makus et al. 1990; 
Merton 1995; Tashjian 1995) explain why potential hedgers act as 
they act, nor do they reveal the underlying (psychological) 
constructs explaining their buying behavior. Moreover, previous 
research on financial services focuses on consumers or managers of 
large companies, whereas the buying behavior of SMEs for 
financial services is particular relevant for the financial derivatives 
industry. Therefore, we propose a new model that explains the 
choice behavior of entrepreneurs of SMEs for financial services. 
Insight in the choice process will reveal the necessary information 
for the financial institution to improve the design of financial 
products. We relate our findings to the effective design of financial 
products. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we introduce a 
model which links beliefs and evaluations of SMEs concerning 
PRMIs to the choices among PRMIs. Second, the relations between 
the key components of the model and SME's characteristics are 
specified in order to deepen our insight into SME's choice 
behavior. After the presentation of the research method and the 
operationalization of the model, our hypotheses are tested with 
structural equation modeling. Data obtained from 467 entrepreneurs 
of small and medium sized agricultural enterprises by means of 
computer-assisted personal interviews constitute the input for this 
part of the research. We conclude with an evaluation of the study 
and discuss several managerial implications of the study. 
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8.3 Modeling Choice Behavior 
Fern and Brown (1984) and Bunn(1993) showed that the 
buying behavior of entrepreneurs can not be classified exclusively 
into either industrial or consumer buying behavior. In this study we 
primarily use consumer research to model the buying behavior of 
entrepreneurs. By taking the effect of the decision unit of the 
entrepreneur into account, a typical element of the industrial buying 
behavior is also incorporated. 
Within consumer research, cognitive psychology and 
attitudinal research are available as tools for modeling choice 
behavior. Cognitive psychology offers the information-processing 
paradigm as a tool for building choice models. Attitudinal research 
offers multi-attribute models that focus on the links between 
cognitive, affective and conative components. Dabholkar (1994) 
proposed to model choice by integrating these two approaches. As 
argued by Dabholkar: "Consumer choice models that integrate the 
contribution of information-processing and attitudinal research 
should promote greater understanding of how consumers make 
choices and of the processes underlying these choices''' (p. 101). In 
formulating a choice model for SMEs' choices between financial 
services we elaborate upon this integrated framework. 
One of the pillars of the choice model proposed is multi-
attribute attitude theory (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1980; Bagozzi 1981). In the classical version of this 
theory, attitude is assumed to be decomposable as a sum of belief-
evaluation products, with the products being weighted equally. The 
beliefs pertain to the degree to which an object may have particular 
consequences and the evaluations reflect the importance of these 
consequences. The equal weighting of belief-evaluation products 
however has been challenged by Shimp and Kavas(1984). They 
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argue that cognitive elements regarding the consequences of 
behavior may be qualitatively different and are therefore likely to 
be organized into different schema or categories. The different 
categories may have different weights attached, and, consequently, 
may have separate influences on attitude. A way of modeling this in 
a mmti-attribute approach is the formulation of expectancy-value 
components: similar beliefs are grouped into components and the 
evaluations of these components are allowed to influence the 
attitude differently. 
The information-processing paradigm provides the second 
pillar of the choice model. It assumes that choice alternatives can 
be described by cognitive representations of object attributes. These 
representations are assumed to underlie consumers' choices 
(Bettman and Sujan 1987; Corfman 1991; Johnson 1984). When 
this rationale is extended to the attitudinal framework, it is likely 
that decision makers use cognitive representations about behavioral 
consequences as the basis for choice. The so-called Expectancy-
Value Components (EVCs) can be seen as corresponding to these 
cognitive representations. An important issue is how subjects 
compare choice alternatives in order to reach a choice. Corfman 
(1991) argued that value and utility are more important than more 
objective features and functions of choice alternatives. Therefore, 
the comparison in our choice model is assumed to take place on the 
EVC level since the expectancy-value components are on the value 
and utility level. To choose between PRMIs, the SME will map 
concrete features of the instrument into a component such as price 
risk reduction capacity or ease of use and will evaluate the 
instrument on this component. Furthermore, the attitude towards 
PRMIs is formulated as a higher-order affective state produced by 
the combination of the EVCs corresponding to different 
components (Bagozzi and Van Loo 1991). 
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The model for SMEs' choices postulates a sequential 
process. In line with the Expectancy-Value Comparison model of 
Dabholkar (1994) SMEs are assumed to group beliefs first 
according to dimensions and to form expectancy-value components 
for the choice alternatives under consideration. SMEs categorize 
beliefs into dimensions to facilitate the comparison across 
alternatives. For example, an entrepreneur might evaluate the ease 
of using a futures contract. This evaluation may be based on 
attributes such as the complexity of the hedging service provided by 
futures exchanges and the accessibility of the trading floor. 
Exploratory factor analysis on beliefs can be employed to reveal 
these dimensions. Components such as "ease of use" or "degree of 
risk reduction performance" may result. It is assumed that along 
each of these more abstract components the PRMIs are evaluated. 
This is the formation of Expectancy-Value Components (EVCs). 
As formulated by Dabholkar (1994), expectancy-value components 
may be thought of as valenced belief clusters that hang together in 
the entrepreneur's mind in schematic or categorical representations. 
Let EVCy be the expectancy-value component for 
alternative i and component j . Let bA be the belief that alternative / 
leads to consequence k and let ek be the evaluation of this 
consequence. The expectancy-value component for alternative i 
along component j is now defined as 
EVC, = £ bikek (1) 
keKj 
where the summation is across all consequences that belong to this 
component. 
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After having formed expectancy-value components for each 
alternative under consideration, the entrepreneur will compare these 
across alternatives. Dabholkar (1994) provided evidence that 
comparison at the level of expectancy-value components may occur 
when there are a few alternatives, when some of the alternatives are 
somewhat unfamiliar, when the choices are rather important and 
when there seems to be some natural grouping of the beliefs. The 
use of futures contracts is somewhat unfamiliar to most of the 
entrepreneurs in our empirical study. Moreover, the choices 
concern financial matters and will therefore be considered 
important. These conditions justify that the alternatives are 
compared from the EVC level onwards. There are different ways of 
comparing the EVCs across alternatives. As shown by Dabholkar 
(1994), the comparison among the EVCs turned out not to be very 
sensitive to the way the comparison was modeled. In the 
psychological literature however there are some indications that, 
when there are only two choice alternatives, the choice process 
seems to be based on value differences between alternatives along 
each of a number of evaluative dimensions (Albert, Aschenbrenner 
and Schmalhofer 1989; Bockenholt and Kroeger 1993; Busemeyer 
and Townsend 1993). In the present chapter, we will consider only 
two choice alternatives, say i and h, and therefore consider the 
following comparison across alternatives for a particular 
expectancy value component: 
REVCff = EVCff - EVC,,. (2) 
These differences are called relative expectancy value 
components. A central assumption of the model is that expectancy-
value components are compared and that from this level onwards 
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relative constructs are considered (Dabholkar 1994). This means 
that the entrepreneur combines the relative expectancy-value 
components to form a relative attitude towards an alternative. The 
relative attitude towards an alternative is the attitude towards an 
alternative, when compared to the attitudes towards the other choice 
alternatives. A study by Van den Putte et al. (1996) empirically 
demonstrates that relative measurements of constructs such as 
attitude are superior when they are obtained as direct comparisons 
of the alternative with other competing alternatives. Therefore, in 
this chapter, from the attitude level onwards, also direct 
comparative measurements will be assumed. 
Let RAT, be the relative attitude of alternative i. As already 
stated, this relative construct is assumed to be determined by the 
comparison of the alternative to the other alternatives on different 
affective components of the attitude, as expressed by the relative 
expectancy-value components. If the number of expectancy-value 
components is J, we assume that: 
RAT, = J pVREVC, (3) 
M 
Note that, since the relative attitude is measured directly in this 
chapter, no aggregation of the attitudes across alternatives has to 
take place. 
Based on the relative attitude the entrepreneur forms an 
intention to choose one of the alternatives when compared to the 
other choice alternatives under consideration. This is the relative 
intention. Traditionally, theories of consumer behavior concentrate 
on the choice process and the choice structure is not under 
discussion, that is, the individual consumer is assumed to be the 
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decision maker. Since, in this chapter, we focus on the 
entrepreneurs of SMEs, the present model also includes the 
entrepreneur's perception of the extent to which significant others 
(such as advisors surrounding the SME) think that one should 
engage in one of the alternatives. This is the subjective norm. Also 
here we assume that the relative subjective norm is a determinant of 
the relative intention. That is, the degree to which the respondent 
thinks that relevant others expect Wm/her to make use of the 
hedging service of futures contracts, when compared to other 
alternatives, is assumed to influence the choice for futures 
contracts. The relative subjective norm is denoted as RSN,. In line 
with various other studies in this domain, the attitude and 
subjective norm are assumed to be correlated (see e.g. Ajzen & 
Madden 1986; Ryan 1982). The relative intention towards 
alternative i, RTN, is now assumed to be determined by the relative 
attitude and the relative subjective norm according to the following 
formula: 
RTN, = PjRAT,. + P2RSN, (4) 
Finally, the relative intention towards the alternative will 
influence the choice for this particular alternative. We will assume 
a linear dependency between the intention and the choice variable, 
which in this chapter is binary: did the entrepreneur choose a 
futures contract or did the entrepreneur choose one of the other 
alternatives? Consider Figure 1 for a graphical representation of 
the choice model proposed. In the sequel the model will be further 
implemented for the context of SMEs' having to make choices 
among PRMIs, one of which is futures contracts. 
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Figure 1 The choice model 
In this figure k denotes consequence k (k = 1... k), Kj 
denote all consequences that belong to expectancy-value component 
j , EVC(J the expectancy-value component for alternative i and 
component j (i = 1... I and (j = I... J), REVC,y the relative 
expectancy-value component for alternative i and component j , 
RAT, the relative attitude towards alternative i, RTN, the relative 
intention to buy alternative i, and RSN ; is the relative subjective 
norm for alternative i. 
8.4 Implementing the Choice Model for the Hedging Service 
Provided by Futures Exchanges 
In addition to testing the choice model, we want to deepen 
our insight into why SMEs evaluate the underlying dimensions, 
which they use in their decision, the way they do. In our model the 
relative expectancy-value components are used by the entrepreneur 
to form his/her relative attitude towards futures and ultimately 
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determine the choice of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur's choice 
for any particular alternative depends on the importance placed by 
the entrepreneur on the different expectancy-value components, as 
well as on how the alternatives differ on these expectancy-value 
components in the entrepreneur's evaluation. Hence, the relative-
expectancy value components are the key components in our 
model. 
In order to gain insight into why entrepreneurs choose as 
they choose, we have to investigate which variables are related to 
these relative expectancy-value components. Insight in the variables 
that influence these key components will provide the management 
of the futures exchange with a framework for improving their 
marketing policy and provides valuable information for the research 
and development department when designing new futures contracts. 
8.4.1 Qualitative Pre-Study 
Prior to the quantitative study, we conducted four group 
discussions with entrepreneurs about price risk management. The 
goal of the group discussions was to gain insight into the decision 
process of selling output using price risk management instruments. 
More specifically, we wanted to gain insight into the criteria 
entrepreneurs use when choosing between alternative price risk 
management instruments and what their evoked set consists of, that 
is, which price risk management instruments are perceived as 
alternatives in their industry. The groups consisted of ten 
entrepreneurs each. Care was taken to select some entrepreneurs 
who had, to some extent, been involved in futures trading and other 
entrepreneurs who had not been involved in futures trading at all. 
Having mixed groups with users and non-users stimulated the 
discussion why one should or should not use futures. Moreover, the 
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decision criteria can be better traced when having mixed groups. 
The group discussions took place in an informal atmosphere and 
each session lasted for about two and a half hours. 
The subjects of our study were entrepreneurs of médium 
and large sized hog farms in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the 
hog industry is one of the most important industries. Because of 
heavy price fluctuations, the entrepreneurs face a price risk and 
consequently futures contracts might be an attractive price risk 
management instrument. 
From the group discussions it became clear that the 
entrepreneurs had only two alternatives regarding selling hogs. The 
first alternative is to buy the piglets, raise them to hogs and then 
sell them on the cash market for a price that is unknown at the 
moment the piglets are bought. The second alternative is to sell the 
hogs forward by selling futures contracts at the moment the piglets 
are being bought and hence eliminate the price risk in the hog cash 
market. It became clear that a number of criteria are used in 
deciding whether or not to use futures contracts. Very prominent 
were: possibility of exercising entrepreneurial freedom, risk 
reduction performance, the possibility to plan the input and output 
of the production process and the ease of use. Furthermore, some 
entrepreneurs perceived futures contracts not as a price risk 
management instrument but as a pricing instrument. For these 
entrepreneurs a futures contract is interesting whenever it can be 
used to maximize the price that can be obtained for the underlying 
commodities. They indicated that if the futures price was high 
enough for them to make a profit, futures contracts became 
interesting. Some entrepreneurs indicated that the futures contracts 
currently traded have standardization characteristics that are 
difficult to fulfill. Especially the standardization towards time of 
delivery is perceived as problematic. These results may have 
The Market for Hedging Services 173 
important managerial implications for the management of the 
futures exchange. 
Entrepreneurs who monitored the futures prices in 
newspapers and professional industry journals did not view the 
futures market as complex, whereas entrepreneurs who were not 
monitoring the futures prices perceived futures as a complex 
instrument that was not easy to use. Entrepreneurs who closely 
traced cash market prices of hogs were very clear in their opinion 
about the hedging service provided by futures exchanges. Those 
who did want "to play it safe" valued the price risk reduction 
capacity of futures whereas entrepreneurs who "valued markets 
with high price volatility, because they provide opportunities to 
gain" perceived the hedging service as not valuable. 
The criteria the entrepreneurs said they used when choosing 
between the alternatives, served as a basis for the formulation of the 
beliefs in the large scale interview. Based on the qualitative pre-
study we expect to find at least the following three dimensions 
underlying these beliefs: entrepreneurship, performance and ease of 
use. Hence, we expect that the key components in the choice 
process are represented by the relative expectancy-value 
components entrepreneurship, performance and ease of use. The 
relative expectancy-value component entrepreneurship (REVCE) is 
the extent to which an entrepreneur values using futures as a way to 
exploit his/her entrepreneurship compared to selling on the cash 
market (Kent, Sexton and Vesper 1982). The relative expectancy-
value component performance (REVCP) is the extent to which an 
entrepreneur values the performance of futures in managing his/her 
price risk compared to selling on the cash market. Finally, the 
relative expectancy-value component ease of use (REVCU) is the 
extent to which the entrepreneur values the ease of use of futures 
compared to selling on the cash market. We can formulate several 
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hypotheses as to how SMEs make choices regarding PRMIs. Based 
on desk research and the group discussions, we can additionally 
formulate several hypotheses as to why SMEs evaluate 
performance, ease of use and entrepreneurship the way they do. 
However, first we will consider the how of SMEs' choices. 
8.4.2 Hypotheses Related to the How of Choices 
Relative expectancy-value components: entrepreneurship, 
performance and ease of use. Our model hypothesizes that an 
entrepreneur groups beliefs into dimensions and transforms these 
dimensions into expectancy-value components for each alternative. 
After having formed expectancy-value components for each 
alternative on the dimensions entrepreneurship, performance and 
ease of use, the entrepreneur compares these across the alternatives 
(and thus forms relative expectancy-value components) which 
determine his or her relative attitude towards futures contracts. We 
hypothesize that the relative expectancy-value components 
entrepreneurship, performance and ease of use are the key 
components in the choice process of the entrepreneur. 
HI: The relative attitude of an entrepreneur towards futures 
contracts is influenced by the relative expectancy-value 
components entrepreneurship, performance and ease of use. 
Relative subjective norm. Although the entrepreneur of a 
SME ultimately makes the choice on his/her own, other highly-
esteemed individuals may be involved in the decision process. 
These individuals may consist of advisors and trading partners. We 
may expect that the opinion of these individuals, who are important 
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to the entrepreneur when futures are concerned, will influence the 
relative intention of the entrepreneur to use futures. 
H2: The SME's perception of the extent to which significant 
others (such as advisors surrounding the SME) think that one 
should use futures contracts as opposed to other alternatives 
is positively related to the relative intention to use futures 
contracts. 
Difference between the futures price and the reference 
price. When selling output the difference between the futures price 
and the reference price will play a role. The reference price is the 
price that determines the decision frame through which the 
entrepreneur views the futures price as a gain or loss. Following 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981) the entrepreneur evaluates the futures price as a 
gain or loss relative to the reference price. If the futures price level 
is above (below) the reference price, the entrepreneurs evaluate this 
price as a gain (loss) which in turn positively (negatively) 
influences the relative attitude toward futures. 
H3: The larger the difference between the futures price and the 
reference price, the higher the relative attitude towards futures 
will be. 
8.4.3 Hypotheses Related to the Why of Choices 
Innovativeness. In line with Leavitt and Walton (1975,1988) 
and Goldsmith (1984) innovators are defined in our study as 
individuals open to new experiences and novel stimuli, as 
possessing the ability to transform information about new concepts, 
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ideas, products or services to their own use, and as having a low 
threshold for recognizing the potential application of new ideas. 
Innovators are the first ones to buy a new product or service, are 
more interested in the new product or service and are more exposed 
to information about the product or service. For the entrepreneurs 
in our study futures contracts are perceived as 'new products'. 
Although they have some sort of experience with risk reduction 
strategies, most of them are unfamiliar with futures contracts. The 
adoption of such a new instrument can therefore be seen as 
innovative (Goldsmith and Hofacker 1991). Innovative entrepreneurs 
like to use new instruments or methods with which they can exploit 
their entrepreneurial freedom of action. Because futures contracts 
increase the "degrees of freedom of action" in the market place, 
we hypothesize that innovative entrepreneurs will more strongly 
value using futures as a way to exploit their entrepreneurship 
(Brandstatter 1997). 
H4: Innovativeness is positively related to the relative expectancy-
value component entrepreneurship. 
Market orientation: tracing the market. In line with the 
broader definition of market orientation proposed by Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993) we consider tracing the market, such as gathering 
information about prices and volume traded, and consumer 
orientation, to belong to the domain of market orientation. Note 
that the mterfunctional coordination component of market 
orientation as included in the Narver and Slater (1990) scale is not 
relevant because SMEs often do not have different functional 
departments. All these departments are combined within the 
entrepreneur. Therefore, in this chapter, the concept of market 
orientation includes consumer orientation and tracing the market. In 
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this research we are particularly interested in the latter aspect of 
market orientation. 
If entrepreneurs are more market oriented in terms of 
tracing the market, then entrepreneurs will have a higher awareness 
of price fluctuations in the cash market and will hence be aware of 
the risks they face in the cash market (assuming the price is 
difficult to predict). So, if entrepreneurs are risk averse, then the 
more market oriented they are in terms of tracing the market, the 
more the hedging performance of futures will be valued. 
H5: For risk averse entrepreneurs tracing the market is positively 
related to the relative expectancy-value component performance. 
Level of understanding. The subjective assessment of the 
performance is heavily influenced by the information users have 
been exposed to with respect to the hedging service of futures. 
However, even if subjects have been exposed to the same amount 
of information, the subjects may differ in their understanding of 
these services. Futures contracts are often perceived as providing a 
complex financial service, which inhibits participation in futures 
trading. Understanding futures trading will reduce the 
psychological distance between the entrepreneur and the hedging 
service provided by the futures exchange. The level of 
understanding will influence how easy futures are considered as a 
PRMI and as a method of selling hogs. We can now formulate the 
following hypothesis. 
H6: The level of understanding of futures contracts is positively 
related to the relative expectancy-value component ease of 
use. 
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Monitoring futures prices. By monitoring futures prices, 
entrepreneurs obtain some experience with futures trading. It is 
well known from the financial strain of literature, that the economic 
justification for futures markets is not only risk transfer but also 
price discovery (Stoll and Whaley 1993). When making price 
agreements, entrepreneurs can use the futures price as a benchmark. 
Entrepreneurs who develop a routine in processing this information 
in a meaningful way will perceive futures as less complex and 
difficult than entrepreneurs who do not have this routine. The 
extent to which entrepreneurs follow the futures prices will 
therefore have a positive relation with the evaluation of ease of use 
of futures contracts. 
H7: Monitoring futures prices is positively related to the relative 
expectancy-value component ease of use. 
We now show how we validated the model and the relations 
between the SME's characteristics and the relative expectancy-
value components of the model as described by the hypotheses. The 
operational procedures (respondent sampling, measures and 
procedure) as well as the analytical procedures will be discussed in 
the next section. 
8.5 Research Method 
8.5.1 Sample 
In 1996 personal interviews were administered to 
467 entrepreneurs. These were obtained by a stratified sample, with 
stratification having taken place on the variables region and size of 
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the enterprise. The interviews lasted for about 45 minutes each. All 
the interviewers had prior interviewing experience, and received an 
extensive training program in the assessment procedures. 
Moreover, the training program ensured that the interviewers 
understood the questions posed to the entrepreneurs. 
The average age of the interviewed entrepreneurs was 
43 years. Of the entrepreneurs 53% had received education at 
middle professional level, 33% at low professional level, 6% at 
high professional level and 8 % at university level. Of the 
467 entrepreneurs, 387 (83%) sold their hogs at day-prices on the 
cash market whereas 14 entrepreneurs used cash forward contracts 
to sell their hogs (3%). The remaining 66 entrepreneurs (14%) used 
a combination of selling hogs on the cash market and selling hogs 
by means of futures contracts. Of the latter group 57.1% indicated 
they used futures solely for hedging, 24.5% used futures solely for 
speculation, while 18.4% used futures for both hedging and 
speculation. 
8.5.2 Procedure 
The entrepreneurs were contacted by the interviewer prior to 
the personal interview, to encourage participation and to ensure that 
the interview was conducted with the right person. The interview 
was computerized and care was taken to build a user friendly 
interface. The software written for this interview was extensively 
tested and 15 test-interviews were conducted to ensure that the 
interface was understood by the entrepreneurs and perceived as 
"very user-friendly". The interview consisted of several parts. After 
having been asked a few background questions (pertaining to for 
example the size of the enterprise, previous behavior regarding 
price risk management) the entrepreneurs were confronted with 
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statements about selling hogs by means of futures contracts and 
selling hogs on the cash market. Care was taken to randomize the 
statements regarding the use of futures and selling on the cash 
market in order to avoid response biases. 
We measured the variables in the model for a concrete 
choice situation, where a price level was given, and the 
entrepreneur had to make a choice. During this measurement 
respondents were instructed to "read the following situation 
carefully" and that "it is important to imagine yourself in the 
situation described". They were told that they had bought the 
piglets and that they had to choose between waiting until the hogs 
could be slaughtered and then sell the hogs on the cash market or 
selling the hogs now in the futures market and thereby fix the price 
in advance. We explicitly provided a price level of the futures 
contract. Five different price levels were randomly assigned to the 
entrepreneurs. The price levels chosen were based on price levels 
from previous years in the futures market and reflected the price 
distribution function. The scenario was perceived as being very 
realistic by the respondents. Entrepreneurs where asked to indicate 
their relative attitude, relative subjective norm and relative 
intention towards the two choice alternatives. Finally they had to 
make a choice between the two alternatives. The interview 
continued with items measuring the entrepreneur's market 
orientation, innovativeness and level of understanding. Finally, the 
entrepreneur's reference price was measured. 
8.5.3 Measures 
The beliefs and evaluations were measured on bipolar 
9 point scales. For the beliefs the end-poles were labelled as 
"strongly disagree" to "strongly agree", whereas for the evaluations 
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the the end-poles were labelled as "very negative" to "very 
positive". It has been argued by Ryan and Bonfield (1975) and 
Wochnowski (1995) that, when multiplying beliefs and evaluations, 
only the use of bipolar scales will result in a logical pattern of 
attitudes. 
In this study the relative attitude was measured by asking 
the respondent to distribute 100 points across the two alternatives 
to indicate the extent of liking. The relative intention was measured 
by asking the respondent to distribute 100 points across the two 
alternatives to indicate the probability of using the alternative. In a 
similar way, the relative subjective norm was measured by asking 
the entrepreneur to indicate the extent to which significant persons 
surrounding him/her thought that he/she should use one of the 
alternatives by distributing 100 points across the two alternatives 
(Van den Putte et al. 1996). Finally, the entrepreneur had to make a 
choice between using futures contracts or selling the output on the 
cash market. 
The measures of the constructs characterizing SMEs were 
developed from scales as introduced by studies in marketing, 
psychology, and management. An extensive list of the items 
included in each of the measures is provided in Appendix A. In 
developing the scales, the following iterative procedure was 
adopted. First, a large pool of items for each construct was 
generated. Care was taken to tap the domain of each construct as 
closely as possible. Next, items were tested for clarity and 
appropriateness in personally conducted pretests with 40 
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and indicate any ambiguity or other difficulty they 
experienced in responding to the items, as well as for any 
suggestions they deemed appropriate. Based on the feedback 
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received from the entrepreneurs, some items were eliminated, 
others were modified, and additional items were developed. 
Market orientation. We utilize items of the Narver and 
Slater (1990) measure of market orientation. The items were 
adapted to suit the purpose of our study. The measure is composed 
of two subscales, respectively measuring consumer orientation and 
tracing the market. 
Innovativeness. The Open Processing Scale (OPS) as 
developed by Leavitt and Walton (1975,1988), is utilized to 
measure innovativeness. The OPS measure provides a 'consumer 
friendly' instrument that is useful for studies on the utilization of 
new products of all kinds (Goldsmith 1984; Joseph and Vyas 
1984). Leavitt and Walton (1988) show that the OPS measure is 
relatively independent of a scale measuring the desire for 
experience. This substantiates the psychometric quality of the OPS 
scale. 
Level of understanding. We utilize items of the multi-item 
measure developed by Ennew et al. (1992) to measure the level of 
understanding. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement 
with each statement on a nine point scale ranging from "strongly 
disagree" to "strongly agree". 
Risk attitude. We used the intrinsic risk attitude as outlined 
in Chapter 7. 
Difference between the futures price and the reference price 
(DRP). The reference price was identified by asking the 
entrepreneur to respond to the open-ended question: "if you sell 
your hogs you will receive different prices for your hogs depending 
on the market situation. Some prices will give you the feeling that 
you have made a loss and some prices will give you the feeling that 
you have made a gain. Suppose that you sold your hogs today, from 
which price level onwards would you perceive the price as a gain?" 
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Immediately after declaring the initial reference price, the 
respondent was confronted with the following sentence "so, if I 
understand you correctly, then a price below Dutch Guilders 
is perceived as a loss" the respondent could answer this question 
with "yes" or "no". When the respondent answers the last question 
with "no", the first question was repeated, in order to give the 
respondent the opportunity to change the initial reference price. 
Whenever the respondent answered the latter question with a "yes", 
the assessment of the reference price had been accomplished (Puto 
1987). The DRP variable was calculated as the difference between 
the price level of the futures contract and the reference price. 
Monitoring the prices of futures. Monitoring the futures 
market was measured with a five point scale indicating how many 
times the entrepreneur had monitored the futures price in a certain 
time interval. On this scale 1 indicated that the futures price had 
never been monitored, 2 indicated that the futures price had been 
monitored several times per month, 3 indicated that the futures 
price had been monitored several times a week, 4 indicated that the 
futures price had been monitored once a day, and 5 indicated that 
the futures price had been followed several times a day. 
8.5.4 Measure Validation 
LISREL was used to assess the measurement quality of our 
constructs. All factor loadings were significant (minimum r-value 
was 4.60, p < 0.001) and greater than 0.4. These findings support 
the convergent validity of the items (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). 
The LISREL based composite reliabilities for the constructs ranged 
from 0.60 to 0.86, indicating reasonable reliabilities for the 
construct measurements. Details are given in Appendix A. 
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8.6 Results 
The data obtained from the 467 entrepreneurs served as 
input for the validation of the model and the different hypotheses. 
The relations between relative expectancy-value components, 
relative attitudes, relative subjective norms, relative intentions, and 
choice behavior, as well as the relations with SME characteristics 
as specified in the previous section, are tested by structural equation 
modeling (Bagozzi 1994; Baumgartner and Homburg 1996; 
Dabholkar 1994; Steenkamp and van Trijp 1991). We used 
LISREL 8 for the structural equation modeling, with the covariance 
matrix as input (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). Prior to model 
estimation we screened the data on coding errors and the presence 
of outliers. We used PRELIS for screening and testing the 
univariate and multivariate normality of the observed variables. The 
coefficient of relative multivariate kurtosis was 1.11, indicating that 
the assumption of multivariate normality is tenable (Steenkamp and 
van Trijp 1991). 
8.6.1 Test of the Choice Model 
First, exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 
beliefs. The results of the exploratory factor analysis showed that 
beliefs are grouped naturally into categories. We found that the 
beliefs could be grouped into three factors (components) which can 
be labeled as entrepreneurship, performance and ease of use. This 
confirms our findings of the group discussions. Hence, the 
entrepreneur may be expected to use these more abstract cognitive 
representations of futures contracts. Based on the results of the 
exploratory factor analysis we conducted a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) to test for the identified belief components. The 
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CFA model for entrepreneurship had a good fit, with a %2 of 14.55 
(df = 8, p = 0.07), a root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) of 0.04, a goodness-of-fit index (GFI) of 0.99, an 
adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) of 0.97, and a comparative 
fit index (CFI) of 0.98. The CFA model for performance had also a 
good fit, with a %2 of 14.55 (df = 8,p = 0.02), a RMSEA of 0.05, a 
GFI of 0.99, an AGFI of 0.97, and a CFI of 0.95. The fit for the 
CFA model for ease of use was not as good but acceptable, with a 
X2 of 36.47 (df = 9, p = 0.0), a RMSEA of 0.08, a GFI of 0.97, an 
AGFI of 0.94, and a CFI of 0.82. The details and results of the three 
CFA models are given in Appendix B. 
Thus, three meaningful expectancy-value components 
- performance, entrepreneurship, and ease of use - were identified. 
The relative EVC's can now be calculated and are denoted as 
REVCP, REVCE and REVCU respectively. These three Relative 
Expectancy-Value components were used in our model. As noted 
earlier, in the actual choice situation, the futures price level, or, 
better stated, the difference between the futures price and the 
reference price, plays an important role in the decision process. 
Therefore this component was also included in our model. 
The model (depicted in Figure 2) had an acceptable fit with 
a x 2 of 29.55 (df = 10, p = 0.001), a RMSEA of 0.06, a GFI of 
0.98, an AGFI of 0.94, and a CFI of 0.98. The test results show that 
the model provides an adequate description of the choice process of 
the entrepreneurs in our study. We will now consider the tests of 
our hypotheses related to the model. 
186 Chapter 8 
Choice model 
0.165 
(3.96) 
2 
X df P RMSEA AGFI CFI 
29.55 10 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.98 
Figure 2 Choice model: structural parameter estimates and fit statistics 
8.6.2 Test of Hypotheses Concerning the How of Choices 
The effect of the REVCs entrepreneurship, performance and 
ease of use on the relative attitude towards futures. The estimation 
results show that the relative attitude of an entrepreneur towards 
futures is significantly influenced by the relative expectancy-value 
components entrepreneurship (p = 0.149, r= 3.12, p < 0.001) and 
performance (B = 0.112, ¿ = 2.29, /? = 0.01), thereby (partly) 
supporting HI. The hypothesis regarding the effect of the relative 
expectancy-value component ease of use on the relative attitude 
toward futures was not supported (P = 0.048, t = 0.97, p = 0.16). 
The effect of the relative subjective norm on the relative 
intention to use futures. The model showed that the entrepreneur's 
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perception of the extent to which significant others think that one 
should use futures, when compared to the other alternative, 
significantly influenced the relative intention to use futures 
(P = 0.115, f = 2.70, p = 0.004), thereby supporting H2. The 
advisors surrounding the entrepreneur consisted of such persons as 
the account manager of the bank, the account manager of the 
slaughterhouse and the successor. These advisors apparently affect 
the SME's choice to use futures contracts via the relative intention. 
The effect of the difference between the futures price and 
the reference price on the relative attitude towards futures. The 
difference between the futures price level and the reference price 
(DRP) had a significant influence on the relative attitude 
(P = 0.247, t = 5.3\tp = 0.00), thereby supporting H3. 
The relative expectancy-value component ease of use did 
not influence the relative attitude towards futures in the concrete 
choice situation. During the measurement of the model a scenario 
was presented to the respondents in which the futures price was 
included. In such concrete choice situation "ease of use" may not 
play an important role. Nevertheless, we may expect that "ease of 
use" influences whether futures become part of the business of 
conduct. Being part of the business of conduct seems important 
because before futures will be chosen by SMEs, it must be 
considered as a tool which belongs to the toolbox of the SME 
(McQuiston 1989; Posavac et al. 1997). In our case this is 
particularly important because the hedging service provided by 
futures exchanges is perceived as complex. Moreover, futures are 
an innovative instrument for the entrepreneurs in this study. In 
order to test the hypothesis that a high score on the ease of use 
component is positively related to becoming part of the business of 
conduct, we analyzed an adoption model describing how futures 
become part of the business of conduct. This model is the same as 
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the proposed choice model except that the concrete choice situation 
(as described in the scenario) and the futures price level are not 
included. The model was operationalized by asking entrepreneurs 
to reveal their relative attitude, relative subjective norm and relative 
intention towards the two alternatives, measuring the extent to 
which futures would be accepted as being part of the business of 
conduct. This model had a good fit with a %2 of 2.45 (df = 3, 
p = 0.47), a RMSEA of 0.0, a GFI of 1, an AGFI of 0.99, and a CFI 
of 1. All the hypothesized causal relations were supported by 
significant f-values. 
The adoption model shows that the REVCU plays an 
important role in the decision whether or not futures form part of 
the business of conduct ((3=0.15, ¿ = 3.39, p = 0.003). After 
futures have been accepted as being part of the business of conduct, 
and are in the toolbox of the entrepreneur, REVCU does not play a 
major role any more in the concrete choice situation. The model fit 
of the adoption model was much better when compared to the fit of 
the choice model. This may be explained by the fact that choosing 
in a concrete choice situation is a much more complex phenomenon 
to explain than the process of futures becoming part of the business 
of conduct. 
8.6.3 Test of the Hypotheses Concerning the Why of Choices 
The effect of innovativeness on REVCE. Innovativeness had 
a significantly positive effect on the relative expectancy-value 
component entrepreneurship (REVCE) (P = 0.130, ¿ = 2.463, 
p = 0.007), thereby supporting H4. The model fit was good with a 
X2 of 12.64 (df = 5,p = 0.03), a RMSEA of 0.05, a GFI of 0.99, an 
AGFI of 0.97, and a CFI of 0.98. Thus it appears that innovative 
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entrepreneurs value more strongly the entrepreneurial opportunities 
that futures provide. 
The effect of tracing the market on REVCP. Our hypothesis 
stated that risk attitude would have a moderating influence on the 
relation between tracing the market and the expectancy-value 
component performance. More specifically, we expected that risk 
averse entrepreneurs who trace the market would more strongly 
value the hedging service (i.e. the performance) of futures markets. 
Based on the risk attitude measure we divided the sample into risk 
averse entrepreneurs and risk seeking entrepreneurs. For the risk 
averse sample we estimated the relationship. Tracing the market 
had a significant, positive effect on the relative expectancy-value 
component performance (REVCP) ((3=0.160, ¿ = 2.089, 
p = 0.0184), thereby supporting H5. The model fit was good with a 
X2 of 1.368 (df = 5, p = 0.93), a RMSEA of 0.0, a GFI of 0.99, an 
AGFI of 0.99, and a CFI of 1. For the risk seeking and risk neutral 
entrepreneurs no effect was found between tracing the market and 
REVCP. So, the relation between tracing the market and REVCP 
only exists for the risk averse group which shows that there is an 
interaction effect between risk attitude and tracing the market. 
The effect of level of understanding on REVCU. The level of 
understanding had a significant, positive effect on the relative 
expectancy-value component ease of use (REVCU) ((3 = 0.139, 
t = 3.033, p = 0.001), thereby supporting H6. The model fit was 
acceptable with a x 2 of 11.41 (df = 5, p = 0.04), a RMSEA of 0.05, 
a GFI of 0.99, an AGFI of 0.97, and a CFI of 0.97. 
The effect of monitoring futures prices on REVCU. 
Monitoring the futures prices had a significant, positive effect on 
the relative expectancy-value component ease of use (REVCU) 
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O = 0.153, ¿ = 2.545, p = 0.006), thereby supporting H7. The 
model was saturated, therefore leading to a perfect fit to the data. 
8.7 Conclusions and Discussion 
8.7.1 Managerial Implications 
The results provide support for our model. The relative 
attitude towards futures has a strong predictive power for the choice 
behavior of entrepreneurs of SMEs. Below we discuss several 
managerial implications of these results. 
Entrepreneur ship. Whenever entrepreneurs had the feeling 
that by using futures they could exploit their entrepreneurial 
freedom to a larger degree, compared to selling in the market, they 
developed a positive relative attitude towards futures. It appeared 
that innovativeness is positively related to the relative expectancy-
value component entrepreneur ship. Futures are an attractive 
instrument whenever their use increases the degrees of freedom in 
the market place. The management of a futures exchange can use 
this information for its promotion of futures and can use this 
information when developing and redesigning futures contracts. 
Positioning futures as an extra tool for the entrepreneur by which 
his/her degree of freedom of acting in the market place increases 
seems valuable. Hence, providing information regarding the 
hedging strategies that can be employed with futures is an 
interesting promotion element. When designing futures contracts, 
the futures exchange can increase the compatibility of futures with 
other instruments available to the entrepreneur and thereby increase 
the expectancy-value component entrepreneurship of futures over 
other alternatives. 
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Ease of use. It was found that the expectancy-value 
component ease of use played a major role in whether or not futures 
become part of the business of conduct. During the group 
discussions it became clear that futures trading, and financial 
derivatives trading in general, is often perceived as complex and 
difficult to understand. The level of understanding and monitoring 
futures prices were positively related to the expectancy-value 
component ease of use. In order to reduce the psychological 
distance to futures contracts, the futures exchange might develop 
training programs for entrepreneurs and thus increase the 
understanding of futures trading. 
Performance. The performance provided by futures is 
another critical attribute which influences the relative attitude. In 
the case of risk averse entrepreneurs, tracing the market is 
positively related to the relative expectancy-value component 
performance. Entrepreneurs monitoring the market know they face 
cash market risk and, in the case of risk aversion, they value the 
risk reduction service provided by futures exchanges. The 
performance of futures can be increased by using a more appealing 
standardization procedure of the underlying commodity. During the 
group discussions it became clear that standardization with regards 
to delivery date was perceived as limiting, causing logistic 
problems within the enterprise. Relaxing some of the 
standardizations may help to increase the performance of futures. 
Recently so-called flex-futures have been introduced for some 
commodities in the US. The standardization of these futures is less 
strict and therefore these futures are better able to fit the specific 
needs of buyers and sellers. In the financial strain of literature a lot 
of attention has been paid to the design process of futures. This 
strain of literature can contribute to the improvement of the 
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performance and hence to the attractiveness of the instrument 
(Tashjian 1995). 
Price level of futures in relation to the reference price. It 
appeared that the difference between the futures price and the 
reference price of the entrepreneur had a significant, positive effect 
on the relative attitude towards futures. Both the futures price and 
the reference price of the entrepreneur are beyond the scope of the 
marketing manager. The futures price is determined by fundamental 
economic factors (supply and demand factors of the underlying 
commodity of the futures contract). The reference price is 
determined by the entrepreneur's aspiration level with regard to 
making a profit. Although the futures exchange cannot influence 
these two prices, it can profit from them when introducing new 
futures contracts. Our model makes clear that, when introducing a 
new futures contract, the price level in the underlying market of the 
commodity is an important determinant in creating sufficient 
trading volume and hence liquidity. When introducing new futures 
at a point in time when the reference price is much higher than the 
futures price, the futures exchange may benefit from the positive 
relation between this difference and the resulting positive attitude 
towards futures which leads to a larger trading volume. 
8.7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
Our findings suggest several directions for further research. 
First of all our study might be replicated within other financial 
services such as the speculation service and might be replicated for 
other financial derivatives such as options and swaps. Our sample 
consisted of entrepreneurs of SMEs who were somewhat unfamiliar 
with futures. An interesting thing to examine might be whether 
entrepreneurs familiar with futures and other price risk 
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management instruments make the comparison of alternatives in a 
similar way. It would be interesting to see whether the same 
determinants also influence their choice. For the entrepreneurs in 
this study only two alternatives were relevant. Whether the choice 
process is the same for three or more alternatives should also be 
interesting to explore. In this chapter we examined the supply side 
of the market, that is, the sellers in the futures market. Obviously, 
to have futures trading, sellers and buyers are needed. So, to gain 
more insight into why futures succeed or fail also the buyers' side 
of the market, that is, the buyers in the futures market, should be 
taken into account which, in our case, are slaughterhouses and 
retailers. 
Our study makes clear that the marketing point of view 
raises questions regarding the optimal design of financial services. 
The design of the financial service influences the performance 
component, and thus influences the choice of the entrepreneurs. 
The financial approach towards financial services focuses on the 
technical feasibility of financial services and in this way provides 
valuable information about the design and development of financial 
services. Both the marketing approach and the financial approach 
are complementary, which would make a multidisciplinary 
approach to research into financial services an interesting avenue to 
explore in the near future. 
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Appendix A 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the Measures 
To examine the measurement quality of the constructs, 
confirmatory factor analysis has been performed using LISREL 8. 
The input for the analysis consisted of covariance matrices based 
oniV = 467. 
Innovativeness 
1)1 buy new products before my colleagues (competitors) buy them 
2) I like to experiment with new ways of doing things 
3) I take more chances than others 
4) I generally like to try new ideas in my enterprise 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate how well the statements fit 
their own views through a five point scale. Construct 
reliability = 0.78; %2 =9.2 (df = 2, p = 0.01); RMSEA = 0.09; 
GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.98. 
Market orientation: tracing the market 
1)1 think it is important to understand the wishes of my customers 
2) I think it is important to know how my customers evaluate my 
product 
3) I adapt to changes in the market 
4) I track the market prices of the products I produce 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their agreement with each 
item through a nine point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". Construct reliability = 0.60; =!.!> (d /=2, 
p = 0.31); RMSEA = 0.01; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.99; CFI = 0.99. 
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Market orientation: consumer orientation 
1) I want to know everything about the consumer who is buying 
pork 
2) I think it is important to know a lot of the end-users 
3) I think it is important to know the demands the consumer makes 
on pork 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their agreement with each 
item through a nine point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". Construct reliability = 0.86; model is saturated 
Level of understanding 
1)1 know how the futures market is fimctioning 
2) There is sufficient information on the functioning of futures 
markets 
3) I understand the way I can hedge my risk on the futures market 
4) I keep up with futures prices 
Entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their agreement with each 
item through a nine point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". Construct reliability = 0.65; %2 = 6.36 (df = 2, 
p = 0.04); RMSEA = 0.06; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.98 
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Appendix B 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis On Beliefs About Futures Contracts 
and Using the Cash market 
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted in order to find the 
underlying factor structure of the beliefs. A three factor model 
provided the best solution. Items loading relatively high on one of 
these factors (factor loading > 0.4) are included with the 
corresponding factors in a confirmatory factor analysis. The 
confirmatory factor analysis has been conducted using LISREL 8. 
The input for the analyses were covariance matrices based on 
# = 467. 
Entrepreneurship 
1) I think that by using futures contracts/cash markets I can fully 
exploit my spirit of free enterprise 
2) I think that the use of futures contracts/cash markets gives me 
the opportunity to receive an extra high price 
3) I think that using futures contracts/cash markets give me a large 
freedom regarding actions in the market place 
X2 = 14.55 (d /=8, /> = 0.07); RMSEA = 0.04; AGFI = 0.97; 
GFI = 0.99; CFI = 0.98 
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Performance 
1) I think that by selling my hogs by means of futures 
contracts/cash markets will enable me to reduce the fluctuations 
in my revenues 
2) I think that a futures contract ensures the sale of my hogs 
3) I think that using futures contracts will improve my relations 
with traders. 
X 2= 17.27 (d /=8 , p = 0.02); RMSEA = 0.05; AGFI = 0.97; 
GFI = 0.99; CFI = 0.95 
Ease of use 
1) I think that using futures contracts/cash markets is an easy way 
of selling hogs 
2) I think that using futures is a difficult matter 
3) I think that by using futures I will not have to worry about 
finding buyers for my hogs 
X2 = 36.47 (d /=9, p = 0.0); RMSEA = 0.08; AGFI = 0.93; 
GFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.82 
CHAPTER 9 
The Information Dissemination Process of 
Futures Exchange Innovations 1 
9.1 Abstract 
Much attention has been paid to theories which explain the 
success or failure of futures contracts. Previous literature explains the 
success or failure of futures contracts by the underlying characteristics of 
the futures contract (Black 1986; Tashjian 1995). From a marketing point 
of view these investigations implicitly focus on the product as an element 
of the marketing mix. In this chapter we focus on promotion and 
distribution as elements of the marketing mix of futures exchanges. More 
specifically we analyze the information dissemination process regarding 
new futures contracts as a two stage process from futures exchanges to 
brokers respectively from brokers to the potential customers. 
9.2 Introduction 
Futures markets make it possible for those who want to 
manage price risk - hedgers - to transfer that risk to those who are 
willing to accept it - speculators. Futures contracts can be seen as a 
hedging and speculation service provided by the futures market to 
hedgers and speculators. Futures markets also provide price 
information that the world looks to as a benchmark in determining 
the value of a particular commodity or financial instrument on a 
given day and time. These important benefits - risk transfer and 
1 This chapter will be published as: Pennings, J.M.E. (1998), "The Information 
Dissemination Process of Futures Exchange Innovations: A Note" Journal of 
Business Research, forthcoming. 
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price discovery - reach every sector of the world where changing 
market conditions create economic risk, including such diverse 
areas as agricultural products, foreign exchange, imports and 
exports, financing, and investments. Futures exchanges provide a 
location for buyers and sellers to meet and, through an auction 
process, discover a price for specific futures contracts. 
Exchanges are also responsible for disseminating these 
prices and guaranteeing fulfillment of traded contracts. This activity 
is centralized on the trading floor of each futures exchange. While 
all market participants have direct access to the floor through their 
brokers, only exchange members have the privilege of actually 
trading on the floor. Some traders known as floor brokers fill 
outside orders for different firms such as commission houses, 
commercial interests, financial institutions and portfolio managers. 
Others trade hedging or speculative accounts for the company they 
work for. Another group, known as locals, trade for their own 
account and speculate on future price movements. Futures 
exchanges are free markets where the many factors that influence 
supply and demand converge on the trading floor and through 
auction are translated to a price (Telser and Higinbotham 1977; 
Cornell 1981; Catania 1989). With a trade volume of 1.8 billion 
contracts in 1995, both futures and options, the futures industry can 
be classified as one of the world's fastest growing industries. The 
futures 'industry' is composed of competing firms (exchanges). Not 
only do futures exchanges compete with other futures exchanges, 
but also with cash forward markets. Moreover, competition with 
Over The Counter (OTC) markets has developed rapidly over the 
past decade. In order to assure survival, futures exchanges show a 
rapid product innovation (Carlton 1984; Miller 1990). The risk of 
failure is considerable for futures contracts (Carlton 1984; Tashjian 
and McConnel 1989; Tashjian 1995). In 1995 40 new futures 
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contracts were launched throughout the world, only a few of which 
have proven to be successful in the first year (Davey and 
Maguire 1996). 
In previous research the success of futures contracts has 
been explained by some well-known observable variables such as 
size of cash market and cash price volatility (Silber 1981; Black 
1986; Ross 1989; Nathan, Lekkas and Wang 1995; Brorsen and 
Fofana 1995). The two well-known approaches in futures contract 
innovation are the 'commodity characteristics' approach and the 
'contract characteristics' approach as outlined in Chapter 2. The 
first approach defines feasible commodities for futures trading 
based on an extensive list of required commodity attributes and the 
second focuses on factors endogenous to the futures industry. 
Literature suggests that successful contracts will emerge where 
futures contracts satisfy a hedging need, where the futures price 
closely tracks the assets held by hedgers, and in markets where long 
and short participants are driven by different motives (Black 1986; 
Duffie and Jackson 1989; Tashijan 1995). 
Although the benefits associated with risk reductions are 
important factors in motivating the decision makers to engage in 
futures trading, potential users are also heavily influenced by their 
subjective assessment of the performance and reliability of a futures 
market as has been outlined by Ennew et al. (1992). The subjective 
assessment of the performance is heavily influenced by the 
information potential users have been exposed to about the hedging 
service and speculation service of the futures contract. This is 
because of the relative complexity of the financial service provided 
by the futures contract. 
A futures exchange can be seen as an institution that 
maximizes the common interest of its members. The rivalry theory 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1976) has been identified as being a key 
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determinant in futures markets innovation. The rival theory finds 
that the rate of innovation activity, i.e. introduction of new futures 
contracts, increases with the intensity of rivalry (competition) in the 
futures industry. Most exchanges are not-for-profit membership 
associations. Membership in each exchange is limited to a specific 
number of individuals, although some exchanges permit the 
holding of multiple memberships by members. The members of 
futures exchanges are often brokerage houses who facilitate the 
auction process. The broker helps to bring individual buyers and 
sellers together. In the case of new futures contracts the broker 
plays an important role in providing information to potential 
customer. This information could lead to participation of the 
potential customers in the market of the new futures contract and 
hence enhance the success of the new futures contract. In this 
chapter we will elaborate on the information dissemination role of 
the brokers. 
In order to set up an operational futures exchange, R&D 
and implementation should follow a structured procedure. 
Sandor (1973,1991) divides the process of R&D and 
implementation by a futures exchange into two stages. 
The first stage consists of a formal examination of certain 
established criteria to determine whether or not the commodity can 
be adapted to futures trading. 
The second stage consists of marketing the new futures 
contract to potential customers. An important element of marketing 
new futures contracts is information dissemination of the new 
services provided by the new futures contract. Futures contracts are 
often perceived as a complex financial service, thereby inhibiting 
participation in futures trading. Information about the services 
futures contracts provide is thus a pre-requirement for successful 
futures trading. 
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Effective information dissemination regarding the service of 
a futures market will enhance the diffusion of futures contract 
innovations and hence the success of new futures contracts. 
Information dissemination of a new futures contract is an element 
of both promotion and distribution as an element of the marketing 
mix of a futures exchange. Promotion includes information 
regarding the new product or service and in the distribution process 
information is provided about the product or service. Information 
can reduce the psychological distance of a potential customer to a 
complex service, such as the hedging and speculative services 
provided by the futures exchange. 
This information dissemination process seems particularly 
important to futures exchanges whose participants are relatively 
small companies, for instance, small commodity cash market 
traders who use the futures exchange to reduce their risk on their 
cash market position (Stoll and Whaley 1993). These small 
participants are not members of the futures exchange and are not 
able to generate information within their organization regarding 
such a complex financial service. 
In order to represent the effect of information on the 
diffusion process of new futures contracts, we propose, in 
accordance with Jones and Ritz (1991), a model of information 
dissemination which includes brokers and customers2. It is assumed 
that brokers act as intermediaries between the futures exchange and 
the (potential) customers. That is, the services that the futures 
contract provides flows from the futures exchange through the 
2 Note that the information dissemination process is only one of the many variables 
explaining the success or failure of futures exchange innovations. We argue that the 
model presented in this chapter can contribute to a better understanding of the 
diffusion of futures contract innovations and hence to the success or failure of 
futures contracts. 
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brokers to the customers. The broker provides the information 
about the service of the futures contract to the customer. The 
assumed information dissemination process of a new futures 
contract is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the size of the 
potential customer market is depending on the willingness of the 
brokers to provide information about the services which the futures 
exchange provides. 
Brokers Customers 
Potential market 
of brokers 1 • 
Potential market 
of customers 
Current market 
of brokers 
Current market 
of customers 
Figure 1 The interaction between the information dissemination process of 
brokers and customers of new futures contracts 
9.3 Information Dissemination Model 
Following Fourt and Woodlock (1960) and Jones and Ritz 
(1991) the information dissemination process regarding the new 
futures contract as hypothesized in Section 9.2 can be expressed by 
the differential equation: 
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— = X(CI)[B(CI) - B(t)] (1) 
at 
where B(t) is the cumulative number of brokers who have 
disseminated the information of the new futures contract at time t, 
X is the individual transfer rate and B(CI) is the maximum number 
of brokers who would disseminate information of the futures 
contract. Both the individual transfer rate and the maximum 
number of brokers are dependent on, i.e. can be influenced by, the 
controllable instruments (CI) of the futures exchange (see Table 1). 
Where the controllable instruments include the exchange seat 
policy, the rewarding policy and hedging efficiency. This implies 
that B is not an absolute maximum, since futures exchange might 
decide to increase or decrease the number of brokers admitted. 
Equation (1) represents the speed of the brokers who 
disseminate information about the new futures contract. The 
individual transfer rate X is the speed adjustment rate, it represents 
the fraction of brokers who have not yet started to disseminate 
information regarding the new futures contract in this period, but 
will disseminate the information in the next period. The futures 
exchange can use incentive measures, such as bonuses, in order to 
speed up the transfer rate. 
For the customers, we assume a similar model: 
^ = a(CI)[C(CI,t)-C(t)] (2) 
at 
where C(t) is the cumulative number of customers who have been 
exposed to the information regarding the new futures contract at 
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time t, a is the individual transfer rate and C(CI, t) is the 
maximum number of customers who would be exposed to the 
information. Both the individual transfer rate and the maximum 
number of customers are dependent on, i.e. can be influenced by, 
the controllable instruments (CI) of the futures exchange (see 
Table 1). 
Equation (2) represents the speed of the information 
exposure process to potential customers. It is assumed that the 
customer's exposure to information includes processing the 
mformation and subsequently using this information in deciding 
whether or not to engage in futures trading. The individual transfer 
rate a is the speed adjustment rate, it represents that part of the 
customers that have not yet been exposed to information regarding 
the new futures contract in this period, but will be exposed in the 
next period. 
The maximum number of customers who would be exposed 
to the information is determined by the number of brokers who 
have disseminated the information regarding the new futures 
contract. Assume that each broker increases the maximum number 
of customers who would be exposed to the information by an 
additional <j> customers, as expressed in equation (3), 
C(t) = 4>(CI)B(t) (3) 
where <j) is the rate of transfer between brokers and customers that 
can be influenced by the controllable instruments of the exchange. 
Using Equations (1), (2) and (3), the solution of the 
differential equation for the information dissemination process 
yields 
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C(f) = <KC/)5(C7)(1 - é 
éf(CI)<CI)(B(CI) - B0) ( 
a(CI) - X(CI) 
) + 
(4) 
where B0 is the initial number of brokers that disseminated the 
information. 
This model is able to provide insight into the information 
dissemination process and hence in the adoption process of the 
futures contract innovation and can therefore contribute to the 
explanation of the success or failure of new futures contracts. The 
model is an S-shaped curve (see Figure 2, the solid line). The 
futures exchange management will be interested to use their 
controllable instruments in such a way that the curve reaches the 
maximum within a short period. The model consists of two parts. 
The first part 
shows the information dissemination process with all brokers 
spreading the information about the new contract from the moment 
of introduction. If this were the only component of Equation (4), 
the resulting evolution of information exposure to the potential 
customer would be an exponential curve, always increasing at a 
decreasing rate (See Figure 2, the dotted line). However, in the case 
of futures contracts, the brokers play an important role regarding 
the information dissemination process which is captured by the 
second part: 
<KC/)5(C7)(1 - e ,-a(C/)r ) 
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$(CIMCI)(B(CI) - B0) 
a(CI) - X(CI) 
This part shows the influence of brokers on the information 
dissemination process. Thus, the second part of Equation (4) can be 
considered a transient term which diminishes what otherwise would 
be an exponential pattern of potential customers being exposed to 
information regarding the new futures contract (Jones and Ritz 
1991). 
C(t) 
t 
Figure 2 The evolution of the customers who have been exposed to the 
information regarding the new futures contract 
In Figure 2 the solid line shows the evolutionary pattern of 
customer exposure to the information of the new futures contract. If 
all brokers spread the information right from the introduction of the 
futures contract, the evolutionary pattern of customer exposure to 
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the information of the new futures contract would be reflected by 
the dotted line in Figure 2. For our model this implies that the 
second part in Equation (4) is not present. 
Now the futures exchange management has five 
instruments, represented by the parameters of the model (as shown 
in Table 1), in order to maximize the model, i.e. to reach the 
maximum information dissemination within a short period. This 
means that the solid line in Figure 2 has to be reshaped towards an 
exponential curve such as the dotted line in Figure 2 which causes 
the maximum to be reached in the shortest possible time, i.e. the 
second part of Equation (4) will lose influence in favor of the first part. 
Table 1 Controllable instruments of the futures exchange 
Controllable instruments Activities of the futures exchange 
B Seat policy of the exchange, only allowing the most 
motivated brokers on the floor, this will increase 
the number of brokers who are willing to 
disseminate high quality information to potential 
customers, hence increase B 
C Increase of network of brokers. 
a Increase of promotion and increase of the quality of 
the service provided, for example, increase of 
hedging effectiveness and decrease of transaction 
costs, will increase the customers' individual 
transfer rate. 
X Incentive measures for brokers, rewarding good 
performance, will increase brokers' individual 
transfer rate. 
Training of brokers regarding the benefits of the 
new futures contract will increase <)>. 
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From Table 1 we can conclude that the information 
dissemination process of new futures and thus the diffusion of 
futures contract innovations is not only dependent on the variables 
thoroughly investigated in financial literature, but also on the 
marketing mix elements promotion and distribution, embodied in 
this chapter by the information dissemination process. This has 
been recognized by the Warenterminborse Hannover (WTB) in 
Germany. In 1998, this exchange will launch new futures contracts 
for wheat and hogs. Because these contracts will be the first 
agricultural futures contracts in Germany, i.e. the potential 
customer is confronted with a relatively long (psychological) 
distance to the futures exchange, the futures exchange management 
puts a lot of effort into disseminating information about their new 
futures, using the activities as described in Table 1, in order to 
reach a large share of both motivated brokers and customers. 
In this chapter we assumed for each broker to inform an 
equal number of customers about the new futures contract and for 
the futures market's management not to spread the information to 
the potential customers directly. Further research extending the 
model on these two points should be an interesting avenue to 
explore in the future. 
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PART CO-
P A R T III F U T U R E S E X C H A N G E 
I N N O V A T I O N S : R I G H T S F U T U R E S 
C O N T R A C T S 
Innovation of products and services is presently a major 
marketing strategy of companies, also of futures exchanges. It can 
be pursued by new products for existing markets or by creating new 
products for new markets. We will focus in this part of the book on 
the latter strategy, more specifically on futures for production and 
environmental rights. Production and environmental rights play an 
important part in European agriculture. A farmer who does not 
possess production rights is not allowed to produce the product in 
question or will pay such a high levy that production would be 
uneconomical, for instance milk in the EU. The same reasoning 
holds for environmental rights: only the entrepreneur holding these 
rights is allowed to produce the pollutant, in proportion with the 
number of rights he or she owns. The rights that have been 
introduced in agriculture are tradable and, as a consequence, a 
lively trade has emerged in a number of member states of the 
European Union (specifically The Netherlands and United 
Kingdom). Price fluctuations are high on the cash market, which 
exposes the farmer to price risk. Therefore, a rights futures market 
seems an interesting option. 
In comparison to goods, rights have a number of interesting 
characteristics which affect the hedging effectiveness of rights 
futures (should they be introduced) and, consequently, the success 
of such a futures market. We analyze the effect these characteristics 
have upon the optimal hedge ratio and on the viability of such a 
futures market. Moreover, we analyze the possibility of cross-
hedging the profit capacity of the farm with the help of rights 
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futures. This part chiefly draws from the finance approach 
(cfr. Figure 3, Chapter 2), in deriving the optimal hedge ratios and 
hedging effectiveness of rights futures. The marketing approach 
comes in when we propose futures contract specifications, which 
are based on the needs of the potential hedgers. 
CHAPTER 10 
The Dimensions of Rights: A 
Classification of Environmental Rights 
and Production Rights 1 
10.1 Abstract 
The literature on rights has paid much attention to the description 
of rights and the performance of systems of rights. Less has been 
published on identifying the underlying dimensions of rights, even 
though such identification seems important for understanding the 
different types of rights and for classifying them so as to facilitate the 
process of development that occurs when introducing rights (Miller 
1995). In this chapter a theoretical framework which sheds light on the 
structure of rights, is developed. After examining the characteristics of 
rights, a correspondence analysis is carried out on existing rights and on 
a hypothetical ideal right in order to find similarities between them and 
to identify their underlying structure. 
10.2 Introduction 
In the context of this chapter we define a right2 as a 
permission from the government or public authority to take action 
which is otherwise prohibited by law. These rights are initiated by 
some government or supranational authority and are distributed to 
1 This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E., W.J.M. Heijman and 
M.T.G. Meulenberg (1997), "The Dimensions of Rights: A Classificaton of 
Environmental Rights and Production Rights", European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 4, 55-71. 
2 The terms allowances, permits, quotas and rights will be used interchangeably 
in this paper to refer to the same phenomenon. 
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the affected firms. We will not consider privately initiated rights 
such as a buy option on a particular house, or intellectual property 
rights, nor will we consider public rights. 
In the existing literature rights are often associated with 
environmental policy (Miller 1995), but they are also very common 
in agricultural production policy (Burrell 1990; Oskam 1989). In 
this chapter we develop a general theoretical framework for rights 
to enable the many rights in today's world to be classified and 
therefore better understood. 
It is important to note the difference between credits and 
rights with respect to environmental policy. A credit is created by a 
source causing less pollution than its allowable limit. To obtain 
such a credit, a polluter is required to show that the actual 
emissions, plus or minus any traded credits, are less than the 
allowable limit. Subsequently the polluter is allowed to trade the 
credit or to bank it. In a credit program, the agency or authority 
responsible for it must certify the creation of credits and also record 
trades. In a rights system, however, trading in rights involves future 
pollution, the latter being illegal without approval. In the case of 
environmental rights, the environmental protection agency (EPA) 
has set an allowable limit for one source; the source can increase or 
reduce its allowable limit by trading rights. 
The primary function of rights is to guide incentives to 
achieve internalization of externalities (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1976; 
Parisi 1995). At first sight this function is less obvious for 
production rights than for environmental rights. Low prices for 
producers such as farmers may be socially unacceptable to the 
government because this group of suppliers and related groups 
would generate an income that is below the accepted minimum 
standard of living. Furthermore, the increasing divergence between 
social classes, for example the low living standard of farmers and 
The Market for Hedging Services 215 
rural population compared with other groups, may be a more 
important consideration, which makes the option of low prices 
unacceptable to the government. To overcome this problem the 
government intervenes, by either buying the oversupply in the 
market or subsidizing, or both, to guarantee a price for farmers for 
their products. However, these subsidies may be a burden to the 
society at large and create a deadweight loss in welfare terms. 
Overproduction has become a negative externality; therefore 
production rights are used as a guide to achieve greater 
internalization of that externality. 
The way in which rights are assigned, enforced, and 
transferred affects the allocation of resources and hence the amount 
and distribution of output (Hahn 1986b). Anderson and Hill (1975) 
argue that the social arrangements, laws, and customs which govern 
asset ownership are established on the basis of variables 
endogenous to the economic system. They address the question of 
how the rights structure is created (Anderson and Hill 1975; Nelson 
1986; Nussbaum 1992). We propose to pay attention to the right 
itself, i.e. we will review its characteristics. By doing so we will be 
able to better understand, from both a business economic and 
policy perspective, how rights can be specified in order to be both 
attractive to the policymaker and the firms affected by the rights 
(Lewis and Sappington 1995; McCarthy, 1992). The characteristics 
which we will identify can be seen as controllable instruments of 
the policymaker. When specifying a right the policymaker implicitly 
uses these characteristics to design the right. Knowing and 
understanding the characteristics and their implications, the 
policymaker will be able to combine these characteristics in an 
optimal way, from both a business economic and policy perspective 
and hence design an optimal right. 
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First, the various types of policy mstrurnents available to 
cope with environmental and production problems are discussed. 
Second, we deal with the characteristics of rights. Some existing 
rights will be classified on the basis of these characteristics. The 
classification will be analyzed through correspondence analysis in 
order to examine the underlying dimensions of those rights. The 
chapter concludes with an evaluation. 
10.3 Mechanisms for Internalizing Externalities: Rights 
Policymakers can choose from a variety of instruments for 
achieving specified objectives when implementing policies to solve 
environmental and production problems. Economists often 
distinguish between two broad categories of instruments. First, the 
command and control mechanisms, which are effective but not 
always efficient; firms have relatively little flexibility to achieve 
their goals. The second type, called incentive-based or market-
based mechanisms, provides firms with incentives to look for more 
efficient ways to internalize (negative) externalities (Opschoor and 
Vos 1989; Tietenberg 1990). The incentive-based mechanisms 
ensure that firms automatically make control efforts in precisely the 
manner and degree which will result in the cost-effective allocation 
of the overall burden of control. Moreover, approaches involving 
economic incentives generally provide firms with incentives to find 
less expensive solutions. One important criterion when selecting 
policy mstruments is to minimize the overall cost of achieving 
prescribed objectives. 
Economic behaviour can be defined as the public at large 
being able to weigh up all of the costs and benefits of such 
behaviour (Pekelney 1993). Rights are one instrument that can 
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supply the appropriate incentives, at least in theory (Hahn 1986a, 
1994). Rights are rooted in the theory of externalities, which states 
that the public costs of certain economic behaviour (pollution, 
production) are largely external to the private costs the agent faces. 
Hahn (1986a) distinguishes two broad categories of 
incentive-based policy instruments for environmental problems: 
pricing mechanisms and quantity mechanisms. This distinction also 
holds for problems of overproduction. In contrast to the quantity 
mechanism, the pricing mechanism is unable to predetermine the 
amount of environmental damage or of production, and is therefore 
less effective than a quantity mechanism. Subsidies and levies are 
examples of a pricing mechanism, they are widely used in 
environmental and production policy as an incentive for reaching 
the government's goal. A marketable rights scheme is an example 
of the quantity approach. Under such a system the overall tolerated 
level of externality is established and then allotted to firms in the 
form of rights. Firms that keep externality levels below the allotted 
level may sell or lease their surplus rights to other firms, or use 
them to offset excess externalities in other parts of their own 
enterprise. Examples of these rights are the SO2 emission rights in 
the US and the milk production quotas in the European Union and 
Canada (Lord 1993; Pennings, Meulenberg and Heijman 1996; 
USEPA 1990,1992a, 1992b; Tietenberg 1989a, 1989b). 
Note that the right is efficient because it is transferable. If 
the authority does not allow any trade in rights, a rights system can 
still be effective but not efficient (Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore 
1994; Selwyn 1993). 
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10.4 Characteristics of Rights 
We will construct a classification for rights that is based on 
their basic characteristics. 
Externality 
Input /Production process 
Figure 1 Flows in the production process 
Externality 
Main product 
By-product 
^Externality^ 
Basic characteristics of both environmental and production 
rights can be deduced from the related production process. Each 
production process can generate externalities (Figure 1), which can 
be internalized by rights. The rights linked to input are mostly 
resource rights, whereas those linked to output are environmental 
and/or production rights. The classes presented in Table 1 do not 
pretend to be mutually exclusive. Some resource rights, such as 
fishery rights, may be seen as environmental rights or as production 
rights, depending on the goal of the authority that initiated them. In 
this chapter, only rights related to output are examined. 
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Table 1 The classes used for classifying rights by input and output 
INPUT OUTPUT 
Rights with respect to Environmental rights Production rights 
resources 
The input for and output of a production process can be 
described in terms of amount, quality, time, place and marketability 
(Naylor and Vernon 1969). Because rights are related to input or 
output, they can be described in an analogous way. 
For rights the following types of characteristics can be 
distinguished: quality, temporal, spatial, property and transferability 
characteristics, which will all be specified and analyzed. They will 
be used as inputs for the correspondence analysis. 
10.4.1 Quality Characteristics 
Production and environmental rights interfere with the 
economic behaviour of the firm. Most rights affect the production 
side of the economy and, indirectly, the consumption side too. As 
far as production rights are concerned this is obvious. A production 
quota is assigned to an agent: it defines how much output is 
allowed in production during a specified period. Overproduction is 
illegal and will be penalized. In most cases environmental rights 
also interfere with production. Pollution rights will have an impact 
on the production level. Rights directly affecting the consumption 
side of the economy, for example, are rights to consume a 
maximum of 20 gallons of gasoline per month. In the European 
Union such rights exist for some chemical materials. 
The quality characteristics of rights reflect the objectives of 
an institution which initiated the right. They specify what action the 
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possessor of the right may take. In general, the right is defined as 
the amount of pollution or production per area per time period. 
Note that in this respect time means the time period for which the 
amount of pollution or production is defined. The duration of the 
rights scheme, i.e. the period the rights will last, will be discussed 
in subsection 10.4.2. In the case of environmental rights, not only 
the total quantity per enterprise, but sometimes also the quantity per 
output (i.e. the efficiency rate), is subject to the right; for example, 
the amount of SO2 emission per kilowatt-hour energy, per time unit 
and per unit of area. In the case of production rights, such rights 
based on efficiency rate are rarely present. 
10.4.2 Temporal Characteristics 
The temporal characteristics of rights indicate the lifetime 
of the rights scheme and thereby the terms of the right. The rights 
scheme, i.e. the right, may be perpetual or tied to a certain period, 
after which it lapses. The right's duration is important for the 
right's marketability. If a rights scheme lasts only for a particular 
period, the government will have to redistribute rights in order to 
continue its policy. The time period during which the agent can 
exercise his or her right may be specified or not. In the latter case 
banking is allowed. The exercise period of the right can be 
specified precisely as a date or be tied to the occurrence of an event. 
One example of the former is the right to drive on Mondays and 
Wednesdays in a city having smog problems. An example of the 
latter - the occurrence of an uncertain event - is an agent who may 
exercise the right until the pollution reaches a specified limit. 
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10.4.3 Spatial Characteristics 
The spatial characteristic indicates the geographic area in 
which the right can be exercised for environmental and production 
economic reasons. Except for global rights, such as those pertaining 
to chlorofluorcarbons rights3, rights are almost always tied to a 
specific geographic area. The spatial characteristic of environmental 
rights is linked to air, water and ground pollution. It is extremely 
important in the case of pollution rights because pollutants are 
region-specific. In the European Union this characteristic of rights 
with respect to production rights is the subject of much discussion, 
because regional use of rights is connected with the distribution of 
the rights among the member states. 
10.4.4 Property Characteristics 
An environmental or production right is not necessarily a 
property right. Whether or not the government can limit, withdraw 
or otherwise modify the rights in the future without compensating 
the holders of rights is an important issue and is extremely 
important for the legal security of the agents affected by rights. If 
the right can be seen as an asset, then the government cannot reduce 
the rights which it has distributed, because it will encounter 
constitutional problems with respect to the right of property. In 
most cases the government indicates explicitly that the allocated 
right is not a property right. For example, the Acid Rain Program in 
the US refers to S 0 2 emission rights, not to property rights (see 
ARP, Title TV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990). 
3 Note that, chlorofluorcarbon rights, although we describe them as global rights, 
affect only the partners of the Montreal Protocol. 
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10.4.5 Transferability Characteristics 
One of the first tasks to be carried out by a regulatory 
agency is to allocate the rights to firms. The national government or 
a supranational government will have to distribute the rights among 
the different economic agents. The first option, auction of the 
rights, implies a financial burden to the economic agents involved. 
The government must indicate which economic agents can purchase 
the rights. The second option, distribution on the basis of 
administrative criteria (for example, grand-fathering), has been 
implemented in the European Union regarding production-rights 
(for example in the case of milk quotas). The basic distribution 
criterion was the historical production in a certain year, i.e. the 
reference year. In the case of pollution rights the above-mentioned 
distribution implies that environmentally unfriendly economic 
agents are rewarded for their behaviour by being given pollution 
rights. The regulatory agency will face substantial pressure to 
allocate rights in proportion to existing behaviour. This allocation, 
of course, favours existing firms which bear little risk or expenses 
when the program is created, and creates a bias against new firms 
which have to change their behaviour drastically (Dwyer 1992). 
Whether a right can be transferred or not will influence the 
perception of the right by the affected firms. Transferable rights 
can, to some extent, be perceived as an asset, whereas a non-
transferable right can be perceived as a privilege. 
Transferability is attractive to policymakers, since it has 
several theoretical advantages over other methods, such as a 
regulated redistribution of rights. The market price of rights will 
reflect the cost of abating the externality and will provide a signal 
to other potential sources of externality. In theory, agents creating 
externalities will purchase rights or sell rights, depending on their 
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initial abatement costs, up to the point at which the unit right price 
equals the marginal cost of externality control in the case of 
environmental rights (assuming no fixed costs). In the case of 
production rights, the agents will purchase or sell rights up to the 
net benefit (Varian 1990). Rights will therefore lead to business 
decisions based on externalities, too. If agents causing externalities 
with different cost and benefit functions are given the opportunity 
to trade rights, the total cost to society of reducing externalities is 
minimized. The trade system also lowers administration costs, 
since once the rights have been allocated, a market in rights can be 
expected to develop independently of the regulators. However, in 
this case it should be clear who is monitoring the policy, which is 
especially relevant in environmental policy. Most rights are 
transferable, because the government's rationale for introducing 
rights is to find an economically efficient solution for its problems, 
and the reason for the superior efficiency of rights compared with 
other policy instruments is that transferability causes the marginal 
cost of abatement to be equal throughout society in the equilibrium. 
This goal can only be achieved by a system of transferability. In a 
recent article Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) show that using 
markets for trading rights can be quite efficient. Participants were 
always better off under a market of rights than without such a 
market. 
The trade in rights can be limited by different factors, some 
of which we will now discuss. The participants in the trade in rights 
may be restricted by the government in order to protect some 
groups. The question of who is allowed to participate in the trade is 
related to this issue. We can distinguish two kinds of participants: 
the affected and the unaffected agents. Agents who wish to enter a 
new market in which participants are affected by rights can only 
enter this market by buying rights. 
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The trade in rights can also be restricted by a government 
through approval procedures. A trade then has to be propounded to 
an authority, which will then use certain criteria to test the trade. 
This kind of regulation can be an impediment to a liquid 
market in rights. The trade in rights may be linked to some item in 
such a way that trade is impossible without this item. This is a 
common phenomenon in the case of production rights. Trading 
milk quotas in the European Union must involve land, because 
milk quotas are linked to land; this influences the transferability of 
the milk right negatively. Not only the right itself but also market 
conditions can cause an illiquid market. 
Transaction costs consist of two elements: finding a trading 
partner and, if necessary, obtaining approval from the authorities 
(Klaassen 1994). Searching for a seller is often a formidable task, 
because of the general scarcity of market information. However, 
some improvements have been made such as in the case of milk 
quotas in Canada, where, in a centralized market place, price 
information can be obtained (Tallard and Curtin 1991). 
Other elements are costs and the length of the approval 
procedure. One advantage of trading rights over commodities is 
that they do not involve transport costs, grading costs, etc. 
For rights there are different kinds of trading systems. We 
can distinguish between those in centralized trade and those in 
decentralized trade. Auctions are a well-known system in 
centralized trade. At sealed-bid auctions, rights are sold, starting 
with the highest bid and continuing until all rights have been sold 
or no bids are forthcoming. This is how the SO2 emission rights in 
the US are traded. Electronic matching is another system, which 
involves all bids and offers being entered into a computer. At a 
particular price the volume of the right offered for sale will equal, 
or almost equal, the volume of the right being bid on. This unique 
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price is referred to as the 'market clearing price'. The Ontario 
milkquota exchange is an example of this system. In contrast to 
decentralized trading systems, which are characterized by the 
employment of many middlemen, the centralized trade is very 
transparent. 
The trading behaviour of agents affected by rights is not 
straightforward. Efficient firms will buy or sell their rights 
depending on the contents of those rights. Agents affected by 
environmental rights will be encouraged to clean up at relatively 
low cost to reduce their emissions, so that they are able to sell 
surplus rights to agents that do not have low cost clean-up options 
(Hahn 1994). Production rights will encourage firms to produce at 
relatively low cost, so that they are able to buy production rights 
from firms that are not so efficient. The agent's trading behaviour 
reflects the interaction between the quality characteristics and the 
transferability characteristics. Having described the characteristics 
of rights in detail, we will summarize them in the next paragraph. 
10.4.6 Overview of Rights Characteristics 
We have described the most important characteristics of 
rights, of which Table 2 gives an overview. 
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Table 2 Framework for describing rights 
Characteristics 
Quality Production or Pollution per Unit of Time per Unit of Space 
Temporal Permanent or Temporal 
Spatial Region Specific, National or Global 
Property Property Right or No Property Right 
Transferability Transferable or Non-Transferable, Linkage to Other Item or No 
Linkage 
10.5 Environmental Rights and Production Rights: 
Commonalities and Differences 
Characteristics of rights as described in Table 2 seem 
relevant to both environmental and production rights. However, 
their point of impact differs. In the case of environmental rights, the 
direct point of impact is the pollution and thereby indirectly the 
production of the main product, whereas in production rights the 
point of impact is directly the production of the main product (see 
Figure 1). This means that environmental rights can affect the use 
of production rights, if the environmental rights and production 
rights deal with the same production process, but not vice versa. 
The background of environmental and production rights and their 
features are analyzed below. 
Certain characteristics of the type of pollutant have a crucial 
impact on the implementation of environmental rights. The 
pollutants may be divided into assimilative and accumulative 
pollutants, and into uniformly mixed and non-uniformly mixed 
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pollutants. This division between pollutants is related to the quality 
characteristics. The capacity of the environment to absorb 
assimilative pollutants is sufficiently large relative to their rate of 
emission and in any year the pollution level is independent of the 
amount emitted in previous years. In the case of uniformly mixed 
pollutants, the ambient concentration depends on the total amount 
of emissions, but not on the distribution of these emissions among 
various sources (i.e. locations). This contrasts with spatial non-
uniformly mixed pollutants (Tietenberg 1985, 1989a, 1992). Each 
of these characteristics (assimilation and degree of mixing) affects 
the quality characteristics of the right. Uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollution is a type of pollution that is relatively easy to 
fit into a rights trading system. For any geographic area this system 
allows ton-for-ton trades between all sources. In this case the 
spatial characteristic may be relaxed. Non-uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutants involve a relationship between emissions 
and the pollution target, for which the location of the sources is 
crucial. For these pollutants the right is specified in terms of a 
ceiling on the permissible ambient concentration of that pollutant 
measured at specific locations: the spatial characteristic. The rights 
system for non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants involves a 
separate market in rights that is associated with each receptor; each 
source would have to procure sufficient rights in each (location-
specific) market to legitimize its emission rate (ambient rights 
system). Uniformly mixed accumulative pollutants involve 
pollution which accumulates in the environment because the 
emission exceeds the assimilative capacity. The rights designed for 
this kind of pollution do not have a temporal characteristic; the 
holder is free to choose when to emit. These rights do not regulate 
emission rates, they limit total emissions. In this market the rights 
are an exhaustible resource, once used they are withdrawn from 
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circulation. The rights system for non-uniformly assimilative 
pollution is complex because of the location specificity. It shows 
the interaction between the quality and spatial characteristics. 
Different approaches can be considered, such as zonal rights systems. 
Similar to environmental rights, the characteristics of 
products have a crucial impact on the implementation of production 
rights. There are many characteristics of products such as 
perishability, seasonality etc. Therefore, these characteristics are 
not elaborated upon and we limit ourselves to describing the 
background of production rights. In many countries state 
intervention in production policy is a normal procedure. Ever since 
the earliest days of the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union, agricultural production has increased more 
rapidly than demand. This has led to structural surpluses and low 
prices for farmers, which can only be eliminated through the 
increasing exercising of public intervention and storage measures, 
subsidized internal disposal schemes and of restitutions for an 
expanding volume of exports to the world market. These market 
support measures could only be sustained at an ever-increasing cost 
to the Union budget. In 1984 the European Commission concluded 
that it was no longer economically sensible nor financially possible 
to give producers a full price guarantee in the case of structural 
surpluses. The European Commission therefore decided that the 
principle of the guarantee threshold in the agricultural sector should 
be replaced by a quota system accompanied by a restrictive price 
policy. This principle forms the basis of the different kinds of quota 
systems in the European Union such as those for fishery, starch, 
sugar and milk. Also in many countries outside the European 
Union, governments introduce production rights to avoid 
overproduction. Most such rights are established within agriculture. 
The production right is defined in terms of the product volume per 
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year which the producer in question is allowed to produce and for 
which in most cases (s)he obtains a guaranteed price. We can 
conclude that the differences between environmental rights and 
production rights are caused by the fact that the point of impact 
differs. Environmental rights indirectly affect the output of the firm 
whereas production rights directly effect the output. The 
commonality of environmental rights and production rights lies in 
the fact that the implementation of a rights scheme depends on the 
underlying product in the case of production rights or polluter in the 
case of environmental rights. 
10.6 Classifying Existing Rights 
We will use the characteristics of rights to classify some 
well-known rights. We use as an example of environmental rights: 
lead rights, SO2 emission rights, chlorofluorcarbon rights in the US 
and manure rights in the Netherlands. As an example of production 
rights we use: milk rights and fishery rights in the European Union. 
Note that we selected rights schemes which are mature, i.e. rights 
schemes which have proven to last for some years. Many rights 
schemes are not stable, meaning that the specification and the rules 
which apply to them change very often. However, our 
methodological approach can also be applied to other rights, such 
as the Swiss highway Vignette, German Trucking Highway tax and 
the Power Plant quota in Denmark.4 
The characteristics described are defined dichotomously. The 
codes of these characteristics (in parentheses) are as follows: 
4 Note that although the stocks of agricultural products are almost depleted in the 
European Union nowadays, production rights are needed to counter oversupply 
and hence low prices for farmers. 
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Dl = Quality Characteristics; 
CI = based on efficiency rate (1) or not (0); 
C2 = point of input; consumption side (1) or production side (0); 
D2 = Temporal Characteristics; 
C3 = the right may be perpetual (1) or not (0), i.e. the rights scheme 
has not or has an expiration date; 
C4 = the period of exercising may be specified (1) or not (0) (banking 
is allowed); 
C5 = the use of a right may be tied to a specific time or a specific event 
whose time of occurrence is known (1) or unknown (0); 
D3 = Spatial Characteristics: 
C6 = the right is restricted to a specific geographic area (1) or is global 
(0), for environmental or production economic reasons; 
D4 = Property Characteristics; 
C7 = withdrawal of the right may or may not have consequences for 
legal security, i.e. compensation in the case of withdrawal (1) or 
not (0); 
D5 = Transferability: 
C8 = geographic limits to trading (1) or no limits (0); 
C9 = allocation by the grandfathering system (1) or auction (0); 
C10 = the participants allowed to trade are solely affected agents (1) or 
include agents from outside (0); 
C l l = trading is regulated by the government, permission is required 
from agency (1) or no such permission is required (0); 
C12 = right is linked to some item (1) or is not linked (0); 
C13 = trading system is centralized (1) or decentralized (0); 
The figures in parentheses correspond with Table 3. 
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The design of this classification is objective in the sense 
that the scores can be assigned objectively. We have assigned the 
scores on the basis of information we have gathered from 
institutions and authorities involved in these rights. Note that the 
methodological approach could be applied to many more rights. 
Before we start our analysis we will specify a 'full right', 
which is a hypothetical right that has optimal characteristics in the 
sense of efficiency, i.e. implementing a policy which is efficient for 
the affected firms as well as for society. This means that the goal of 
internalization of externalities is reached at low cost to both the 
individual firm and society. This full right is based on efficiency 
rate, is perpetual, has no restrictions on transferability, and is a 
property right. In our analysis this right can be seen as a benchmark 
with which existing rights can be compared. 
The rights (including the full right) which we will examine 
are classified in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Classification of existing rights according to their characteristics 
CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CIO Cll C12 C13 
PRODUCTION RIGHTS 
Milk right 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Sugar rights 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Fishery rights 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
Lead rights 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Chlorofluor-
carbon rights 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
S0 2 emission 
rights 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Dutch manure 
rights 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Full right 1 1\0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
We carried out a correspondence analysis to identify the 
basic dimensions of rights. The primary purpose of correspondence 
analysis is data reduction and summarization. Broadly speaking, it 
addresses itself to the problem of analyzing the interrelationships 
among a large number of variables and then explaining these 
variables in terms of their common underlying dimensions. 
Correspondence analysis has several features that contribute to its 
usefulness in research. The multivariate nature of correspondence 
analysis can reveal relationships that would not be detected in a 
series of pairwise comparisons of variables. Correspondence 
analysis also helps to show how variables are related, not just that a 
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relationship exists. The joint graphical display obtained from 
correspondence analysis can help in detecting structural 
relationships among the variable categories, in our case the rights 
and the characteristics.5 The analysis was carried out using the 
CORAN correspondence analysis computer package (Bagozzi 
1994; Carroll, Green and Schaffer 1986, 1987). The central 
objective of CORAN is to find a set of coordinates representing the 
rows of the two-way contingency table (such as Table 3), so that 
the Euclidean distances between the rows of the coordinates 
respond in a straightforward way to squared distances between rows. 
Our primary aim was to identify: (1) the similarities and 
differences between rights with respect to the various 
characteristics; (2) the similarities and differences between the 
characteristics with respect to the rights; and (3) the 
interrelationship between the rights and the characteristics. We also 
wanted to ascertain (4) if these relationships could be represented 
graphically in a joint low-dimensional space. This means that two 
rights are close if they share similar characteristics, and two 
characteristics are close, if they occur in the same rights to the same 
degree. It also implies that a right is close to a characteristic if the 
right has that characteristic. 
The histogram of the eigenvalues indicates that the fourteen 
characteristics can be explained by an underlying structure 
consisting of 6 dimensions. 
5 For a detailed description of correspondence analysis the reader is referred to 
Hoffman and Franke (1986). 
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Tabel 4 Eigenvalues 
Factor Eigenvalue Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
1 0.6467 59.51 59.51 
2 0.1846 16.99 76.50 
3 0.1398 12.87 89.37 
4 0.0716 6.59 95.95 
5 0.0355 3.27 99.22 
6 0.0084 0.78 100.00 
The eigenvalue represents the amount of variance accounted 
for by a factor. Note that three factors explain about 89 %. Based 
on the well-known scree test criterion, the underlying structure of 
the data set can be represented by three factors (or dimensions). 
In Figures 2 and 3 the rights are denoted by Rl for milk 
rights, R2 for sugar rights, R3 for fishery rights, R4 for lead rights, 
R5 for Chlorofluorcarbon rights, R6 for SO2 emission rights, R7 for 
Dutch manure rights and R8 for the full right. 
Figure 2 represents the configuration of the characteristics 
and rights formed by the first two principal axes. Each of the 
principal axes is associated with an eigenstructure which defines 
the projections on the axes, as well as the relative variance in the 
characteristics and rights explained by the axes. In this analysis the 
full right can be seen as the ideal point. 
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Figure 2 Plot of the first dimension on the horizontal axes and the second 
dimension on the vertical axes 
Figure 2 shows that there is a striking similarity within the 
group of production rights, i.e. they are located close to each other. 
Within the group of environmental rights the similarity is less 
compared with the production rights. We can observe an 
interrelation between the production rights and the characteristics 
related to transferability (C8, C10, Cll and C12). Other rights and 
characteristics show no such interrelation. 
From Figure 2 it can be concluded that the first dimension is 
able to discriminate between the full right and the existing rights, 
and the second dimension is able to discriminate between the 
existing rights. The first dimension describes the economic 
implications of the right from the point of view of both the affected 
firms and the society (dimension 1 has an absolute contribution of 
77.6 to the full right, i.e. the full right is mainly stretched by this 
dimension). This dimension can be labeled as the efficiency 
dimension because characteristics 1 (based on efficiency rate), 
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3 (perpetual or not), 7 (compensation in the case of withdrawal) 
and 13 (trading system) load heavily on this dimension. The 
government can now evaluate the economic aspects of actual or 
proposed rights by using the first dimension as a benchmark. Rights 
which load relatively heavily on this dimension are preferred from a 
firm's point of view but also from a welfare perspective. 
The second dimension is able, to some extent, to 
discriminate between environmental and production rights. The 
upper quadrant contains the rights associated with the 
environmental rights, whereas the production rights are in the 
bottomleft area of the plot. This dimension can be labeled as the 
content dimension, because characteristics 3 (right is perpetual or 
not), 9 (grandfathering or not) and 13 (trading system) load heavily 
on it. 
Figure 2 shows that the distance between existing rights and 
the full right is large, indicating that much work needs to be done 
from an economic point of view on the process of designing rights. 
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Figure 3 Plot of the third dimension on the horizontal axes and the second 
dimension on the vertical axes 
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From Figure 3 it can be concluded that the third dimension 
is able to discriminate between the rights with respect to 
transferability. This dimension can be labeled as the 'marketability' 
dimension because characteristics 10 (trade is only allowed with 
affected firms or not) and 12 (right is linked to an item or not) load 
heavily on this dimension. The full right is located near the center 
because this ideal right is stretched mainly by dimension 1. This 
plot gives us less information on similarities and interrelationships 
because the characteristics and rights are equally scattered in the 
plot; hence on the basis of the second and third dimensions, the 
rights and characteristics are not alike. This is not unexpected 
because this technique tries to condense all information into the 
space with the fewest dimensions (see Figure 2). 
10.7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter a theoretical framework for rights has been 
developed. Both environmental rights and production rights have 
been considered. Both categories of rights are linked to the 
production process. The rights have been analyzed by 
characteristics deduced from the related production process. This 
theoretical framework makes it possible to classify existing rights 
and gives some insight into the many rights which are initiated in 
today's world. If applied to existing rights the underlying structure 
of rights can be determined empirically with the help of 
correspondence analysis. The benchmark in the correspondence 
analysis is a hypothetical right which has the optimal characteristics 
in the sense that such a right can contribute in the best way to 
reaching the goal of an authority and the affected firms in the sense 
of cost efficiency. The first of the three dimensions extracted, if 
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using correspondence analysis, can be labeled as the 'efficiency' 
dimension because it is able to discriminate between the existing 
rights and the full right. The distance between the full, ideal, right 
and the existing rights is relatively large, indicating that from a 
business economic point of view much attention has to be paid to 
and research needs to be done on designing rights. The second 
dimension can be labeled as the 'content' dimension, because it is 
able to discriminate between environmental and production rights, 
whereas the third dimension can be labeled as the 'marketability 
dimension'. Our results should be interpreted with caution, because 
we used a small data set. We are continuing this line of research. 
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CHAPTER 11 
New Futures Markets in Agricultural 
Production Rights: Possibilities and 
Constraints for the British and Dutch 
Milk Quota Markets 1 
11.1 Abstract 
Farms are increasingly being affected by policies that involve 
production rights. Because of fluctuations in the prices of these rights in 
the spot market, farmers face a price risk. Establishing a futures market 
might enable them to hedge against this price risk. Rights futures have 
some features that differ from those of traditional commodity futures. 
This makes them an effective and efficient tool for managing price risk. 
The implications of these findings will be illustrated for milk quotas in 
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Prior conditions which might 
make a futures market for milk quotas successful in both countries will 
be deduced. 
11.2 Introduction 
Between 1973 and 1983, milk production in the European 
Union (EU) rose by 30% while consumption rose by a mere 9% 
(Braatz 1992). This resulted in very large stocks of butter and milk 
powder and strong pressure on the EU budget because of the terms 
of the Common Agricultural Policy guarantee price system. As a 
1 This chapter will be published as: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.T.G. Meulenberg 
(1998), "New Futures Markets of Agricultural Production Rights: Possibilities 
and Constraints for the Dutch and British Milk Quota Markets", Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 49, 50-66. 
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result a milk quota scheme was introduced on April 2th, 1984. All 
EU members had the right to produce a certain quantity of milk.2 
Individual states were free to implement this policy at their own 
discretion within the comparatively liberal framework the EU had 
provided. The EU has allowed the transfer of quotas within 
countries themselves. National governments must add their own 
rules to the framework of EU regulations (Burrell 1989; Oskam 
1989). Despite the fact that these EU regulations require trade in 
milk quotas to be linked to land, farmers in both The Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom have found ways of circumventing this 
requirement.3 The trade in milk quotas is increasing every year and 
most of this increase takes place in the United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands. The underlying value of the trade in these two 
countries was almost one billion ECUs in the milk year 1993/94 
(Van Dijk and Pennings 1995). For this reason we have focused our 
attention on the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. 
The motivation for this work originated from questions 
raised by dairy farmers and farmers' unions as well as from several 
futures exchanges. Farmers' unions were interested in finding out 
whether the use of futures on milk quotas would enable them to 
hedge effectively against price risks incurred in leasing and 
purchasing milk quotas. Futures exchanges wanted to find out 
about the viability of such a futures market. The chapter's research 
2 For a detailed analysis of the producer response to the EEC milk super levy the 
reader is referred to Burrell (1990) and Williams (1993). The terms quotas and 
rights will be used interchangeably in this paper to refer to the same phenomenon. 
3 In most cases land is only transferred for one year. The purchasing farmer uses the 
land involved in the transaction for a year, taking care not to use it for dairy 
farming. After that year, the land loses its quota and is transferred back to the 
original owner whilst the quota remains with the purchasing fanner (Besseling 
1991). This construction has proven an effective way of circumventing the 
attachment of quota to land, and is of particular help to smaller farmers who are 
unable to raise enough money to buy land as well. 
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design is as follows: first, the extent of volatility in the milk quota 
market is investigated both for leasing and purchasing; the market's 
price volatility is then compared to the volatility of commodities for 
which a successful futures trade has already been established; then 
follows a theoretical assessment of the effect that the special 
qualities of rights will have on the optimal hedging ratio, on 
hedging effectiveness as compared to traditional commodities and 
on the cross-hedge possibilities of rights. To provide insight into 
the variables that play a role in the viability of such a futures 
market, several simulations are included to show the conditions 
under which such a futures market might be successfully 
established. 
11.3 Rationale for Hedging 
11.3.1 Spot Market of Milk Quotas 
In the United Kingdom most quotas transfers take place in 
England and Wales and, as can be seen from Figure 1, the total 
quantities transferred have grown continuously. After the abolition 
of regional boundaries in 1993, quota markets in the United 
Kingdom have shown considerable growth. These figures show not 
only that a large quantity is traded, but also that the number of 
participants (buyers and sellers, lessors and lessees) is considerable: 
23,500 participants in 1994/1995. 
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Figure 1 Milk quota transferred in England and Wales (Source: National Dairy 
Council, 1995) 
The development of the milk quota market in The 
Netherlands received an additional impetus when leasing was 
introduced in 1989/90 and leasing is still gaining in popularity. In 
1988/89, about 300,000 tons of quotas were transferred 
permanently between farms. In 1990, following the introduction of 
leasing, the total quantity transferred remained roughly the same. 
Only 180,000 tons, however, were transferred permanently. The 
remainder was offered for lease, indicating a shift towards 
temporary transfers. Figure 2 shows the rapid growth in leasing and 
a much slower growth in permanent transfers in succeeding years. 
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Figure 2 Milk quota transferred in The Netherlands (Source: Productschap voor 
Zuivel, 1995) 
When transferring quotas, most farmers seek the assistance 
of agents, the mediators on the market. In the United Kingdom 
there are two main milk quota agents, Bruton Knowles and Quota 
Land Transfers (Dyfed). However, there are also smaller agents 
active in the market and the organization responsible for 
implementing the quota scheme is also involved in the process of 
mediation (Dairy Industry Newsletter 1993). In The Netherlands 
there are many mediators on the milk quota market. The large dairy 
cooperatives try to match demand and supply on the lease market, 
whereas on the buying and selling market real estate agencies and 
some of the large mixed-feed companies are active. 
Spot markets for milk quotas have not been well structured 
or developed. Many agents are farm consultants trading small 
volumes. Cooperation between agents often remains at a very 
limited level, and there are no official bodies to facilitate 
communication between them. Thus, the price discovery process is 
not optimal, and farmers lack any clear-cut reference price. 
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Canada developed a centralized spot market in the 1980s 
and there have been centralized spot markets for milk quotas in 
Ontario since 1980 and in Quebec since 1985 (Oskam 1991). These 
centralized spot markets made the market for milk quotas 
transparent, though a more transparent spot market does not remove 
the risk farmers face when planning to lease or purchase milk 
quota. A transparent spot market does not enable one to predict 
future milk quota prices. However, the presence of a central spot 
market usually facilitates the institution of a futures market, in that 
it creates the possibility of offsetting a futures contract through cash 
settlement. With cash settlement, delivery of the underlying good 
does not actually take place. Instead, futures market positions are 
determined, using a model of calculation to be chosen by the 
futures exchange, often corresponding to prices on the central spot 
market. Canada, like the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, is 
investigating the feasibility of futures trade. 
11.3.2 Risks Faced by Dairy Farmers 
In The Netherlands and the United Kingdom agents 
normally charge a fixed mark-up commission, so the largest share 
of the price risk is borne by farmers. Both countries show 
considerable price differentials among regions and during different 
periods of time and this raises management problems for farmers. 
First of all, if the farmer intends to buy or sell milk quota, (s)he 
does not know what the price at the end of the milk price year will 
be, so (s)he faces a price risk. Secondly, dairy farmers who sell 
milk quota at the end of the milk price year have to sell dairy cows 
within a very short period, theoretically within an infinitely short 
period of time, because, having sold milk quota they will not be 
allowed to produce milk during the subsequent milk price year. 
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Thus, because farmers have to sell dairy cows immediately, they 
are not able to get the best price for their herd, i.e. farmers face 
execution costs. The same reasoning holds for farmers wanting to 
expand their farms. 
In order to gain insight into the volatility of milk quota, 
month-end data were gathered on purchase and lease prices in the 
United Kingdom and for other farm products in which there is a 
long tradition of successful futures trading for the years 1987 to 
1995 (source: Bruton Knowles, USDA National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, Rotterdam Potato Cash Market). Based on these 
data we have calculated the coefficient of variation, which is a 
stable and dimensionless expression of price volatility, as a proxy 
of market risk faced by farmers. It appeared that the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of milk quota prices, both lease (average CV is 
0.13) and purchase (average CV is 0.11), is comparable to that of 
wheat (average CV is 0.10) and soy beans (average CV is 0.07) 
and, although to a lesser degree, of potatoes (average CV is 0.27). 
This suggests that from a "risk perspective" milk quota futures 
seem valuable. Note that a high degree of volatility does not 
necessarily mean that market risk will be higher than it would be 
with low volatility. Risk implies that prices cannot be predicted 
with any measure of certainty. 
Besides providing a platform for hedging activities, futures 
markets also fulfil an information role. Without a futures market, 
informed agents use information about next period's price to make 
spot market purchases. Grossman (1989) argues that the trading 
activity of informed agents in the present spot markets makes the 
spot price a function of their information. When the spot price 
reveals all of the informed traders' information, both types of 
traders (informed and uninformed) will share the same beliefs 
about next period's price. In this case there will be no incentive to 
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trade. In general, the spot price will not reveal all of the informed 
trader's information, since there are other factors ("noise") which 
determine the price along with the informed traders' information. 
This is particularly relevant for the milk quota market where price 
information on milk quota through magazines and personal, 
informal channels, is the main source of information. Substantial 
time lags and a lack of accuracy are common characteristics of 
these types of data. The information problem is most severe at the 
farm level, since individual farmers have rather limited information 
networks. This implies mat, with only spot markets, informed and 
uninformed traders will have different beliefs about prices in the 
next period. It is this difference in beliefs which creates the 
incentive for futures trading in addition to the usual hedging 
incentive. When a futures market is introduced, the futures price as 
well as the spot price will transfer the information possessed by 
informed agents to uninformed agents. 
On average, only 3% of the trade on the futures market is 
actually delivered (Catania 1989). In the case of a futures market of 
rights, actual delivery occurs more frequently when such a market 
is still in its early stages because the cash markets of most rights are 
not sufficiently liquid yet. Hedgers who fail to make a deal on the 
cash market will not offset their futures market position. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, this higher frequency of delivery 
will not pose a problem in the situation where there is a futures 
market for rights. 
The Market for Hedging Services 247 
11.4 Optimal Hedge Ratio and Hedging Effectiveness 
The motivation behind hedging cash prices with offsetting 
futures contracts is to reduce, if not eliminate, cash price risk. Any 
deviation in the cash-futures price relationship at settlement date 
will be arbitraged away. However, if the arbitrage transaction costs 
are high, the necessary convergence of cash-futures price will not 
occur. This will introduce a risk for the hedger. This so-called basis 
risk will negatively affect participation in futures markets (Shafer 
1993).4 The basis between a futures contract and its underlying 
commodity is an important yardstick of the cost involved in using 
the futures contract to hedge. Basis risk can be divided into timing, 
spatial and quality discrepancies between the cash position of the 
farmer and commodities deliverable on futures (Paroush and Wolf 
1989). 
A right is a perfectly homogeneous 'commodity', i.e. the 
underlying commodity of a rights futures contract is identical to the 
commodity in the cash market. This implies that there will be no 
problems with respect to location of delivery, because delivery will 
take place by transferring book entries between accounts (Pirrong et 
al. 1994). Nor will there be any problems with respect to quality. 
Hence, there is no spatial and quality basis.5 This characteristic is 
important for a farmer affected by rights who wishes to reduce his 
or her price risk. 
A farmer might use a forward contract or a futures contract 
to manage price risk. The advantages of forward sellings/buyings 
over hedging in futures are quite clear. As with futures, the price 
4 Where the basis is defined as the local cash price minus the futures price. 
5 If the maturity dates of a futures contract do not fit the hedger's horizon, the 
temporal basis will still play a role (Castelino 1992; Geppert 1995, Pennings and 
Meulenberg 1997). 
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level is fixed in advance of delivery, but unlike hedging in futures, 
there is no further adjustment of the firm's return as a result of any 
subsequent change in the basis. Moreover, the forward contract can 
be tailored more closely to meet the firm's needs with respect to 
quantity, quality, place and time of delivery as well as other terms. 
This is why forward contracts are still very important in agriculture. 
In the case of rights, the advantages of forward sellings/buyings 
over hedging in futures are not valid. In this case, the advantages of 
futures markets - the highly organized methods of trading with the 
extreme standardization of terms resulting in widespread and low 
cost access of buyers to sellers and great integrity of the contract -
are not affected by the disadvantages of futures versus forward 
contracts mentioned above. This implies that rights futures are a 
more suitable price risk management tool for farmers than forward 
contracts. 
Consider a farmer who can lock in the price risks regarding 
milk rights with the help of milk quotas futures. We will assume 
that the only production costs are the costs of acquiring milk 
quotas. Given mat the farmer is risk averse and wishes to maximize 
the expected profit in the next time period adjusted for risk, where 
risk is measured by the variance in the expected profit margin, the 
objective function has been based on the expected value-variance 
(EV) model (Robison and Barry 1987). In the EV model, risk is 
measured by the variance in profits. The EV model is suited to 
determine relationships between variables and to show the direction 
of change in relevant variables.6 Garcia, Adam and Hauser (1994) 
provide additional evidence of the usefulness of the EV model 
compared to the negative exponential and Cox-Rubinstein utility 
6 For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and the discussion on the 
use of the EV model and the general expected utility model, the reader is referred to 
Bigelow (1993), Meyer and Rasche (1992), and Tew et al. (1991). 
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functions. In the EV model, the objective of the hedger is to 
maximize the objective function: 
n , ^ = Et(nt+l)-\vKt{n1+x) ( i ) 
where n £ , is the certainty equivalent, £ , (rL + 1 ) is the expected 
profit, given the information set at time t, and var,(TI(+1) represents 
the variance in profit, while X denotes the risk parameter which, 
for risk averse decision makers, is positive, thus providing 
compensation for risk bearing (Pratt 1964). At time t the farmer 
wishes to maximize the certainty equivalent for the next milk price 
year denoted as period t + 1, indicating that the hedging horizon is 
one year. Given that the cash positions (milk quotas) are 
predetermined, the expected profit at time t + 1 equals the revenue 
from selling the main product minus the cost of leasing the milk 
quotas in the cash and futures markets, corrected for the transaction 
costs. The expected profit per unit of output can now be written as: 
Et(Ut+x) = Et(p!+X) - [a(ft - E,(fl+1)) + Et(CPt+l) + \ a \ TC] (2) 
where Et(pl+1) is the expected cash price of milk given the 
information set at time t, a the hedge ratio7, ft the futures price at 
which the contract is opened, Et(ft+}) the expected settlement 
futures price, given the information set at time / and E,(CPt+l) the 
expected cash price of the lease milk quotas, given the information 
set at time t and TC the transaction costs. 
7 The hedge ratio is the number of futures contracts per unit of the underlying cash 
position. 
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Because of the great importance of the basis on the hedging 
effectiveness, as outlined earlier, Equation (2) is rewritten in terms 
of the basis: 
2?(n,+1) = Et(pt+l) - [aOJ - W*y> + WtJ + m+i) + I a I 7U] (3) 
where Et(bt+]) is the expected basis at maturity, given the 
information set at time t, which equals Et (CPt+1) - E, (ft+l). 
To determine the variance of the profit it is necessary to 
determine the covariance matrix of the stochastic variables 
contributing to the variance. Let vart(pt+l), var ( (/ , + I ) and 
\art(bt+l) be the variance in the milk price, the variance in the 
settlement futures price and the variance in the basis, given the 
information set at time ƒ respectively. Furthermore, let 
cov,Cp, + 1,6 f + 1), cov,(/, + 1 J jp, + 1) and cov ( ( / , + I , bt+l) be the 
covariance between the milk price and the basis, the covariance 
between the futures price at maturity and the milk price and the 
covariance between the futures price and the basis respectively. The 
variance of the profit can be expressed as: 
var ((n t + 1) = (a - l) 2 var,(ft+1) + var,(&,+1) + var t(/? ( + 1) 
- 2(a -1) cov,(fl+l, bt+x) + 2(a -1) c o v ^ , , Pt+1) - 2 covt(pt+l, bt+}) (4) 
The optimal hedge ratio can be derived by taking the first 
derivatives from IT^, with respect to a. Hence, the optimal hedge 
ratio can be expressed as: 
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where P[ is the correlation between the milk price and the futures 
price of the milk quota at maturity and p 2 is the correlation 
coefficient between the basis and the futures price of milk quota at 
maturity. 
Equation (5) can be decomposed into both a speculative and 
pure hedge component. The first term of Equation (5) represents 
the speculative component and the second and third term represent 
the pure hedge component. When a farmer believes that the futures 
prices are unbiased (i.e. Et(ft+l) = ft) and px and p 2 are zero, the 
optimal hedge ratio is 1 (assuming that the transaction costs are 
negligible), i.e. the farmer will hedge the total cash position. Even 
when a hedger is extremely risk-averse, i.e. X -> oo and both p} 
and p 2 are zero, the optimal hedge ratio equals 1. If there is a 
positive correlation between milk quotas (input) and milk (output) 
i.e. p, > 0 a "natural" hedge will appear in the system (see 
Equation (5)). As a result, the optimal strategy would be to hedge a 
smaller amount than one would have done had this correlation been 
absent (Tzang and Leuthold 1990; Fackler and McNew 1993). This 
is not surprising, because if price fluctuations in milk quotas are to 
some extent compensated by price fluctuations in milk, the 
fluctuations in expected profit will decline, and therefore the need 
for hedging will also be reduced. 
Castelino (1992) showed that the correlation between the 
basis and the futures price, p 2 , is usually a negative one. As a 
result, Equation (5) implies that, if the variance in the basis 
increases, less will be hedged. Because of the characteristics of 
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rights, as explained at the beginning of this section, the variance in 
the basis will be small and at maturity zero. Thus, generally 
speaking, more will be hedged in the case of rights than would be 
the case when hedging traditional commodities, since the latter 
introduces spatial and quality basis risk. This means that the 
hedging effectiveness of rights futures is greater than that of 
traditional commodities. Tashjian and McConnell (1989) have 
demonstrated that hedging effectiveness is a very important 
determinant in explaining the success of futures contracts. 
We are able to show that, relatively speaking, more will be 
hedged when trading rights, than would be the case when trading 
traditional commodities, ceteris paribus both by the optimal hedge 
ratio, and the minimum variance hedge ratio. The minimum 
variance hedge ratio is the optimal hedge ratio for an extremely risk 
averse hedger or one who believes futures are unbiased. Using 
Equation (5) (again assuming that the transaction costs are 
negligible) the minimum variance hedge ratio can be expressed as: 
var ((6 ( + 1) is negligible because of the characteristics of rights. 
Theoretically, if basis risk is zero and assuming for the moment 
p, = 0, the minimum variance hedge ratio will be 1 and residual 
risk zero (Castelino 1992). However, we might expect that due to 
the natural hedge the minimum variance hedge ratio is smaller than 1. 
In this respect, it is important to note that successful futures 
trading can only occur when the futures market is efficient. The 
ultimate consequence of a market's efficiency is the fact that 'prices 
always fully reflect all available information' (Fama 1991). In our 
a = 1 - ft + ?2 (6) 
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hedging model this comes forward from our assumption that 
futures prices are unbiased (i.e. Et(fl+1) = ft in Equation (5)). If a 
futures market diverges too much from market efficiency, farmers 
will not trade and the market will collapse even though its potential 
trade volumes are high. 
Not only is it interesting that rights themselves can be 
hedged effectively, it is also significant that rights futures lend 
themselves to cross-hedging the profit capacity of the farm. The 
term cross-hedging is used to describe situations in which futures 
contracts are used to hedge non-deliverable commodities (Stoll and 
Whaley 1993). Farmers affected by rights have an opportunity to 
cross-hedge the profit capacity of the farm. This will be 
demonstrated below. 
Let us assume that the only barrier to entering the dairy 
industry is the necessity of milk quotas for production, i.e. the only 
limiting factor is the milk quota. This implies that the price of milk 
quotas can be seen as an economic rent. The economic rent 
generated in the production process is allocated to the milk quota. 
Whenever there is some fixed factor, in this case the milk quotas, 
that inhibits entry into the dairy industry, there will be an 
equilibrium rental rate for that factor. Hubbard (1992) has shown 
that milk quotas have replaced land as the fixed input in dairy 
farming and that they have become the ultimate repository of 
economic rent. Even with a fixed amount of allocated milk quotas, 
it will always be possible to enter the dairy industry by buying the 
position of a farm that is currently in the industry, i.e, buying milk 
quotas. The competition for milk quotas among potential entrants 
will force up prices to the point at which the net benefit of 
producing equals the price of milk quotas (Varian 1990). The value 
at industry level for lease milk quota can therefore be expressed as: 
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(7) 
where PR is the price of milk quotas, R0 is the total amount of 
rights allotted by the government, p is the price of milk and C(i?0) 
is the cost of production excluding the cost of buying the milk 
quota. The cost concept used in Equation (7) is broad, i.e. these 
costs include factor costs, non-factor costs and capital depreciation. 
In contrast to lease milk quota, the value of milk quota 
(buy/sell) is the discounted economic rent generated in the 
production process. The value of purchase milk quota at the 
industry level can therefore be expressed as: 
where i is the annual interest rate and N the number of years the 
milk quota system will be in effect. 
Equation (7) shows that the lease price of milk quota 
reflects the possibilities of marketing the milk and of the cost 
structure of the production process (excluding the cost of milk 
quotas) in a particular year. Hence, the lease price of milk quotas is 
a proxy for the current annual performance of the industry. If the 
price is high, this indicates that the industry is performing well and 
is therefore willing to pay a high price for the milk quota, and vice 
versa. Analogous to Equation (7), Equation (8) shows that the 
purchase price of milk quota reflects the discounted possibilities of 
marketing the milk and the cost structure of the production process 
(excluding the cost of milk quotas) during the period that the milk 
quota system is in effect. 
N pnR, - cn(R,) 
(l + 1)" 
(8) 
«=1 
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Assuming that the profitability of individual farms is closely 
related to that of the dairy industry, the farmer now has the 
opportunity to use a single (milk quota) futures contract to hedge 
against adverse annual profit in the dairy industry in the case of a 
futures contract for lease quota and to hedge against adverse 
discounted revenue in the dairy industry in the case of milk quota 
futures (buy/sell). Regardless of the complexity of the production 
process, the farmer can use those futures to hedge against adverse 
fluctuations in the profit capacity of the production process, instead 
of using a complicated and perhaps non-existent futures contract 
spread. This cross-hedge possibility will affect the viability of a 
milk quota futures market in a positive way. 
Having investigated the hedging effectiveness of milk quota 
futures contracts, major aspects of the feasibility of such a futures 
market will be discussed in the next section. 
11.5 A Futures Market for Milk Quota: Requirements 
New futures contracts have made a significant contribution 
to the growth of commodity trading. However, futures contracts 
carry a considerable risk of failure (Carlton 1984; Tashjian and 
McConnel 1989; Tashjian 1995). In 1995, world wide, 40 new 
futures contracts were launched. Only a few of these proved 
successful in the first year (Davey and Maguire 1996). 
In order to successfully introduce a new futures contract, 
implementation should follow a structured procedure. Sandor 
(1973, 1991) discerns three stages in the process of research and 
development of a futures exchange. 
The first stage consists of a formal examination of certain 
established criteria (embedded in different approaches to successful 
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futures contract innovation) to determine whether or not the 
commodity can be adapted to futures trading. The second stage 
consists of specifying the contract and includes a viability study, 
while the third stage consists of post-introductory changes in 
specifications of the terms of the contract to broaden contract 
appeal. The first two stages are examined below. 
In the first stage, two well-known approaches in successful 
futures contract innovation are commonly used: the 'commodity 
characteristics' approach and the 'contract characteristics' approach 
as outlined in Chapter 2.8 
Following these approaches, there are three reasons why 
milk quota futures might have potential for futures trading. First of 
all, the future prices of milk quotas are uncertain at this time, 
creating an urge to hedge among risk averse farmers. Secondly, 
milk quotas satisfy all the criteria of the 'commodity 
characteristics' approach. An important question within the 
'commodity characteristics' approach is whether or not the cash 
market size is large enough to justify a futures market. When 
comparing the underlying value of the trade in milk quota in both 
countries with the Dutch potato market, which has a long tradition 
of successful futures trading, we observe that the milk quota market 
in the United Kingdom (350 million ECUs in 1993/94) and the 
Netherlands (600 million ECUs in 1993/94) is larger than the 
Dutch potato market (300 million ECUs in 1993/94). This suggests 
that from a "cash market size" perspective milk quota futures look 
promising. The characteristics of rights, as has been outlined 
earlier, make milk quotas very suitable for futures trading according 
Another strand of literature explaining the success or failure of futures is literature 
on contract design. This literature suggests that successful contracts will emerge 
when the futures price closely tracks the cash market price and when buyers and 
sellers are driven by different motives (Duffle and Jackson 1989; Tashjian 1995). 
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to the 'contract specification approach'. Thirdly, the absence of an 
efficient cross-hedge for milk quotas will favourably influence the 
success of milk quota futures trading.9 Furthermore, Tashjian and 
Weissman (1995) have found that futures contracts that attract 
participants who are risk averse and who have highly variable 
endowments produce high trading volumes. Both characteristics 
hold for farmers in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
(Smidts 1997; Van Dijk and Pennings 1995). Moreover, the fact 
that milk quota futures lend themselves to cross-hedging the profit 
capacity of the farm may well have a positive influence on the 
success of milk quota futures. However, as outlined above, the 
presence of a natural hedge will decrease the hedging need and thus 
negatively influence the success of milk quota futures. 
The absence of monopoly power is an important factor in 
having a successful futures market. A monopoly situation may 
occur in the futures trade, when any single party (the monopolist to 
be) is ale to acquire a large portion of the existing contracts, thus 
undercutting the usual assumption that every trader is "small" in 
relation to the market. Another way could be for a party to simply 
decline to liquidate its position. Thus, at the very close of trading, a 
former small holding will have become large in relation to the open 
contracts. Manipulations of the futures market become manifest as 
squeezes, which are also known as corners. The adjustment to the 
risk of manipulation drives a wedge between the futures price and 
the anticipated price of the cash commodity. This gap makes the 
futures contract less valuable as a hedging tool. In the milk quota 
market, a relatively large number of parties each hold a relatively 
small proportion of the total national quota making it difficult to 
9 Black and Silber (1986) found that the level of success of new futures contracts 
that qualify as pioneering products, which is certainly the case for milk quota, is 
significantly higher than the level of success of later "me-too" product designs. 
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manipulate the market. Even so, when establishing a milk quota 
futures market, measures to counter market manipulation will need 
to be taken. The best antidote for monopolization is information. 
An exchange can monitor holdings to ensure that even amounts 
under the limit will not become excessive in relation to the rest of 
the market (Easterbrook 1986). 
In the second stage the viability of a futures market for milk 
quotas is analyzed. We propose two kinds of futures contract 
specifications. Futures Contract A is defined as the right to produce 
an amount of milk each milk year as long as EU milk policy 
continues. Futures Contract B is defined as the right to produce an 
amount of milk for a particular milk price year. The first contract is 
related to the milk quota buy/sell market, the latter to the lease 
market. Fanners who intend to stop dairy production or who want 
to expand their milk production in the long run, might use 
Contract A. Contract B is suited for temporary, short-time quota 
sales or acquisitions. 
By definition, futures contract volume is a function of the 
size of the futures contract, size of the cash market, hedge ratio and 
velocity (Black 1986). The function relating the trading volume to 
these variables can be expressed as: 
V = • HR • VLCT (9) 
FCZ 
where V stands for the volume of the futures contract (number of 
contracts traded), CS for cash market size, FCZ for the size of the 
futures contract, HR for hedge ratio and VLCT for velocity. 
Velocity is defined as the number of times the underlying product is 
traded on the futures market. A velocity of 1 means that market 
transactions take place between hedgers. Velocity frequently 
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exceeds 1, with speculators being active on the futures market as 
well. Thus, it is common for a situation to occur in which a short 
hedger uses a futures contract to sell his or her underlying product 
to a speculator who, in turn, sells it to another speculator or a long 
hedger at some later date. For a long hedger, an analogous scenario 
might be applied. 
Equation (9) can be used to determine the constraints and 
possibilities of the viability of a futures market for milk quota. The 
cash market size is a given, while the size of the futures contract 
has been fixed in the contract specification. Therefore a sensitivity 
analysis may be run by inputting alternative values for HR and 
VLCT. Note that, when using Equation (9) for a sensitivity study, 
we implicitly assume that all dairy farmers who trade milk quota 
participate to some extent in futures trading. How many futures 
contracts they trade in relation to their cash position depends on 
their hedging ratio. 
The following assumption is made regarding the contract 
specification of milk quota futures: a futures contract represents 
7000 kilogram of milk quota with a specific fat content. This 
amount equals the average annual production of a dairy cow in the 
United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Representatives of the 
Dutch farmers union and the dairy industry confirm that farmers 
tend to think in terms of number of cows when making decisions 
with respect to milk quotas. As a result the underlying value for 
Futures Contract A would be about 12,000 ECUs and for Futures 
Contract B 1000 ECUs, which is in line with the underlying value 
of other agricultural futures contracts traded in Europe. 
Volumes for 1994 were calculated for different levels of 
velocity and hedge ratios, as shown in Figures 3,4, 5 and 6. 
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Futures contract A 
United Kingdom 
Figure 3 Estimated volume of futures contract A in the United Kingdom for 
different levels of velocity and hedge ratios 
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Futures contract B 
United Kingdom 
Figure 4 Estimated volume of futures contract B in the United Kingdom 
different levels of velocity and hedge ratios 
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Futures contract A 
The Netherlands 
Figure 5 Estimated volume offutures contract A in the Netherlands for different 
levels of velocity and hedge ratios 
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Futures contract B 
The Netherlands 
Figure 6 Estimated volume of futures contract B in the Netherlands for different 
levels of velocity and hedge ratios 
Figures 3-6 show that an increase in velocity will increase 
the volume. However, a simultaneous decrease in the hedge ratio 
will partially offset this increase and vice versa. If both the hedge 
ratio and the velocity increase, volume will increase at a 
tremendous rate. It seems reasonable to expect that the velocity will 
be greater than 1, because we observed speculative trading in the 
cash market of milk quotas (Brasler 1994). Furthermore, we might 
expect the hedging ratio to be smaller than 1, making the values of 
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VLCT and HR in the south-east areas in Figures 3-6 more relevant. 
If we follow Silber's (1981) criteria for a viable futures market, this 
would suggest that there might be an opportunity for milk quota 
futures. 
The market's velocity is determined by the number of 
speculators operating on the market. These speculators will assume 
the spot risk from the farmer and provide market liquidity, which 
will keep hedgers' execution costs (costs incurred by hedgers when 
executing an order in a non-liquid market) at a low level (Perinings 
and Kuiper et al. 1998). They are the ones who keep the market 
flowing. Therefore, to be successful a milk quota futures market 
will have to appeal to speculators as well. 
The hedging ratio not only depends on the contract 
specification, which in its turn influences the basic risk as outlined 
in the previous section, but also on farmer attitudes towards futures 
trade. In Chapter 8 it has been shown that ease of use and 
performance of futures are important criteria in a farmer's decision 
for or against using the services of a futures market. 
11.6 Conclusions and Further Research 
Farmers face both a price risk and an execution cost risk 
with respect to their herd, because of the large price differentials of 
milk rights between regions and during different periods of time. A 
futures market would enable them to hedge against these risks. 
Rights futures have some features which make them different from 
those of traditional commodity futures and, at the same time, make 
them very suitable for futures trading. One such feature of rights 
futures is that, unlike traditional commodity futures, they have no 
residual risk at maturity. The underlying commodity is identical to 
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the commodity in the cash market, which is seldom the case with 
traditional commodities. Nor is the place of delivery of importance 
since delivery takes place by book entry and hence will not 
adversely affect hedging effectiveness. If such a futures market 
were established, it would provide a price-risk management 
instrument for farmers with a great hedging effectiveness. If there is 
a positive correlation between rights (input) and milk (output) a 
"natural" hedge will appear in the system. As a result, the optimal 
strategy would be to hedge a smaller amount than one would were 
this correlation absent. Not only can futures serve as an interesting 
price-risk management instrument to reduce cash market risk, with 
the underlying commodity being a right, they also provide an 
opportunity for cross-hedging the performance of the industry. 
To gain a further insight into the feasibility of such futures 
markets in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, we have 
studied the effect hedging ratio and velocity will have on volume. 
A milk quota futures market seems viable when the hedging ratio 
approaches 1, which is not an unthinkable situation with respect to 
milk quotas, their hedging efficiency being relatively high. 
Furthermore, velocity would have to be bigger than 1, implying 
speculator presence. Hedging ratio is not just determined by the 
characteristics of the futures contract, it also shows that it is 
considerably influenced by the farmers' attitude towards futures 
markets as well. Further research must include an analysis of the 
willingness of farmers to use futures, in order to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the potential of a futures market for milk quota. 
Research in this area would be of considerable interest. 
266 Chapter 11 
11.7 Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank the participants of the EUNITA 
Seminar "Risk Management Strategies in Agriculture: State of the 
Art and Future Perspective"; the participants of the VTA Triennial 
Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists 
held in Edinburgh in 1996; Antony Rucker, Director of Operations 
at the London Commodity Exchange; the members of the research 
group "Tradable Rights on the Cash Market and Futures Market" 
and W. Erno Kuiper, Bruce T. Traill and two anonymous reviewers 
of the Journal of Agricultural Economics for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. We are grateful to 
Rolf Wevers (The Clearing Corporation of Amsterdam Exchanges), 
Bruton Knowles, the Intervention Board, the National Farmers 
Union, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the 
National Dairy Council, the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors and the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
for invaluable data. 
CHAPTER 12 
Environmental Rights on the Futures 
Markets: an Application to the Dutch 
Manure Market 1 
12.1 Abstract 
A study was carried out to analyze futures markets for tradable 
rights after a cash market has been initiated. Furthermore, some 
indication was given as to the size of such a futures market to provide 
insight into its viability. Futures markets can play a role in solving 
environmental problems, by making the market for pollution rights (i.e. 
P 2 0 5 rights) and agro rights (milk rights, sugar rights and P2O5 rights) 
more effective and transparent. Moreover, the market for tradable rights 
would be able to meet the users' need for hedging. This chapter 
investigates the possibility of introducing a futures markets of tradable 
P 2 0 5 rights and the commodity manure. Because there already is a cash 
market for manure, although not well developed yet, and there will be a 
cash market for P 2 0 5 rights, a futures market would be a logical sequel. 
The futures market can play a role in implementing agricultural policy 
efficiently and, with respect to manure and P 2 0 5 rights, can be an 
economically efficient solution to environmental problems. 
1 This chapter has been published as: Pennings, J.M.E., M.T.G. Meulenberg and 
W.J.M. Heijman (1996), "Environmental Rights on the Futures Markets: an 
Application to the Dutch Manure Market", Environmental and Resource 
Economics 7, 79-94. 
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12.2 Introduction 
The market for transferable rights, such as SO2 permits, is 
expanding. In the Netherlands, for example, problems with 
P2O5 emissions on account of intensive livestock production are 
tackled by the emission of P2O5 rights. In the U.S., a first start in 
developing a spot and futures market for permits (rights) was made 
by initiating the Acid Rain Program. The overall goal of the Acid 
Rain Program (ARP, established by Title TV of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990) was to obtain significant environmental 
benefits through reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides, which are the primary components causes of acid 
rain. To achieve this goal at the lowest possible cost to society, the 
program employs market-based approaches for controlling air 
pollution. In addition, it encourages energy efficiency and pollution 
prevention. The Program introduced a permit (not a property right) 
trading system that harnesses the incentives of the free market to 
reduce pollution (EPA 1993; Tietenberg 1989; Sandor 1991; Walsh 
1992). 
Despite the fact that the U.S. has taken the first steps in 
developing a spot market and a futures market, a centralized spot 
market for rights (i.e. milk rights) has run in Ontario since 1980, 
followed by Quebec in 1985. Since 1984 there has been a 
decentralized spot market for rights (i.e. milk rights) in the 
Netherlands and the United-Kingdom. 
The possessor of (environmental) rights is bearing risks. 
Price fluctuations cause changing values of the right. Futures 
markets are a tool to deal with these price risks and hence will 
result in more efficient decisions. In this chapter, the possibilities 
and limitations of futures markets for environmental rights are 
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discussed and an application to Dutch phosphorus rights, issued by 
the Dutch government, is presented. 
In Section 12.3 some government policy options for 
abatement are discussed, which show that the introduction of a 
rights system is an efficient way for handling pollution problems. 
Sections 12.4 and 12.5 deal with the cash market for rights and the 
risk involved for users in general and for the Dutch P2Os rights in 
particular. In Section 12.6 some models for futures markets for 
environmental rights are presented and applied to the Dutch 
P2O5 market. The viability of this futures market is discussed in 
Sections 12.7 and 12.8. This chapter ends with an conclusion. 
12.3 Policy Options for Abatement in the Presence of Rights 
In practice, many conditions of the model of perfect 
competition have not been satisfied. One broad class of violations 
are those occurring when an agent making a decision does not bear 
all the economic consequences of his or her action, the so-called 
externality. An externality is caused by the fact that the property 
rights structure is not exclusive. Externalities cause the market 
price to diverge from social costs and benefits. In general this 
brings about an inefficient allocation of resources and enhances 
government intervention in the market. The government has 
different tools to internalize externalities such as regulation, levies 
and the introduction of environmental rights (Bresser 1988; Huppes 
1992). 
Currently, a much suggested tool for internalizing 
externalities is the introduction of rights (cfr. Chapter 10). In the 
case of pollution rights we can make a distinction between a 
geographic transfer and a temporal transfer. A geographic transfer 
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means a transfer of the right to another location. A temporal 
transfer means that the right can be used not only during the 
maturity but also during another time. In other words the right can 
be banked. As to a temporal transfer we can distinguish a 
permanent transfer or a temporary (lease) transfer (Peeters 1992; 
Tietenberg 1992). 
Trading systems of rights can be characterized in terms of a 
number of important attributes, including scope of coverage, degree 
of government intervention, the technical basis for the trading, and 
its geographic limits (see Chapter 10). The geographic area in 
which trades are permitted is largely determined by the type of 
pollutant. If the pollutant spreads widely and has adverse effects 
even if the concentration is low, the geographic area is likely to be 
large. In other cases many pollutants have adverse effects primarily 
on a small local or regional area. An example is the manure 
problem in the Netherlands (Hahn 1984; Oskam 1991), which we 
will further investigate in this chapter. 
Usually, when the efficiency of a system of tradable rights is 
involved, costs of the emission reduction are minimised under the 
constraint of minimum required reduction in the emission 
(Tietenberg 1985). However, in this case, the system of tradable 
manure rights is considered efficient if it ensures maximum profit 
w of a region's livestock farming sector as a whole and for each 
individual farm under the given constraint of a maximum allowed 
amount of manure M in the region.2 Manure is in this context 
embedded to minerals. 
It is assumed that there are n farms in the region considered. 
Total costs c, of farm i including the cost of manure transportation 
2 Of course, the amount of manure can be measured in several ways, for example in 
weights units P 2 0 5 , in M 3 sludge or otherwise. 
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and the costs of levies, excluding the costs to be paid for the 
manure right consisting of the price pm times the right m,, are 
assumed to be a rising function of production qn while the 
production manure ratio u, is assumed to be fixed for each farm i. 
So: 
ct = c,(g) p- > 0 (1) dqt 
q, = V.,mt (2) 
From this it follows: 
dc 
ct = cfam,) = \i,ct(mt), > 0 (3) 
dm. 
With a fixed price p of the final product and pm for the price of the 
manure right mn total revenue rt and profit w, of farm i equal 
respectively: 
r, - pq, = p\i,m, (4) 
w, = r, - c, = p\Ltm, - ti,c((m,.) - pmm, (5) 
3 A manure right is the right to produce a certain amount of manure during one 
period, and can be divided into standard contracts of specific amounts of manure. 
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It is assumed that farms strive for profit maximization. From the 
last equation it follows that farm i's profit is maximized if: 
dw. de, n dc:. - — = u,. • p - u,, • — - pm = 0 or: \it(p - —±-) = p„ dm, am, dm. 
The profit maximization problem for the sector as a whole may be 
formulated as follows: 
n 
max w = ^ w, = 
n 
w = £ 
(6) 
<=1 ;=1 ¡=1 
subject to ^ mt < M. 
;=1 
Because it is assumed that the constraint of the allowed 
maximum amount of manure is restrictive, the "lesser than or equal 
to" sign can be replaced by an "equal" sign, hence we can apply the 
Lagrange procedure.4 Thus: 
n 
max L = p^ \ximi 
n 
~ PmY,mi 
/=1 
ft 
(=1 
- mt - M) 
(7) 
4 If the "lesser than or equal to" sign should be maintained, the Kuhn Tucker 
conditions apply. 
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subject to: ^ mj = M. 
The first order conditions for a maximum are: 
r - = P r i ( - | » , 7 1 - / ' . - l = l ) (1 < z < ») cm, dm.-
It follows, that in the maximum: 
dm, dm2 dw3 
= . . . = H , . ( P - ^ - ) = . . . = r i „ ( P " ^ ) 
(8) 
This means that, in equilibrium, the marginal revenue of the 
manure right equals marginal costs for all farms in the region. This 
result implies that, under the given constraint of the maximum 
amount of manure Mand given price p, profits are maximised when 
all rights are sold at the equilibrium price pm. 
The equilibrium price may be found by way of an auction.5 
The auctioneer announces a price and considers how many permits 
are sold at this specific price. He continues doing so in a systematic 
way till he has reached a price at which all permits have virtually 
been sold. In this way, the equilibrium price is set and every farmer 
can buy the manure rights he wants at the equilibrium price. Of 
5 There may be different systems of selling the manure contracts. For example, it 
may be decided that each farmer has a certain amount of manure rights for free 
depending on the amount of land he owns in the region. Then only those manure 
rights that are not exploited by the owners (e.g. arable fanner) can be bought and 
sold at the auction. 
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course, this can only work properly with perfect competition at the 
demand side of the market. 
A system that is based only on administrative regulations 
might not be as efficient, because, in practice, it is impossible to 
estimate the marginal productivity function of each farm. Besides, 
marginal productivity functions tend to change over time. The 
conclusion is that a system of tradeable manure rights may be more 
efficient than a system that consists only of administrative 
regulations. 
Once the firm understands how the rights market functions 
and knows the price per right, it can start to formulate and evaluate 
alternative courses of action. The various actions to choose from 
(inexhaustive list): 
- Purchase the necessary right each year for a specific period 
- Purchase in year x all the necessary rights to cover the period of 
operation 
- Install control equipment in year x 
- Purchase the necessary rights in year x; install reduction 
methods, for example increase u. in our presented model by 
using different feed concentrate, at a future date and sell the 
rights previously purchased. 
- Continue emissions without purchasing any rights and be 
penalized for violations 
In practice it is impossible to estimate the future price per 
right, which causes uncertainty and as a consequence inefficient 
decisions. The futures market offers a tool to solve the above-
mentioned problem. By making use of the futures markets of rights 
the firm can lock in the price and will be able to hedge against 
(adverse) price fluctuations. The futures market of rights is an 
economically efficient tool in planning ahead for users of rights. 
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12.4 Cash Markets of Rights: the Dutch P 2 O s Rights Market 
The cash market for rights shows some characteristic 
features. The amount of environmental rights is generally 
predetermined by the government. This implies that the total 
(aggregate) supply of rights is fixed, although some fine tuning 
regulations with respect to the trade of rights are possible. For 
example, trade may only be allowed in particular areas or a fixed 
percentage of reduction in the amount of rights may take place 
when trade occurs (which is the case on the Dutch cash market of 
P2O5 rights). The demand for rights is a demand derived from the 
means of production. The demand for rights will be an outcome of 
many factors like final product price, interest rate, etc. A right is a 
perfect homogeneous 'commodity', which implicates that the right 
is a very fungible 'commodity' on the cash market. 
In the Netherlands livestock production has been expanding 
enormously in the past twenty years. Consequently, there is an 
overproduction of manure from the environmental point of view. 
This overproduction causes problems of minerals in the soil like 
eutrophic, nitrate loading of groundwater and acidification. These 
environmental problems made it necessary for the Dutch 
government to introduce a manure policy. Since 1987, when the 
Dutch government introduced a manure production right, the Duth 
government has had legislation on manure. By this policy 
instrument it tries to solve the problem. Another related instrument 
is the manure accountancy. Every producer of manure has to record 
how many minerals enter the production unit and how many are 
removed from the production unit. In this way every mineral can be 
traced (Baltussen 1992,1993; Nentjes 1990). 
In the 'Manure' Act it is arranged that a farm is principally 
not allowed to produce more manure than an equivalent of 
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125 kilograms of phosphorus per hectare of land. This land has to 
be the property of a farmer or in use on a tenancy basis. Farmers 
who recorded their livestock on 31 December 1986 have been 
allocated PaOsrights by the government. The amount may either 
exceed or remain within the 125 kilogram phosphorus limit. 
If a farmer was granted an average P2O5 rights of more than 
125 kilograms per hectare in 1986, he will be allowed to produce 
phosphorus up to his P2O5 rights. The phosphorus surplus, i.e. the 
amount of phosphorus exceeding the legal limits (this amount 
depends on which crop is grown on the land), will have to be 
removed from the farm. The farmer has to pay a levy because he 
produces more than 125 kilograms of phosphorus per hectare. 
Moreover he ought to have a manure record system. A farmer with 
a production of 125 kilograms of phosphorus per hectare or less 
does not have to pay a levy, doesn't need to have a manure record 
system and may increase his production up to 125 kilograms per 
hectare. 
Since January 1994 it has been possible to buy P2O5 rights 
(the free transferable part of the rights, which was defined in the 
Act). Purchased rights will be added to existing P2O5 rights. A 
farmer who intends to produce more than 125 kilograms of 
phosphorus needs to buy P2O5 rights. If a farmer under the 
conditions of the new Act purchases more than 125 kilograms per 
hectare he must be able to remove the phosphorus surplus from his 
farm and prove that to the government. 
A farmer with a phosphorus production of more than 
125 kilograms per hectare who wants to increase his production has 
three possibilities under the new 'Removing Manure Production 
Act'. 
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1) To buy P2O5 rights; through this transaction his average 
production of phosphorus per hectare will exceed the 
125 kilogram limit and he will have to pay a levy and bear the 
cost of removing the surplus phosphorus from his farm. 
2) To buy land in order to produce manure up to 125 kilograms of 
phosphorus per hectare without paying a levy. 
3) Combination of possibilities 1 and 2. 
12.5 Risk Involved for Users of Rights (i.e. P 2 O s rights) 
When the spot market for P2O5 (phosphorus) rights is being 
established after the 'Removing Manure Production Act' has come 
into operation, there is a possibility for a futures market. With the 
creation of tradable rights, phosphorus rights markets involve price 
risk for the users (i.e. intensive livestock farmer). In order to 
comply with the new legislation, an intensive livestock farmer (a 
farmer who produces more than 125 kilograms of phosphorus per 
hectare) who wants to increase his production may either purchase 
phosphorus rights or reduce phosphorus production. Phosphorus 
production methods can be distinguished in reduction of 
phosphorus output per ariimal or reduction of the livestock. 
Reduction of phosphorus per animal involves making use of feed 
with low concentrate of minerals and breeding animals with a better 
feed conversion. The intensive livestock farmer will make this 
decision on the basis of the net profit involved in the above-
mentioned possibilities. A farmer with relatively low marginal 
abatement costs (i.e. reduction in phosphorus production) will 
invest in phosphorus reduction measures. If his measures to reduce 
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the phosphorus production are successful, he may be able to sell 
some P2O5 rights. A farmer with relatively high marginal abatement 
costs but with a relatively high processing margin (exclusive 
abatement measures) may decide to purchase P2O5 rights. Because 
prices of P2O5 rights, manure, abatement, meat etc. fluctuate, he 
runs a price risk (adverse price fluctuations in the cash market) the 
so-called processing margin risk. The intensive livestock farmer 
may make use of three markets to manage a part of his processing 
margin risk, namely 1) the market of phosphorus rights, 2) the 
market of hogs and 3) the market of manure, where the market of 
manure is the market where the livestock farmer has to sell the 
surplus manure he produces on his farm. 
Whether farmers are inclined to hedge rights depends on 
their risk attitude. We will illustrate this for a farmer who is risk 
averse, with a constant average risk attitude measure X. We assume 
that this farmer is hedging only his rights by buying those rights in 
the futures market (i.e. long hedging). Furthermore it is assumed 
that production does not vary as a result of variation in weather 
conditions or unexpected diseases. The latter assumption seems 
reasonable for the production considered, pig raising and dairy 
farming. Following Robison and Barry (1987) we will demonstrate 
that the variance in price of rights in the spot market has a positive 
impact on hedging. It is assumed that the price of the right is the 
only factor of uncertainty in the profit maximisation problem. The 
objective of profit maximisation for a farmer, who is constantly 
absolutely risk averse with a constant average risk attitude measure 
X, can be expressed as follows : 
X 
UCE = E(K) - - var(7t) (9) 
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where UCE is the certainty equivalent, 7t is the profit and X is the 
risk parameter which is positive, assuming the individual is risk 
adverse. If the only price uncertainty in determining the profit is the 
input price of the right, then the profit can be expressed as: 
% = R - [(P + e)(q -h) + Pfh] - C(q) - F (10) 
where R is the turnover (output times output price); P + 6 is the 
current spot price of the right with expected value P and variance 
a2s; q is the unhedged input of rights; h is the hedged input and Pf 
is the futures price of rights; it is assumed that there is no basis risk; 
C{q) are variable costs and F are fixed costs. 
The expected profit is: 
E(%) = R - [P(q - h) + Pfh] - C(q) - F (11) 
Similarly, the variance of profits is: 
<) = (q ~ hfa\ (12) 
The certainty equivalent model can now be formulated as: 
*ce = E(p) - ( | ) a 2 n ) (13) 
X 
where - is the trade-off at equilibrium between expected profit 
and variance of profit. By substituting (11) and (12) into (13), the 
objective function can be written in terms of the level of risk, 
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max 7t ce 
(14) 
To determine the optimal holdings of futures contracts, the 
objective function is differentiated with respect to h. After setting 
the first order condition equal to zero one obtains: 
This relationship indicates the condition required for a complete 
hedge. If the expected spot price P equals Pf, the total cash 
position will be hedged because a risk aversive farmer will always 
exchange an uncertain price for a certain one if the latter equals the 
expected value of the uncertain one. But the expected spot price P 
and the futures Pf price may not be equal. Very important to note 
is the fact that the expected spot price P of the right and the futures 
price of the right Pf are costs in respect to the objective function 
(i.e. are negative prices). Risk-averse firms will exchange a certain 
input price Pf for the uncertain spot input price of the right, i.e 
excluding input price risk, despite the fact that the certain input 
price of the right exceeds the uncertain spot input price. The more 
risk-averse the farmer and/or the more price fluctuations in the spot 
market of the right, the greater the level of hedging for a constant 
positive difference between Pf and P. Only when P, the expected 
spot input price of the right, exceeds the certain future price, will 
the risk-averse firm speculate, because the expected value of the 
-P + P< f (15) h = q - [• 
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difference between buying and subsequently selling (i.e long 
liftings value) is positive. 
Differentiating h in Equation (15) with respect to a 2 yields 
the farmer's level of hedging response to an increase in the variance 
of the expected spot input price of the right, 
dh (-P + P/) n ~ 
—o = r^r (16) 
del (^2)2 
The response to an increase in the variance of the spot input price 
of the right is unambiguously positive as long as Pf > P. 
12.6 A Proposal for Implementation of P2O5 Futures 
Contracts 
The contract specification for manure futures is more 
difficult than for P2O5 rights futures since a manure futures is a 
legally binding agreement to make or accept delivery of a 
standardized quantity and quality of manure at a standardized time 
and place for a price agreed upon today, while manure is not a 
homogeneous product. First, four kinds of manure are 
distinguished: from hogs, cows, calves and poultry. Second, the 
manure can be distinguished by their contents of phosphorus and 
other minerals. Probably the best solution in this complex matter is 
to specify two manure contracts: hogs manure futures and poultry 
manure futures. The manure surplus problem in the Netherlands is 
mainly caused by hogs and poultry farming. It is expected that 
those kinds of manure will generate the most trade. The two 
contracts should also specify the phosphorus and moist contents. 
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Although manure from farms will seldom be exactly the same as 
specified in the two futures contracts, hedging is possible by cross-
hedging. In Table 1 the special features of the proposed futures 
contracts are summarized. 
Table 1 Special features ofP2Os future contract and Hogs/Poultry futures contract 
P 2 0 5 Futures contracts Hogs/Poultry manure 
futures 
Unit of trading 
Standards 
Months and years traded in 
Price basis 
Delivery 
the contract unit shall 
specify the right to produce 
a certain number of kg 
phosphorus 
phosphorus rights are those 
issued by the Dutch 
government and 
administered by 'Bureau 
Heffingen'. Deliverable 
phosphorus rights must be 
applicable to phosphorus 
production in the same 
year of the month of 
delivery 
every month of every year 
all prices of phosphorus 
rights futures shall be 
multiples of one NLG per 
contract 
Delivery shall be made by 
book entry transfer 
between accounts in the 
book entry system of the 
government by cash 
settlement 
the contract unit shall 
specify a certain number of 
kg of hogs/poultry manure 
with specified moist and 
phosphorus content 
the contract is specified as 
to origin, delivery place 
and time, contents of moist 
and phosphorus 
every month of every year 
all prices of hogs/poultry 
manure futures shall be 
multiples of one NLG per 
contract 
delivery shall be made in 
cooperation with and by 
the rules of the clearing 
house or by cash settlement 
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12.7 Participants and Hedging Systems 
Participants (hedgers and speculators) involved in the 
already existing hogs futures market could be interested in the 
P2O5 rights and manure futures. Other possible participants in the 
trading of manure futures are the manure processing industries. 
They could use the futures market to hedge against adverse price 
fluctuations of manure. By making use of the futures market they 
can plan ahead and so be able to use their capacity optimally. The 
government may be a participant in the rights futures as well. 
Through the futures market, the government is able to plan ahead 
and when starting programs it can hedge against adverse program 
costs. Environmental organizations can buy futures contracts on the 
futures market, thus achieving their goals in the same way as 
happened on the S 0 2 rights market in the USA. In the Netherlands 
participation of farmers on the futures market is not as common as 
it is in the United States. In the case of the intensive livestock 
farmers it will be the (cooperative) meat processing industries and 
the (cooperative) mixed feed industries that will participate. In the 
Netherlands, the feed concentrate industries and meat processing 
industries have already worked closely together in the production 
chain to establish high quality meat (for example, Dumeco). 
If the intensive livestock farmer purchases the P2O5 futures, 
he is obligated to remove the manure surplus, which means that he 
needs to hedge himself against adverse cost price fluctuations with 
the help of manure futures. In this way he can use both futures 
markets to hedge against adverse price fluctuation of both 
commodities. The intensive livestock farmer may also use the 
already existing hogs futures markets for his output to hedge 
against adverse price fluctuations. 
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The intensive livestock farmer can make a futures contract 
combination of the above-mentioned possibilities, buying the 
P2O5 rights futures and selling the hogs and manure futures. The 
farmer can use this hedge to protect his processing margin against 
adverse price fluctuations. This so called spread (the simultaneous 
purchase of one futures contract and the sale of a different futures 
contract) can be considered analogous to the soybean crush at the 
Chicago Board of Trade and could be called "the Meat Product 
Spread" (MPS). After making use of the MPS, the only factor of 
uncertainty in the processing margin is the feed price. Nevertheless, 
the farmer can also buy a futures contract such as corn on the 
futures markets of feed components. 
Often a co-ordinated marketing operation through the 
marketing channel is needed in order to achieve competitive 
advantages over rivals. Chain marketing, established by the 
agribusiness industries, can be extended by their offering the 
intensive livestock farmer an MPS package. By introducing an 
MPS package, chain marketing can be strengthened. The farmer 
can establish a known processing margin without having to worry 
about the knowledge involved in futures trading (Table 2). 
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Table 2 Meat product spread model 
Mixed feed industries (MFI) Goes long in the feed concentrate components. 
For example com and soybean meal at the 
CBOT. 
Intensive livestock farmer Makes use of MPS package 
MPS: long in P 2 0 5 futures contract 
short in hogs manure futures contract6 
short in hogs futures contract 
Meat processing industries (MPI) Goes long in hogs future contract. 
The MPS can be executed by trading each futures contract 
seperately or by trading the spread as a combined futures contract. 
If the spread is traded as one futures contract then in fact the 
processing margin from hogs is being traded. An MPS contract 
specification is a combination of the three contracts involved. 
12.8 Viability of Futures Markets of Rights 
Yet the cash market of rights has not been well-structured 
and developed. This primitive structure of the cash market will 
have an impact on the futures markets for rights. The purpose of 
futures markets is to provide hedging possibilities for participants, 
since actual delivery seldom occurs in a liquid futures market. On 
average, only 3% of the trade that is conducted is actually 
6 The value of manure is negative, so the price will be negative. To avoid a 
negative price quotation in the futures market we can define a dual manure 
futures contract. This contract could be defined as the service to remove a certain 
number of kilograms of manure with specified moist and phosphorus contents. 
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delivered. In the case of a futures market for rights, actual delivery 
will be higher in the early days of such a market, because the cash 
market will not be that liquid yet. Hedgers who do not succeed in 
making a deal on the cash market will not offset their futures 
markets position. As mentioned in section 11.4, this higher 
frequency of delivery will not pose a problem in the case of a rights 
futures market because of the homogeneity of rights. 
In this section the viability of a futures market for manure 
futures contracts and P2O5 rights is evaluated by using data on the 
cash market in manure, contract success criteria and data on 
existing futures markets. The following assumptions were made: 
(1) a manure futures contract is defined as 125 kilogram P2O5 
embedded in hogs respectively poultry manure. The 125 kilogram 
P2O5 criterion was chosen because of the 125 kilograms of P2O5 per 
hectare criterion of the Dutch manure legislation. 
(2) 90% of the amount of phosphorus that was processed and traded 
in 1991 was hedged on the futures market. This figure was 
expected to fluctuate because farmers, agri-distributors and 
processors can make contracts with each other on the cash market 
which would have their impact on this figure. 
(3) the turnover on the futures market was two and a half. The 
argumentation with respect to the turnover was the following: a 
contract may be traded on the spot market between farmers A and 
C, the turnover of one contract being one. A contract may also be 
traded between farmer A and middleman B and between 
middleman B and farmer C, the turnover of one contract being two 
times. On the futures market speculators can trade with a farmer, a 
scalper or another speculator (in reality the clearing house will take 
the opposite position in those transactions). The above-mentioned 
ways of reaching a certain level of turnover makes an average 
turnover of two and a half acceptable. 
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In 1991, the supply of phosphorus was 88 million 
kilograms; 3 million kilograms P2Os of which were processed, 
3 million kilograms were exported and the rest distributed to 
phosphorus shortage areas within the Netherlands. From the 
distributed part of the manure 14 million kilograms were traded 
(Source: National Manure Office 1993). In total, 17 million 
kilograms were traded consisting of 3 million kilograms from the 
processing industry and 14 million kilograms from distribution 
industries. The volume of this futures market would be 
306,000 futures contracts per year (17 million kilogram times 90% 
divided by 125 times 2.5). This volume is more than three times the 
actual volume of the potato futures contract in Amsterdam and 
indicates a successful futures contract according to Silber, Sandor 
and the Wall Street Journal. 
In 1992, the supply of manure was 16 million tons; 
616 thousand tons of which were processed, 378 thousand tons 
exported and the rest distributed to shortage areas within the 
Netherlands. Of the distributed part of the manure, 2.8 million tons 
were traded. (Source: National Manure Office 1993). A futures 
contract on hog manure could be defined as 25 tons of hogs manure 
with 5 kilograms of P2Os per ton. A futures contract on poultry 
could be defined as 25 tons of poultry manure with 15 kilograms of 
P 2 0 5 per ton. The 25-ton criterion was chosen because that was the 
average manure capacity per truck. The phosphorus criterion was 
based on the P 2 Q 5 content in manure of hogs, respectively poultry. 
The price risk involved on the manure cash market could be hedged 
on the hogs and/or poultry manure futures market. If 90% of the 
cash market was hedged and the turnover was two and half, the 
volume would be 252,000 contracts per year. Again the percentage 
of 90% is disputable. If the manure processing industries and the 
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producers of manure make spot market contracts in advance, this 
percentage of 90% will be lower. 
The statistics on manure traded are not complete yet for the 
Netherlands. What we do know is the amount of manure removed 
from intensive livestock farms to farms with a shortage. This 
manure shift is recorded by the so-called delivery proofs. The 
participants in the manure trade will likely want to hedge against 
adverse price fluctuations. In Table 3 an estimation is presented for 
this hypothetical futures market, where a contract is specified as 
25 tons of manure (hogs or poultry). 
Table 3 Estimated volume (number) of manure futures contracts (not specified as 
to type of manure) 
Amount of manure 
traded with delivery 
proofs in tons* 
Corresponding 
contracts (90% of 
column 2 divided 
by 25) 
Turnover Volume of 
trade at 
hypothetical 
futures market 
1990 2792000 100512 2.5 251280 
1991 3241000 116676 2.5 291690 
Source: LEI-DLO, own calculation, 1993 
The volume of contracts traded on the hypothetical futures 
market is high compared with the existing futures market in hogs 
and potatoes in Amsterdam. Important in the calculations made 
above is the supposition that on the cash market for manure, there 
is a cash market between every participant in the marketing channel 
of manure. Integration of manure producers with agri-distributors 
and processors could reduce the turnover. 
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Table 4 Manure production in millions of tons and the equivalent in P2Os in 
millions of kilograms of phosphorus 
Production Surplus 
manure P2O5 manure P2O5 
1994 83.3 223 17.2 84.3 
1995 75.4 196 17.3 74.1 
2000 64-71 172 -184 22-26 86-93 
Source: National Manure Office, 1993 
Table 4 shows an estimate of the future Dutch manure 
problem. The manure surplus will be traded on the cash manure 
market. If there is a high price variability on that cash market, a 
futures market will be a logical consequence so that participants 
can hedge against adverse price fluctuations. The amount of surplus 
manure indicated in the above-mentioned contract specifications is 
huge. 
Table S Proposed solution for the Dutch manure surplus in millions of kilograms of 
phosphorus 
1995 2000 
Distribution 59 32 
Process/export 12 54 
Source: TNO-Arcadis and National Manure Office 
If it is assumed that 90% of the manure to be distributed is 
hedged by the participants on the manure futures market and the 
turnover is two and a half, the volume of futures contracts will be 
one million in 1995 and 576,000 contracts in 2000, provided that 
one contract consists of 125 kilograms of phosphorus. Important to 
note, however, is that this number is partly influenced by the 
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magnitude of the contract. In the calculation the 125-kilogram P2O5 
criterion was used because of the 125 kilograms of P2O5 per hectare 
criterion of Dutch manure legislation. This criterion is disputable. 
Another and perhaps better criterion would be the value of the 
underlying commodity. The value of the manure futures contract 
must not be too high because that would have a negative impact on 
the attractiveness of the contract. On the other hand, the value of 
the underlying commodity (i.e. manure) must not be too low 
relative to the transaction costs involved in trading on the futures 
market. The 125-kilogram criterion might give the contract too low 
a contract value. Nevertheless, Tables 3 and 4 show that the manure 
surplus in the Netherlands is of such volume that a futures market 
will be successful according to the volume traded (under the 
assumptions made). 
12.9 Conclusions 
Introducing environmental rights is an economically 
efficient tool for implementing environmental policy. The users 
(i.e. polluters) of rights have to put up with adverse price 
fluctuations of the right, which cause different valuation of the 
right. This uncertainty of price estimate for the futures on rights 
causes problems for firms in making optimally efficient economic 
decisions. Futures markets for rights would be a perfect tool to 
solve the above-mentioned problem. With the help of such a 
market, users of rights can lock in the right price for the futures 
contract. A futures market for those rights is not available yet. An 
important barrier for developing such a futures market is the 
legislation involved with rights. Cooperation with the government 
in initiating a right, spot and futures market is required. 
CHAPTER 13 
Complex Spread Hedging where 
Production is Restricted by Rights 1 
13.1 Abstract 
The specific characteristics of rights make them extremely 
suitable for futures trading in a commodity product spread context. The 
usefulness of production rights futures in the case of commodity product 
spread hedging is analyzed for the dairy industry where production is 
restricted by milk quota. 
13.2 Introduction 
Futures markets for tradable environmental and production 
rights2 can help make the market for rights more effective and 
transparent. Moreover, a futures market for tradable rights would be 
able to meet the users' need for hedging.3 In the USA, the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) are trying to establish a futures market for S 0 2 rights 
(Sandor 1991; Walsh 1993). Rights that lend themselves to trading 
on a futures market are also found in agriculture, examples being 
1 This chapter is based on: Pennings, J.M.E. and M.T.G. Meulenberg (1996), 
"Complex Spread Hedging where Production is restricted by Rights" Working 
Paper, Wageningen Agricultural University, Department of Marketing and 
Marketing Research. 
2 Note that the words rights on one hand and environmental rights and production 
rights on the other hand are used interchangeably. 
3 The scope of this chapter does not include the question of how futures can be 
used as hedging vehicles because there is already an extensive literature on this 
subject. See, for example, Stoll and Whaley, 1993 and Pennings and Meulenberg, 
1997b. 
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the water rights and phosphorus rights in the US and the milk rights 
(milk quotas) in Canada and the European Union (Pennings, 
Heijman and Meulenberg 1997). 
In this chapter an attempt is made to determine the optimal 
hedging amount of output and input when production is restricted 
by environmental rights or production rights. It is assumed that the 
farmer can hedge both the volume of production and rights. First 
we analyze the general case of a farmer who hedges main products, 
inputs and by-products. This is done by maximizing the farmer's 
certainty equivalent. Having determined the optimal hedging 
amounts and hedging ratios in general terms, the model is extended 
by including rights futures contracts. The characteristic features of 
rights futures are discussed in the context of commodity product 
spread hedging. We then go on by applying the model to dairy 
complex spread hedging including milk quotas. Finally, the results 
and main conclusion are summarized. 
13.3 Model 
We begin by introducing a model of a farmer's hedging 
decision in the case of a commodity product spread.4 Consider a 
farmer who can lock in the price risks with the help of three futures 
markets. This so-called commodity product spread - analogous to 
the Soy Bean Crush at the CBOT - enables a farmer to manage part 
of his or her processing margin risk. Given that the farmer wishes 
to maximize the expected processing margin in the next time period 
adjusted for risk, where risk is measured by the variance of the 
4 A commodity product spread refers to the simultaneous purchase and sale of 
two or more different futures contracts in order to hedge the farmer's production 
margin or profit. 
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processing margin, the objective function can be expressed on the 
basis of the expected value-variance (EV) model (Kahl 1983; 
Robison and Barry 1987). We have adopted the EV approach 
because we want to determine the relationship between the 
variables and to show the direction of change in relevant variables.5 
n c e = £(II) - X var(n) (1) 
where E(U) is the expected processing margin and var(n) 
represents the variance of the processing margin. The risk 
parameter X for risk-averse decision makers is positive, thus 
providing compensation for risk bearing (Pratt 1964). At time t the 
farmer wishes to maximize the certainty equivalent for the next 
period t + 1. Given that the cash positions are predetermined for 
the main product, by-product and input, the expected processing 
margin at time t + 1 equals the revenue from selling the main 
product and by-product in the cash market and futures market 
minus the cost of buying the input in the cash markets and futures 
markets corrected by the transaction costs and the basis, where the 
basis is defined as the local cash price minus futures price. A 
farmer who uses the futures market to manage price risk is aware of 
the basis and will take account of it (Lapan and Moschini 1994). 
The expected processing margin can now be written as: 
£ A + , = t [ak(PFkt - EtCVkt+x) + VkEtCVkt+l . 
- akTCk + akEtBasisk 
5 For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and the discussion on the 
use of the EV model and the general expected utility model, the reader is referred 
to Bigelow (1993), Meyer and Rasche (1992), Robison and Hanson (1997) and 
Tewetal. (1991). 
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where EtFLl+i is the expectation formed at time t of the processing 
margin at time t + 1, EtCVKt+l is the expectation formed at time / 
of the cash price of commodity k at time t + 1 (a positive sign 
denotes an output price and a negative sign denotes an input price); 
ak is the amount of commodity k corresponding to futures 
contracts where k = 1 is the main product; k = 2 is the 
by-product and k = 3 is the input (k = 1, k = 2 corresponds to 
a short position and k = 3 corresponds to a long position, and the 
optimal hedging amount is denoted by a°k), PFk, is the futures 
price at which the contract is opened (a positive sign denotes an 
output price and a negative sign denotes an input price); $ k is the 
amount of cash market position of commodity k, TCk is the 
transaction costs per futures contract k (transaction costs include 
brokerage costs and interest costs of margin requirements) and 
EtBasiskt+1 is the expectation formed at time t of the basis of 
commodity k at time t + 1. 
For reasons of convenience, in the rest of this chapter 
E1CVKt+l and EtBasiskl+1 are denoted as CVKt+l and Basisk 
respectively. 
In the case of a full hedge, the cash position equals the 
futures position (ak = PA). If the futures position is larger than 
the cash position (ak > $k), then there is speculation. Finally, if 
the futures position is smaller than the cash position (ak < p\) 
then there is a partial hedge of the cash position. 
Let <y2CVk and cs2BasiSt be the variance of the cash price of 
commodity k and the variance of the basis of commodity k 
respectively. Also let R be the term which combines the 
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covariances. The variance of the processing margin is now given 
by: 
vardT) = J [(P, - ak)2a2cvk + c x ^ L j + R (3) 
k=l 
where CVkt+] has a constant variance conditional on the 
information available at time t given by: 
a2CVk = E(CVkl+} - E,(CVkt+l))2 and a2^ has a constant 
variance conditional on the information available at time t given by: 
G2BasiSk= E(Basiskt+l- Et(Basiskt+l))2. See the Appendix for 
more details on the variance and on the content of R. 
The optimal hedging amounts of the main product (oc°), 
by-product (a"2) and input (a , ) are derived by taking the first 
derivatives from TIce with respect to ak. Hence, the optimal 
hedging amounts can be expressed as: 
(CV1,+1 - PF\ + TC\ - Basis,) 
2Xa cv\ 
( P , C T 1 2 + a°2R\ + p2i?2 + p3i?3 + a°3R4) 
(4) 
) 
'cv\ 
a' = OP (Q ( C V 2 ' ^ ~ PF2< + T C 2 " B a s i S 2 ) 
ZA.aCK2 
_ (P 2g 3 4 + qffi + p,i?5 + p3i?6 + a°i?7) 
°CV2 
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a , = 
(CT3,+, - PF3, + TC3 - BasisJ 
_ (ß 3 g 5 6 + a°i?4 + ß2i?8 + ptJg9 + a°i?7) 
(6) 
CK3 
where i?l... R9 are the covariances between the futures price, cash 
price and basis of the corresponding commodities (see the 
Appendix Equation Al); a 1 2 is the covariance between the cash 
price of the main product and the basis of the main product; a 3 4 is 
the covariance between the cash price of the by-product and the 
basis of the by-product; CT56 is the covariance between the cash 
price of the input and the basis of the input and OPat is a multiplier 
which can be expressed as: 
— ; — ; r r = ( 7 ) 
CVk 
where p ( f l C t ) *s m e correlation between the basis and the futures 
price. 
OPak can be interpreted as a proxy for hedging 
effectiveness (Pennings and Meulenberg 1997a). If there is no basis 
risk, OPat will be 1 (in this case a2BaslSi = p ( S i Q ) = 0) and will 
indicate that the futures contract performance is perfect with respect 
to basis risk. If the basis risk tends to infinity the value of OPat 
tends to be zero (in this case < 5 2 B a s i S k -> co and p ( B 4 c 4 ) = 0) 
indicating that the risk reduction performance is minimal. 
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It is possible to express each of the a°k separately in terms 
of the exogenous variables and parameters (the system of 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) has an unique solution), but these 
expressions are so complex that they are worked out later, where 
some simplifications are made because of the specific 
characteristics of rights. 
From Equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) it can be inferred that if 
prices in the three markets are not related i.e. Rl... R9 are zero 
and if the variances of the cash price of the three products tend to 
infinity, the optimal hedging amounts will converge to the 
corresponding cash positions (i.e ak = p\). Under this condition, 
the farmer will make a complete commodity product spread hedge. 
Also it can be inferred from (4), (5) and (6) that if risk 
aversion X increases, the hedging amount of the output and 
by-product will also increase, provided that 
(CVkl+l - PFkt + TCk - Basisk) for k = 1, 2 is positive. This 
condition will normally be met, because risk-averse farmers will 
exchange a certain revenue in the futures market for the uncertain 
cash price only if the expected spot price includes a risk premium. 
Note that risk aversion does not imply that individuals are 
unwilling to take risks but that individuals must be compensated for 
taking risks in the form of a premium over and above the return on 
a cast-iron investment. 
If risk aversion increases, the hedging amount of the input 
will also increase if (-CV3t+l + PF3, + TC3 - Basis3) is 
positive, as is normally the case. Risk-averse farmers will wholly or 
partially exchange a certain input cost (PF3, + TC3 - Basis3) for 
the uncertain input cost of the input, i.e. excluding input price risk, 
even though the input cost exceeds the expected input cost. It is 
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important to note that the expected spot price of the input CV3t+l 
and the futures price of the input PF3l are considered to be costs in 
the objective function (2). Normally the markets we consider are 
related and the hedging amount is therefore affected by the 
covariance terms which represent the interaction of the futures. 
a 0 
The optimal hedging ratio HRk = — is an increasing 
Pi 
function of the cash position under the condition that the farmer is 
risk-averse, i.e. X > 0, and that there is no interaction between the 
futures in the spread, i.e. Rl... R9 in Equations (4), (5) and (6) are 
zero. This property of the hedging ratio can easily be interpreted: if 
the cash position increases, the farmer's degree of risk will increase 
and in order to restore the optimal balance between risk and return 
the hedger must increase his or her hedging ratio. If, however, the 
futures in the spread are related, i.e. Rl... R9 are not zero, then 
this property of the hedging ratio does not necessarily hold, since 
a°2 and a°3 will influence the optimal hedging ratio too. We will 
elaborate on this situation below in the case of rights. 
13.4 Extension to Environmental Rights and Production 
Rights 
The primary function of rights is to offer incentives for 
internalization of externalities, the environmental costs in the case 
of environmental rights and the financial burden to the tax payer in 
cases of agricultural price support (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967; 
Parisi 1995). 
Let us assume that the input in the commodity product 
spread is a production right, a permit from the government or 
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public authority to perform actions which are prohibited by law 
unless approved by government or public authority. 
We assume that the production right permits the production 
of a certain amount of the main product in a certain period. The 
cost of the right is the rental price of the right during a specific 
period and we assume that the right can be sold or leased. This 
situation corresponds with the current practice in European 
countries and Canada of leasing and buying milk quota in order to 
produce milk. 
Unlike traditional commodity futures contracts, rights 
futures contracts have no residual risk at maturity. For a more 
detailed description the reader is referred to Chapter 11. 
The absence of basis risk with rights futures has an impact 
on the hedging amount of rights and also on the hedging amount of 
the other commodities in the spread. The optimal hedging amount 
of rights increases, compared to the optimal hedging amount of an 
input that is not a right. In the case of traditional commodities the 
multiplier OPai is smaller than 1 because, as shown by Castelino 
(1992), the correlation between the basis and the futures price i.e. 
P(Bt,ck) 1S u s u aUy negative and as a result the multiplier has a 
decreasing influence on the optimal hedging amount. However, in 
the case of rights, the multiplier in (6) is 1 because there is no basis 
and hence has no decreasing influence upon the optimal hedging 
amount. This means that the farmer will hedge more input if the 
input considered is a right than when the input is not a right. This is 
caused by the special features of rights discussed in Chapters 10 
and 11 and the conclusion will also hold in the case of a commodity 
spread. 
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13.5 Dairy Complex Spreading: the Case of Milk Quota in 
Canada and the European Union 
In Canada and the European Union, milk production has 
expanded enormously, amongst others because of agricultural 
policies supporting product prices. Consequently there has been an 
overproduction of milk. The costs as a result of these price support 
policies became too high and made it necessary for national and 
supra-national governments to introduce a milk quota policy.6 The 
trade in milk quota is large in Canada and in the member states of 
the EU. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the total 
quantities of milk quota transferred have grown continuously. In 
1993/94 some 1.7 billion liters were traded (both lease and sales) in 
both countries. In the same period 1.6 million kilogram butterfat 
(unused market sharing quota sales) were traded in Canada on the 
Ontario exchange. 
The prices on the Ontario exchange are very volatile. The 
coefficient of variation, based on month-end data for the period 
1987/88-1993/94 was 0.27 for unused market sharing quota sales. 
This is almost equivalent to the potato market in the Netherlands 
(coefficient of variation of 0.28 for the same period) in which there 
is a long tradition of successful futures trading by farmers. 
Therefore, milk quota futures might be useful from a "risk 
perspective". Also, Gunjal and Legault (1995) found that the 
majority of dairy farmers in Quebec are risk averse. A dairy farmer 
could manage his or her processing margin risk by trading on three 
futures markets: selling milk futures (main product), selling 
livestock futures (by-product) and buying milk quota futures 
Various details of Canada's dairy policy and EU's dairy policy can be found in 
Ewasechko and Horbulyk (1995), Burell (1989) and Oskam (1989). 
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(input), if such futures markets did exist.7 Suppose that cash market 
prices of milk and livestock are not correlated, that the prices of 
milk quota and milk are very strongly positively correlated and that 
the price of milk quota is not correlated with the price of livestock, 
then in model p ( c n > C K 2 ) = 0 , p ( c n c n ) * 1 and p { C V 2 , C v 2 ) = ° » 
where p is the correlation coefficient. 
To some extent this case describes the current situation in 
Canada and the European Union. In these countries the cash market 
for livestock is weakly related to the cash markets for milk and 
milk quota. The cash price of milk quota is determined to a large 
extent by the price of milk. This relationship is positive: if the milk 
price increases the farmer is willing to pay more for the milk quota 
if there is a shortage of milk quota (from the farmer's point of 
view). The latter is actually the case in Canada and the EU. For 
reasons of convenience we assume that the milk and milk quota 
prices are exactly correlated. 
The covariance terms in our model will be affected by these 
assumptions. Many covariances will be zero because the livestock 
market is not related to the other two markets and because of the 
characteristics of rights as outlined earlier in Chapters 10 and 11. 
The optimal hedging amounts can now be expressed as: 
7 In October 1995, the US commodity futures trading commission approved 
Grade A milk futures for both New York's Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 
(CSCE) and the Chicago Mercantile exchange (CME). The CSCE began trading 
its contract on December 12th, 1995, the CME on January 11th, 1996. In 
combination with the CSCE Cheddar cheese and non-fat dairy milk contracts that 
have been traded since June 1993, the milk contracts offer comprehensive trading 
opportunities in the dairy complex. The Amsterdam Agricultural Futures 
Exchange is currently investigating the possibility of a milk quota futures 
contract in the Netherlands. 
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(Cn , + , - PF\t + TCI - Basis,) a° = OPa (p, 1 a i K l 2Xa2 
(8) 
(p>i 2 + Pa*3 + a3QcT15), 
2 ' 
'cn,. 
a , = OPa2(P2 -
(CT2 t + 1 - PF2, + TC2 - Basis2) 
2X<J: CV2,. 
( P i * * ) , 
(9) 
'CK2 ) + , 
a . = (P3 " 
(~CV3(+l + PF3t + TC3) 
2Xa cvx. 
_ ("fas ~ Pipis)-) 
(10) 
'CV3,. 
where a 1 5 is the covariance between the cash price of the main 
product and the cash price of milk quota. 
From Equation (8), (9) and (10) we see that a°3, the optimal 
hedging amount of milk quota, is related to a ° , the optimal 
hedging amount of milk. This is not surprising because we assumed 
that in the cash market these commodities are related. The optimal 
hedging amount of livestock is not related to the optimal hedging 
amount of milk quota and milk. Also it can be inferred from (8), (9) 
and (10) that if the variance of the cash market prices of the 
commodities (including rights) in the spread reaches irifinity, all 
optimal hedging amounts, a °k, can be determined separately and 
ak = PA. In practice the cash market prices in agricultural markets 
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have a finite variance, amongst others because of policy 
instruments and market structure. 
On the basis of (8), (9) and (10) some conclusions can be 
drawn about the influence of crucial variables for the hedging 
amount of milk quota: the milk quota cash position P 3, the cash 
position of milk p, and the farmer's risk aversion X. 
In order to measure these influences on a 3 , the optimal 
hedging amount is expressed in the exogenous variables, by 
substituting (8) into (10) 
a°3 = n p 3 - H - (OP^ - K - Q) - ft)) (11) 
where T, H, K and Q are combinations of characteristics of the 
respective cash and futures markets as specified in (8) and (10) (see 
Appendix for the content). 
The influence of the milk quota cash position P3 on oc3, the 
optimal hedging amount of milk quota, can be derived from 
Equation (11) by taking the first derivative of a 3 to p 3 . 
(12) 
CV3,. 'CV\._ 
On the basis of (12) it can be concluded that the milk quota 
cash position P3 has a positive influence on the optimal hedging 
döL° 1 amount of milk quota i .e .—- > 0 if OPa < -y - and 
OP? ' 
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CT25 > — — + cr15 where a25 is the covariance 
0 P a ° l 5 
between the basis of the milk and the cash price of the milk quota, 
which, in general, will be close to zero. In other words, if the 
hedging effectiveness of milk is low and the cash price variances of 
the milk quota and the milk are high then the cash position of milk 
quota will have a positive influence on the optimal hedging amount 
of milk quota. 
The influence of the cash position of milk ß, on a\, the 
optimal hedging amount of milk quota, has been derived from (11): 
dal 
r[- er 15 
CT 
( i - OP. + 
CK3 (J o-
(13) 
cv\u 
It appears from (13) that the hedging effectiveness of the 
milk, expressed in OPai, is an important factor for the influence of 
Pl5 the cash position of the milk, on a°3, the optimal hedging 
amount of milk quota. If OPai is relatively small (not negative) 
compared to the variances, then the cash position of the milk has a 
positive influence on the optimal hedging amount of milk quota i.e. 
da0, 
~ - > 0. It follows that if the milk hedge becomes less effective ap, 
and hence OPa^ becomes smaller, then the hedger will increase 
his/her hedging amount of milk quota. 
Equation (14) shows the influence of risk aversion X on the 
optimal hedging amount of rights. 
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^ = T(P3H - (OPaK)) (14) 
From Equation (14) it appears mat risk aversion has a 
positive influence on the optimal hedging amount of milk quota 
under the condition that H > Ka 1 5OP a iCT^ 3 i + [. Note that H and K 
will normally be positive (see Robison and Barry 1987). This 
condition is sooner met when the hedging effectiveness and the 
variance of milk prices are low. 
Because we assumed that the prices of milk quota and milk 
are exactly correlated, the hedger has the possibility of using only 
one futures contract to hedge for both commodities. This so-called 
cross hedge is effective if the co-movement of cash and futures of 
the related commodities is reliable and consistent. The hedger will 
then use the futures contract that has relatively low liquidity cost 
and low residual cost, in our case, the rights futures contracts 
(Anderson and Danthine 1981; Black 1986; Ames et al. 1992). 
These characteristics of rights futures, high hedging effectiveness 
and the cross hedge possibilities, imply that rights futures are a very 
suitable tool for implementing production policy efficiently, both 
from the policy perspective and from the business economics 
perspective. 
13.6 Summary 
In this chapter we analyzed how futures contracts are related in 
a commodity product spread. We examined the relationships between 
the cash position, the cash price variance and the risk aversion in a 
commodity product spread and their influence on the optimal hedging 
amounts. Because farmers are increasingly affected by environmental 
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rights and production rights, we extended the commodity product 
spread model to tradable rights. It was concluded that because of the 
nature of rights, the farmer will hedge more if a commodity is a right 
than if it is not a right. In our case we analyzed how the hedger will use 
different hedging strategies to manage his or her processing margin 
risk. We illustrated the usefulness of milk quota futures for the dairy 
complex and draw conclusions about the influence of the milk quota 
cash position, the cash position of milk and the farmer's risk attitude 
on the optimal hedging amount of milk quota futures in a dairy 
complex spread. If the co-movement of cash and futures prices of 
related commodities is reliable and consistent, the hedger will prefer a 
cross hedge by a futures contract with lower residual risk, in our case 
the rights futures contract. However, no such futures market is yet 
available. Further research on the viability of futures markets for rights 
is in progress. 
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Appendix 
The variance of the expected processing margin is given by: 
R = +2Q3, - a!)a,o 1 2 + 2(P, - a,)(P 2 - a 2 )a 1 3 
+2(P, - a , )a 2 a M + 2(P, - a,){% - a 3 )a 1 5 
+2(P, - a i ) a 3 a 1 6 + 2a, (P2 - a 2 ) a 2 3 
+ 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 4 + 2aj(P3 - a 3 )a 2 5 + 2 a ] a 3 a 2 6 
+2(P2 - a 2 ) a 2 a 3 4 + 2(P2 - a 2)(p 3 - a 4 )a 3 5 
+2(p 2 - a 2 ) a 3 a 3 6 + 2a 2 (p 3 - a 3 )a 4 5 
+ 2 a 2 a 2 c 4 6 + 2(p3 - a 3 ) a 3 a 5 6 
where cr^ represents the covariance between the variables x and y 
with x = 1... 6 and y = 1... 6, where 1 denotes the cash price of 
the main product, 2 the basis of the main product, 3 the cash price 
of the by-product, 4 the basis of the by-product, 5 the cash price of 
the input (i.e. rights) and 6 the basis of the input. 
var(Ti) = (p, - c c , ) 2 ^ , + a f a 2 ^ 
+ (P 2 - a 2 ) 2 a 2 K 2 + a\a2BasiS2 
+ (P3 - a 3 ) 2 a 2 K 3 + afcLi,, + R 
(A.1) 
where 
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Explanation of the terms 
Rl •• CT13 + ü 2 4 ~ »14 " - ü 2 3 ; 
R2 = ü 2 3 -
R3 = rj 2 5 - c 1 5 ; 
RA = CT15 + ü 2 6 " " ^ 2 5 - ou; 
R5 = °\A ~ a\l> 
R6 °"45 _ <*3s'> 
Rl = ü 3 5 + <*46 " " <*36 
R8 = CT36 - CT35; 
R9 = 
Kl a , s - o-25; 
K2 : CT35 ~ CT45; 
K3 = 
1 
H = 
(-CV3t+x + PF3t + TC3) 
2Xa2cy3 
K = 
(CH, + 1 - + TCI + Basis,) 
2Xa CVh 
Q = (ß,o 1 2 + ß3*3) 
' e n , . 
CHAPTER 14 
Towards A Marketing-Finance 
Approach: Final Remarks and 
Illustration 1 
14.1 Abstract 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that a synthesis between the 
finance and the marketing approach is useful for analyzing the possible 
success or failure of hedging services. It has also been shown that much 
research is yet to be done in the domain of both approaches separately. In 
this final chapter we discuss the additional value of the marketing-finance 
approach, using the results presented in the previous chapters. The 
usefulness of the marketing-finance approach is illustrated by an empirical 
study of the market potential of a new to the world futures contract which 
is yet to be introduced. 
14.2 Marketing-Finance Approach 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that in studying the market 
potential of a hedging service provided by a futures market the 
integration of the marketing approach and the finance approach into a 
marketing-finance approach offers the best results. In order to profit 
optimally from such an integration, each separate approach will have 
to be elaborated further along the lines of research topics, as has been 
1 This chapter is an extended version of Pennings, J.M.E., M.G.M. Wetzels and 
M.T.G. Meulenberg (1997), "Synthesis of the Financial Approach and the 
Marketing Approach towards Financial Services: A Conceptual Model for the 
Futures Contracts Innovations" Working Paper, Wageningen Agricultural 
University, Department of Marketing and Marketing Research. 
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done in the previous chapters. Thus, the finance approach needs a 
shift of perspective from portfolios to futures exchange management, 
so that the measures developed within this approach will also provide 
the exchange management with valuable information on how to 
create successful markets. The elaboration of the marketing approach 
should focus in particular on a better understanding of the decision 
making process of entrepreneurs regarding the use of price risk 
management iristruments. Especially a better understanding of the 
question "why do entrepreneurs decide the way they do" generates 
important information for the marketer. The different components 
that play a part in an entrepreneur's decision-making, e.g. risk 
attitude, deserve more attention, not only in making these constructs 
operational, but also in measuring their influence on actual behavior. 
Integrating both approaches into a marketmg-finance 
approach broadens our knowledge of the existing markets (why are 
some of them successful while others are not?), and for that reason is 
helpful in improving the development of hedging services. It reveals 
problems and opportunities alike. Examples from our research results 
can illustrate our point. Our research on hogs futures shows that 
1) performance and entrepreneurial freedom come to the fore as very 
important components in the decision making of farmers regarding 
the use of hog futures. This is relevant information since it indicates 
that research has to be done on hedging effectiveness and 
compatibility with other price risk management instruments. 
2) the farmers' survey demonstrates that standardization of date of 
delivery was perceived as problematic. This information indicates the 
need for research on the flexibility in the standardization for date of 
delivery, thus improving the performance - and implicitly the appeal -
of the hog futures contract. 
Our research into rights futures, a new to the world futures 
contract, in Part HI shows that, 1) from a finance perspective, these 
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futures contracts have some very convenient features which make 
them efficient instruments for hedging price risk, 2) from a marketing 
perspective, it is found that potential users perceive futures markets 
as complex. As a result, futures contracts are not always considered 
an alternative price risk management instrument. For the futures 
exchange management this means that, in order to secure a successful 
introduction of futures, they will in particular have to pay attention to 
the information which they disseminate among potential hedgers 
about the functioning of futures contracts. 
The foregoing examples illustrate the merits of the marketing-
finance approach. It appears that the results from the separate 
approaches are complementary in an analysis of the market potential 
of a futures contract. Clearly, both approaches can be used separately 
in order to analyze specific aspects of existing futures markets. 
We will now illustrate the marketing-finance approach for a 
new to the world hedging service by analyzing the market potential 
of a whey powder futures contract, which does not exist yet. 
Recently, both the European Whey Products Association and the 
Amsterdam Exchanges came up with the idea of creating a whey 
powder futures contract. Since the data for this study were limited, 
the marketing-finance approach to a new whey powder futures 
contract cannot be elaborated in detail. 
14.3 The Market Potential of a Whey Powder Futures 
Contract: an Illustration of the Marketing-Finance 
Approach to New Hedging services 
Whey is a liquid product released in the manufacture of 
cheese and casein after the curd has been separated. It emerges from 
acids, rennet and/or physico-chemical processes. The sharp price 
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fluctuations of whey powder harm both processors and end-users of 
whey powder. Both market parties have a considerable interest in 
reducing price risk. For this reason it is useful to investigate the idea 
of launching a whey powder futures contract. 
14.3.1 Research Design 
In order to investigate the necessary technical criteria for a 
whey powder futures contract, we gathered data on prices, trade 
volume and product specifications of whey powder in Europe. The 
data covered the period from January 1989 up to and including 
June 1996. Also, a questionnaire was mailed to the directors of 
sixteen whey powder producing enterprises in seven European 
countries. The companies were contacted by the EWPA (European 
Whey Products Association) before the mail questionnaire was sent, 
to encourage participation and to ensure that the questionnaire be sent 
to the correct individual. In order to understand the decision process 
of CEO's in the whey powder market and to make sure that the 
questionnaire would be interpreted correctly, the relevant literature 
was consulted and in-depth interviews were carried out with three 
senior executives. All respondents were senior managers involved in 
the marketing of whey powder. Eleven questionnaires were returned, 
i.e. a response rate of 69%. Note that the EWPA covers all 
companies involved in European whey powder production. Although 
our sample of eleven executives is small in absolute terms, it 
nevertheless covers 75% of the total European whey powder sector in 
terms of volume. Moreover, our respondents were key-subjects and 
well-informed. 
From in-depth interviews with senior managers, it appeared 
that cash forward contracts (legal agreements between sellers and 
buyers in which the price is fixed for delivery in the future) and 
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inventory control (which determines the price level in the total cash 
market between an upper and lower level predetermined by an 
inventory authority) are perceived as alternative instruments for 
futures. For that reason our survey includes questions about cash 
forward contracts and inventory control. We take into account the 
influence of competition between these alternatives, along the lines 
suggested by Laroche and Sadokierski (1994). Beliefs about the three 
alternative price risk management instruments were measured by 
using statements describing the characteristics of these alternatives. 
Respondents indicated on a scale ranging from 1 ("I strongly 
disagree") to 7 ("I strongly agree") the extent to which they agreed 
with the statements. Also, the respondents were asked to indicate on 
a scale from 1 ("I would definitely not intend to select") to 7 
("I would definitely intend to select") their intention to select one of 
the alternatives. The probability of actually using the price risk 
management instruments is measured relatively by asking the 
respondents to distribute 100 points among the alternatives to 
indicate the probability of using one of the three instruments (van den 
Putte et al., 1996)2. Furthermore, we measured some relevant aspects 
of futures contracts which were strongly related to instrumental needs 
and convenience needs. The aspects included in the survey were 
generated by the in-depth interviews conducted with a number of 
senior managers. The respondents were asked to indicate the 
importance of each aspect on a scale ranging from 0 ("No 
importance") to 10 ("Overwhelming importance"). 
2 Note that not using any price risk management instrument is not an alternative 
for whey powder producers. The heavy price fluctuations and relatively low 
profit margins make risk management necessary from a producer's point of view. 
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14.3.2 Analysis and Results 
Finance approach 
Criterion 1: price volatility. In order to conclude whether the 
volatility of whey powder prices justifies the introduction of a whey 
powder futures contract, the coefficient of variation of European 
whey powder prices is compared with that of soybeans in the United 
States, the latter commodity having a long tradition of successful 
futures trading. The coefficient of variation of whey powder, 0.23 
(based on 78 monthly observations covering the period January 
1989-June 1996) is relatively high compared with the coefficient of 
soybeans, 0.07 (based on 78 monthly observation covering the same 
period as for whey powder). Thus, from the price volatility point of 
view, a market for whey powder futures looks promising. Criterion 2: 
size of cash market. The underlying value of the cash market is about 
1 billion US dollars; the underlying value of the cash market for 
potatoes (successfully traded at the Amsterdam Exchanges), by 
comparison, is worth 300 million US dollars. Criterion 3: 
standardization possibilities. Whey powder can easily be 
standardized (whey powder is a rather homogeneous product). 
Criterion 4: number of participants. The number of potential 
participants, on both supply and demand side, is rather small, which 
could lead to problems of squeezing the market (market 
manipulation). Hence, there could be high market-depth risk and, as a 
result, low hedging effectiveness. For this reason it is very important 
to attract speculators to the market. 
Marketing approach 
In order to gain insight into the opinions of senior managers about the 
whey powder market, the respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with a series of statements on the whey 
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powder market, ranging from 1 ("I strongly disagree") to 7 ("I 
strongly agree"), Table 1 summarizes the opinions. 
Table 1 Statements on the whey powder market (1 = I strongly disagree; 
7 = 1 strongly agree) 
Statement Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range 
I am able to predict the price of whey 
powder three months from now 
2.55 1.57 4 
I am able to predict the price of whey 
powder six month from now 
1.82 1.17 3 
I am able to predict the price of whey 
powder nine month from now 
1.82 1.40 4 
I am able to predict the price of whey 
powder twelve month from now 
1.82 1.47 4 
The cash traders in the whey powder market 
ensure a clear price discovery 
2.89 1.90 5 
In the past, I used price risk management 
instruments in order to eliminate price risk 
2.91 2.02 6 
The price fluctuations in the whey powder 
market are large 
6.55 0.93 3 
I perceive price fluctuations in the whey 
powder market as a risk 
5.36 1.50 5 
1 want to eliminate price risk, irrespective of 
the price level 
5.27 1.68 5 
I want the whey powder market to be 
stabilized around predetermined price levels 
5.55 1.57 5 
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From Table 1 it appears that CEO's do not consider 
themselves capable of predicting the prices of whey powder and that 
this unpredictability is seen as a risk. The CEO's wish to eliminate 
this risk by stabilizing the total cash market. This can only be done 
through inventory control by the industry. Thus, we may expect 
CEO's to favor inventory control over cash forwards and futures. 
In order to gain insight in both instrumental and convenience 
needs, the CEO's were asked to indicate the importance of some 
aspects of futures trading (cf. Chapter 2 for a detailed description of 
the instrumental and convenience needs). The following aspects were 
considered to be important: reducing price variability (Mean 
Important Score (MIS) 8.2, Standard Deviation (SD) 1.2), reliable 
clearing system (MS 8.2 and SD 2.3), availability of price 
information (MIS 7.7 and SD 1.9), competent brokers (MIS 7.5 and 
SD 2.9) and easy access to the trading floor (MIS 7.0 and SD 1.9). 
The first aspect represents instrumental needs, whereas the other 
aspects represent convenience needs. There is a clear hierarchy in 
convenience needs. A reliable clearing system is perceived as the 
most important aspect of futures tjading, which can be explained by 
the fact that the clearing system directly affects the financial position 
of the participants. This is followed by availability of information, 
competent brokers and easy access to the trading floor. 
The likelihood of using one of the alternative ways of 
managing price risk was measured directly. The respondents were 
asked to distribute 100 points to indicate the probability of using one 
of the alternatives. Table 2 summarizes these results. 
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Table 2 Probability of using one of the alternatives by distributing 100 points 
Price risk management instrument Mean Standard deviation 
Futures contracts 35.5 24.55 
Inventory control 44.5 27.44 
Cash forwards contracts 20.0 18.03 
We found a significant preference for inventory control as opposed to 
cash forwards and futures contracts (F statistic = 2.45, p < 0.1). 
Inspection of the frequency distributions of the constant sum 
scale, which represents the probability of using the alternative price 
risk management instruments, revealed two typical response profiles. 
With cluster analysis using squared Euclidian distances and Ward's 
method (error sum of squares method (Punj and Stewart, 1983)) two 
distinct clusters were identified. Cluster 1 consists of five 
respondents who favor the use of futures (Response profile: 
Futures 48; Inventory Control 24; Cash Forwards 28). Cluster 2 
consists of four respondents who favor inventory control (Response 
profile: Futures 20; Inventory Control 70; Cash Forwards 10). In 
order to explore the differences between these two clusters, we used 
the Mann-Whitney U-test to analyze the beliefs of the respondents 
regarding the three alternative instruments. We found that the two 
clusters differed as far as their knowledge/understanding of futures 
trading was concerned ("I understand how futures trading works", 
z = -1.88 [p = 0.06]; "The futures market provides a useful way of 
stabilizing returns", z = -2.28 [p = 0.02]). Moreover, Cluster 1 
consisted of whey powder producers who trade their whey powder 
themselves, whereas Cluster 2 consisted of whey powder producers 
who do not trade whey powder themselves but sell it directly to a 
cash market trader. The latter group mainly consists of bulk 
producers without any interest in the marketing of whey powder. 
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We did not find a significant higher intention to use futures 
among senior managers who already had experience with price risk 
management instruments, nor did we find a significant higher 
intention to use futures among senior managers that were familiar 
with futures trading. We did find significant relationships between 
the relative intention to select futures and the following beliefs: the 
price fluctuations in the whey powder market are large (p = 0,69, 
p < 0.05), the futures market provides a useful way of stabilizing 
returns (p = 0,69, p < 0.05), the futures market is a useful aid in 
forward planning (p = 0,78, p < 0.05). 
14.3.4 Relevance of the Marketing-Finance Approach to Whey 
Powder Futures Contracts. 
The marketing-finance approach suggests that the 
opportunities for trade in whey powder futures are limited. From a 
technical point of view there might be problems of liquidity and 
hence hedging effectiveness. With respect to the cash market size and 
the homogeneity of the underlying product, futures trade would not 
be hindered. So, from a technical point of view, whey powder futures 
trade looks promising only when a sufficient number of speculators 
are in the market to offset the lack of liquidity which is to be 
expected when only hedgers enter the market (see Figure 1 and 
Figure 3 of Chapter 2). From a customer point of view we see that 
the majority of the whey powder producers favor price stabilization 
by inventory control (see Figure 1). Figure 1 uses a plus or a minus 
sign respectively to indicate which aspects of the marketing-finance 
approach have a positive or negative effect on the viability of a whey 
powder futures market. 
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Figure 1 The marketing-finance approach applied to whey powder futures 
contracts 
From the survey it appeared that the customer's 
understanding of the futures trade is an important determinant of the 
customer's engagement in the futures trade. Information 
dissemination of the pros and cons of futures trading may lead to a 
better understanding, thus reducing the psychological distance to a 
complex service such as the one provided by futures exchanges. 
Note that inventory control, the alternative favored by the 
majority of the respondents, is difficult to establish, because it 
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requires a central authority and strict discipline from all whey powder 
producers. During the in-depth interviews it appeared that it was hard 
to establish a central authority with the power necessary to take 
actions to restrict the behavior of individual firms. Moreover, 
inventory control might not be allowed by the European Union's 
anti-trust law. Therefore, futures may well be a second-best solution 
for whey powder producers. In this chapter we did not examine the 
needs for price risk reduction of the whey powder consumers, such as 
large food and feed companies, which might have an impact on our 
conclusions on the viability of whey powder futures. 
Within the framework of this study it is interesting that the 
peripheral services such as price information and competent brokers 
are perceived as important by whey powder producers. Therefore, it 
seems valuable that the management of exchanges should pay 
attention to the peripheral services. 
Thus, using the marketing-finance approach, the viability of 
whey powder futures is questionable. Both the finance and 
marketing approach, the latter in particular, show the weak market 
potential of a whey contract. 
The complementarity of the results from the marketing 
survey with customers and the financial evaluation of a possible 
contract in the whey powder example demonstrates the value of the 
marketing-finance approach. Is this complementarity the optimal 
contribution a marketing-finance approach can make to the 
evaluation of success of a futures contract or can we do even 
better? Clearly, it is always useful to analyze more in depth both the 
consumer behavior and the financial features of the futures contract 
in order to improve the marketing-finance approach. But it seems to 
us that also further progress in the marketing-finance approach 
could be made by truly integrating both approaches. One might use 
the results from the first consumer analysis to improve the 
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specification of one or more new futures contracts and afterwards 
test them in consumer research. In reverse one might use the results 
of the financial analysis to find out more specifically which 
consumer characteristics are relevant for consumer decision making 
and use this information afterwards for fine tuning specification 
and promotion of the futures contract. By such a sequential 
procedure of consumer research profiting from the results of 
financial analysis and vice versa the marketing-finance approach 
might serve futures exchange management best in their concrete 
policy of improving existing contracts respectively of introducing 
new contracts. 
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Summary 
Due to the recent and proposed reductions in price support 
for agricultural products, as a part of the European Union's 
common agricultural policy, an increase in price volatility for 
agricultural raw materials is perceptible. This causes an increase in 
price risk, both for the primary agricultural company and the 
affiliated agribusiness. For a risk-averse entrepreneur, the higher 
price volatility in the market of agricultural raw materials will 
increase his or her need for price risk management instruments, 
such as futures contracts. 
Not only does an increased price volatility further the use of 
existing futures contracts for raw materials, it also leads to the 
introduction of new ones. Moreover, the introduction of production 
and environmental rights forms an additional impulse to the 
development of futures contracts as well. Recent developments in 
computer-guided trading systems will further enhance the 
attractiveness and accessibility of the futures contract as a price risk 
management instrument. In addition, the introduction of a single 
European currency will give an extra impulse to trade in 
(commodity) futures contracts, since it obliterates one of the 
traditional difficulties in futures contract specification, 
standardization after currency and thus makes national futures 
markets more attractive for participants from other European 
countries. The developments mentioned above - increased price 
volatility in the spot market of agricultural raw materials, the 
introduction of negotiable production and environmental rights, the 
rise of computerized trading systems and the introduction of a 
single European currency- all add to the great interest in 
agricultural futures markets which exists among financial 
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institutions. For several European futures markets, among which 
the Amsterdam Exchanges, the London International Financial 
Futures & Options Exchange and the March6 a Terme International 
de France, this has been the cause for the development of new 
agricultural futures contracts. However, futures contracts involve a 
substantial risk of failure. Of the 40 futures contracts launched 
around the world in 1995, only a few were successful in their first 
year. The development and introduction of futures contracts is an 
expensive and time-consuming process, especially when it concerns 
entirely new contracts. For this reason, insight into the market for 
hedging services is desirable. 
In this doctoral thesis we will focus on those aspects of the 
risk reduction services provided by futures exchanges which lie in 
the interdisciplinary field between marketing and finance. The 
services offered by futures contracts will be investigated from two 
approaches: the finance approach and the marketing approach. 
The finance approach to financial services is a normative 
approach: it answers the question 'which necessary conditions will 
have to be met to make a particular financial service successful?' 
Fulfilling these necessary conditions, however, does not guarantee 
the market success of financial services. Their success also depends 
on the extent to which they succeed in meeting the needs of 
(potential) customers at a competitive price. The latter point of 
view stems from the marketing tradition, which holds that customer 
needs occupy a central position in the development of products and 
services. 
The marketing approach conducts qualitative and 
quantitative research into the need for financial services and the 
market potential of a particular financial service. In many cases, 
alternative products or services will be available to satisfy the 
entrepreneur's needs. For this reason, the marketing approach pays 
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a lot of attention to the entrepreneur's decision making process. In 
our particular case the entrepreneur's decision making process 
concerning price risk management instruments. Insight into the way 
in which an entrepreneur reaches a decision and why he or she 
decides the way he or she does, provide the marketer with clues on 
how to market the hedging service. Given the necessary conditions 
imposed by the finance approach, the results from me marketing 
approach may serve to compose the characteristics of a particular 
financial service. 
When creating a particular service, the marketing approach, 
in its preoccupation with customer needs, tends to pay only limited 
attention to issues of technical feasibility, whereas the finance 
approach tends to undervalue customer needs in favor of the 
technical aspects of a particular service. A combination of the 
marketing approach (with its stress on desirability from a customer 
perspective) and the finance approach (with its focus on the 
technical feasibility of a service) seems to offer a solution to this 
problem. Therefore, the development of new futures contracts 
would be served by a combined use of the marketing and the 
finance approach. 
Apart from the integration of both approaches, a further 
deepening of each approach would be beneficial. This thesis 
elaborates on a number of aspects which stem from the finance 
approach, e.g. hedging efficiency and liquidity. The perspective has 
been shifted from portfolio to exchange management. Furthermore, 
the optimal hedge ratio and optimal "commodity product spread" 
have been deducted for rights futures. The marketing approach has 
also been elaborated upon, in that an investigation has taken place 
of the how and why of the choices which entrepreneurs make 
concerning the covering of price risk and, more particularly, 
concerning futures contracts. 
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This study consists of three parts. Parti systematically 
discerns the different sources of risk that emerge from transactions 
on the futures market. This classification has been used to develop 
new measures for a futures market's hedging effectiveness and 
liquidity, which provide both the exchange management and the 
hedger with insight into the risk-reducing capacity of futures 
contracts. Moreover, a conceptual model for over-all risk reduction 
has been developed, on the basis of which a measure for hedging 
effectiveness has been developed. Contrary to the existing 
measures, this one does not focus on portfolio performance, but on 
the hedging function of a futures contract. This measure, as 
opposed to others, takes into account the fact that futures contracts 
on the one hand realize a reduction of price risk in the spot market, 
and on the other hand, introduce a risk of their own, which is 
inherent to the futures trade. Our measure discerns basic risk and 
market-depth risk. Moreover, it takes into account the costs of 
commission. Let this measure be the distance between the hedging 
service offered by the futures exchange and the 'perfect hedge', an 
ideal situation where the hedging service eliminates risk in the spot 
market without introducing an additional risk of its own, then this 
distance can be subdivided into a systematic and a non-systematic 
part. The systematic part, caused by the specifications of the futures 
contract and the structure of the futures exchange, can be managed 
by the futures exchange, whereas the non-systematic part is beyond 
the exchange's influence. The measure for hedging effectiveness 
provides the hedger with a means to compare the competitiveness 
of different futures contracts. It incorporates not only the 
characteristics of the futures contract, but also the spot market risks. 
The measure's futures market risk component indicates the hedging 
quality of the futures contract. The spot market price risk 
component emphasizes the need for price risk reduction. The 
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empirical results, based on data from the Amsterdam Exchanges 
(Agricultural Futures Markets), show the measure's usefulness for 
an exchange management. 
As an important determinant of the hedging effectiveness of 
futures contracts, liquidity, or, more accurately put, market depth 
has been studied more closely. Contrary to earlier investigations 
into market depth, we show that the price path is non-linear due to 
market order imbalances. The market depth measure developed 
consists of two dimensions, which can be related logically to the 
futures market's toolbox. Our findings indicate that market depth is 
preferably to be valued along the two dimensions that constitute its 
basis. 
Not just motives of a financial-economic nature play a part 
in the entrepreneur's decision to trade on the futures market. 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to study the decision 
making behavior of entrepreneurs concerning price risk 
management instruments. To this study, Part II of this book has 
been devoted. In this part, a decision making model has been 
developed which tells us how entrepreneurs decide and why they 
decide the way they do, concerning price risk management 
instruments. In this context, risk attitude is an important concept. 
Methodological research was conducted into the way in which risk 
attitude is measured within economics (the "expected utility 
framework") and within marketing-psychometrics (risk attitude 
scales). During large-scale experiments, the risk attitude measures 
developed were tested for construct validity by checking for 
convergent validity and nomological validity. The different risk 
attitude measures correlate significantly, indicating convergent 
validity. Moreover, the value function (obtained using the rating 
technique) does not correlate with the risk attitude measures, 
indicating discriminant validity. The psychometric risk attitude 
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scale performs well on the self-report measures, contrary to the 
measure obtained from the lottery technique and the intrinsic risk 
attitude obtained through relating the utility function (itself 
obtained using the lottery technique) and the value function. 
However, the risk attitude measure and the intrinsic risk attitude 
greatly outperform the psychometric scale where the relation with 
actual behavior is concerned. 
After having gained more insight into the risk attitude 
construct, the decision making behavior of entrepreneurs was 
modeled. Important elements affecting his or her decision making 
behavior were: the extent to which the entrepreneur feels that the 
use of futures will enhance his or her entrepreneurial freedom (as 
compared to other price risk management instruments), his or her 
understanding of the functioning of futures contracts (compared to 
his or her understanding of other relevant price risk management 
instruments) and the performance of futures contracts in the field of 
price risk reduction (compared to that of other relevant price risk 
management instruments). 
The decision making process of entrepreneurs appears to 
have a two-phase structure. During the first phase, the entrepreneur 
decides whether futures contracts constitute a relevant alternative 
and should thus be in his or her toolbox. In this phase the 
aforementioned elements entrepreneurship, understanding and 
performance are of great importance. 
During the second phase of the decision making process, 
when futures contracts are already a part of the entrepreneurs 
toolbox, the difference between the entrepreneur's psychological 
reference price and the actual futures market price becomes an 
important factor in the decision for or against entering the futures 
market. The components entrepreneurship and performance remain 
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of importance during this phase of the decision process, whereas 
understanding no longer plays a part in the second phase. 
Due to the structure of futures markets, the process of 
disseminating information about innovative futures contracts, 
henceforth the information dissemination process, is of great 
influence on the success of a futures contract. This has been 
investigated for an information dissemination process in which the 
brokers from the exchange spread the information among the 
potential users of a futures contract. 
Part ÏÏI of this study is devoted to an investigation into the 
feasibility of futures contracts on rights. First, an overview and a 
taxonomy are presented of the different environmental and 
production rights in agriculture and outside of it. The prices of 
these rights reflect the production rent. We show that the specific 
characteristics of rights increase hedging effectiveness. From this 
point of view, rights futures seem an interesting instrument for 
eliminating spot market price risk. We further show that the use of 
rights futures may be highly effective in situations of "spreading", 
where production has been restricted by rights. 
By integrating the marketing and finance approach, the 
insight into the market for hedging services is increased. On the one 
hand a marketing-finance approach broadens our knowledge of 
existing markets, on the other hand it improves the development 
process of hedging services. By using both approaches, potential 
problems, as well as opportunities, can be discovered in an early 
stage. Thus, our investigation into rights futures yields that, from a 
finance perspective, these new futures contracts have highly 
convenient features and are therefore efficient instruments to cover 
price risk. The marketing perspective, however, reveals that 
potential users perceive futures markets as very complex and 
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therefore do not perceive futures contracts as alternative price risk 
management instruments. 
The marketmg-finance approach is an integral approach 
which contains all aspects relevant to draw conclusions about the 
viability of a futures market. The marketing-finance approach 
yields insight into the policy measures which a futures market 
might take to create and secure a viable futures market. In this book 
much attention has been paid to subjects pertaining to one of both 
approaches which demanded further deepening in order to reach a 
fruitful integration of both approaches. Further elaboration of this 
marketing-finance approach is of great importance to an efficient 
and effective futures market policy. 
Samenvatting 
Met de recente en verder voorgenomen reductie van de 
prijssteun aan landbouwprodukten, in het kader van het 
gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid van de Europese Unie, is een 
toename in de prijs-volatiliteit van agrarische grondstoffen waar te 
nemen. Hierdoor neemt het prijsrisico toe, zowel voor het primaire 
agrarische bedrijf als de daarmee verbonden agribusiness. Voor een 
ondernemer die risico-mijdend is zal deze grotere prijs-volatiliteit 
in de markten van agrarische grondstoffen de behoefte aan 
prijsrisico management-instrumenten, zoals termijncontracten, 
vergroten. 
Niet alleen bevordert de grotere prijs-volatiliteit het gebruik 
van bestaande agrarische grondstoffentermijncontracten, zij leidt 
ook tot de introductie van nieuwe termijncontracten. Ook de 
introductie van productierechten en milieurechten geeft de 
ontwikkeling van termijncontracten mogelijk een extra impuls. De 
recente ontwikkelingen in computergestuurde handelssystemen 
zullen de aantrekkelijkheid en toegankelijkheid van termijn-
contracten als prijsrisico managementinstrument verder doen 
toenemen. Daarbij zal de introductie van één Europese munt de 
handel in (goederen-)termijncontracten een extra impuls geven, 
aangezien één van de moeilijkheden van de termijncontract-
specificatie, standaardisatie naar muntsoort, komt te vervallen en 
nationale termij nmarkten nu aantrekkelijker worden voor 
deelnemers uit andere Europese landen. 
De bovengenoemde ontwikkelingen - grotere prijs-
volatiliteit in de effectieve markt van agrarische grondstoffen, de 
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introductie van verhandelbare productierechten en milieurechten, 
de opkomst van geautomatiseerde handelssystemen en de komst 
van één Europese munt- dragen bij tot de grote interesse van 
financiële instituten voor agrarische termijnmarkten. Deze 
ontwikkelingen zijn voor verschillende Europese termijnmarkten, 
waaronder de Amsterdam Exchanges, de London International 
Financial Futures & Options Exchange en de Marché á Terme 
International de France, reden geweest om nieuwe agrarische 
termijncontracten te ontwikkelen. Het risico van een mislulddng is 
echter substantieel bij termijncontracten: van de 
40 termijncontracten die in 1995 wereldwijd werden gelanceerd, 
hadden slechts enkele een succesvol eerste jaar. Het ontwikkelen en 
introduceren van terrnijncontracten is een kostbaar en tijdrovend 
proces, vooral wanneer het gaat om volledig nieuwe contracten. 
Inzicht in de markt voor hedging services is derhalve wenselijk. 
In dit proefschrift zullen wij ons richten op aspecten van 
termijnmarkten die liggen op het raakvlak van marketing en finance 
ten aanzien van de risico reductie service ("hedging service"). De 
diensten die termijncontracten aanbieden zullen onder de loep 
genomen worden vanuit twee benaderingen: de finance benadering 
en de marketing benadering. 
De finance benadering van financiële diensten is een 
normatieve: 'aan welke noodzakelijke voorwaarden dient te worden 
voldaan om de financiële dienst tot een succes te maken?' Het 
voldoen aan deze noodzakelijke voorwaarden garandeert echter niet 
het marktsucces van financiële diensten. Het succes van deze 
diensten hangt mede af van de mate waarin zij de behoeften van 
potentiële cliënten bevredigen tegen concurrerende prijzen. Dit 
gezichtspunt komt vanuit de marketingtraditie, die stelt dat 
produkten en diensten dienen te worden ontwikkeld naar de 
behoeften van de klant. 
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De marketing benadering onderzoekt kwalitatief en 
kwantitatief de behoefte aan financiële diensten en het 
marktpotentieel van een bepaalde financiële dienst. Vaak zullen er 
alternatieve producten of diensten zijn die de behoeften van de 
ondernemer bevredigen. Daarom wordt in de marketing veel 
aandacht besteed aan het besluitvormingsproces van de ondernemer, 
in ons geval het besluitvormingsproces van de ondernemer ten 
aanzien van prijsrisico managementinstrumenten. De wijze waarop 
de ondernemer tot een beslissing komt en waarom de ondernemer 
beslist zoals hij beslist geeft de marketeer aangrijpingspunten over de 
wijze waarop hij de hedging service moet vermarkten. Uit de 
resultaten van dit onderzoek kunnen dan de karakteristieken van 
een bepaalde financiële dienst worden samengesteld, gegeven de 
noodzakelijke voorwaarden die uit de finance benadering volgen. 
Vaak levert de marketing benadering het probleem op dat 
het technisch niet haalbaar is om zo'n dienst te ontwikkelen. Een 
combinatie van de marketing benadering ("welke dienst is 
wenselijk vanuit het perspectief van de cliënt?") en de finance 
benadering ("welke dienst is haalbaar vanuit technisch oogpunt?") 
lijkt hiervoor een uitkomst te bieden. Een succesvolle ontwikkeling 
van nieuwe termijncontracten is gebaat bij een gecombineerd 
gebruik van de marketing benadering en finance benadering. 
Naast de integratie van beide benaderingen zijn beide 
benaderingen gebaat bij een verdere verdieping. In dit proefschrift 
zijn enkele aspecten uit de finance benadering -zoals hedging 
efficiency en liquiditeit- verder uitgewerkt. Het perspectief is 
verlegd van portfolio's naar het management van de beurs. Tevens 
is de optimale hedge ratio en de optimale "commodity product 
spread" afgeleid voor rechtentermijncontracten. De marketing 
benadering is in deze studie uitgewerkt op het vlak van het hoe en 
waarom van de keuzen die ondernemers ten aanzien van prijsrisico-
366 Samenvatting 
afdekking, in het bijzonder ten aanzien van termijncontracten 
maken. 
Deze studie bestaat uit drie delen. In Deell worden op 
systematische wijze de verschillende risico bronnen onderscheiden 
die voortvloeien uit transacties op de termijnmarkt. Met gebruik 
van deze classificatie zijn nieuwe maatstaven voor de hedging 
effectiviteit en de liquiditeit van een termij nmarkt ontwikkeld, die 
zowel voor de hedger als voor het management van de terrnijnbeurs 
inzichten verschaffen in de risico reducerende capaciteit van 
termijncontracten. Tevens is een conceptueel model voor algehele 
risicoreductie ontwikkeld en op basis van dit model is een maatstaf 
voor hedging efficiëntie ontwikkeld. In tegenstelling tot de 
bestaande maatstaven richt deze maatstaf zich niet op de prestaties 
van een portfolio maar op de hedgefunctie van het termijncontract. 
Deze maatstaf houdt, in tegenstelling tot andere maatstaven, 
rekening met het feit dat termijncontracten enerzijds een reductie 
van prijsrisico in de effectieve markt realiseren, maar anderzijds 
een eigen risico introduceren dat inherent is aan termijnhandel. 
Onderscheiden worden basisrisico en marktdiepte-risico. Daarbij 
houdt de door ons voorgestelde maatstaf rekening met de 
commissiekosten. Beschouwt men deze maatstaf als de afstand 
tussen de hedge-dienst zoals aangeboden door de terrnijnbeurs en 
de 'perfecte hedge', de ideale toestand waarin de hedging service 
het risico in de effectieve markt elimineert zonder zelf risico te 
introduceren, dan kan deze afstand worden onderverdeeld in een 
systematisch deel en een niet-systematisch deel. Het systematisch 
deel, veroorzaakt door de specificaties van het termijncontract en 
de structuur van de terrnijnbeurs, kan door de terrnijnbeurs beheerst 
worden, terwijl het niet-systematisch deel buiten de invloedssfeer 
van de beurs valt. De maatstaf voor hedge-effectiviteit verschaft de 
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hedger een middel om de concurrentiepositie van verschillende 
termijncontracten te vergelijken. Niet alleen de kenmerken van het 
termijncontract maar ook de risico's in de effectieve markt zijn 
geïncorporeerd in de maatstaf. De termijnmarkrisico-component 
van de maatstaf geeft de hedging kwaliteit van het termijncontract 
aan. De effectieve markt prijsrisico-component legt de nadruk op 
de behoefte aan prijsrisico reductie. De empirische resultaten, 
gebaseerd op data van de Amsterdam Exchanges (Agrarische 
Termijnmarkten), tonen het nut van de maatstaf voor het 
management van een termijnbeurs aan. 
Aangezien de liquiditeit een belangrijke determinant is van 
de hedging effectiviteit van termijncontracten, is liquiditeit, of beter 
gezegd marktdiepte, nader bestudeerd. In tegenstelling tot vroegere 
onderzoeken naar marktdiepte hebben wij laten zien dat het 
prijspad, tengevolge van situaties van het niet in balans zijn van 
markt orders, niet lineair is. De ontwikkelde maatstaf van liquiditeit 
bestaat uit twee dimensies, die op een logische manier kunnen 
worden gerelateerd aan het beleidsinstrumentarium van de 
termijnbeurs. Onze bevindingen duiden erop dat marktdiepte bij 
voorkeur moet worden geëvalueerd langs de twee dimensies die aan 
marktdiepte ten grondslag liggen. 
Niet alleen financieel-economische overwegingen spelen 
voor de ondernemer een rol om wel of niet op de termijnmarkt te 
handelen. Daarom is het van uiterst groot belang om het 
beslissingsgedrag van ondernemers ten aanzien van prijsrisico 
managementinstrumenten te bestuderen. Dit hebben wij gedaan in 
Deel II van dit boek. In dit deel is een beslissingsmodel ontwikkeld 
dat ons leert hoe en waarom ondernemers beslissen zoals ze 
beslissen ten aanzien van prijsrisico managementinstrumenten. Een 
belangrijk concept in deze context is risico-attitude. Daarom 
hebben wij methodologisch onderzoek verricht naar de wijze 
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waarop risico-attitude binnen de economie ("expected utility 
framework") en de marktkunde-psychometrie (risico-attitude 
schalen) worden gemeten. Door middel van grootschalige 
experimenten zijn de ontwikkelde risico-attitude maatstaven 
getoetst op construct validiteit, door te testen op convergentie 
validiteit en nomologische validiteit. De verschillende risico-
attitude maten correleren significant met elkaar wat duidt op 
convergentie validiteit. Bovendien correleert de waarde functie 
(verkregen middels de 'rating' techniek) niet met de risico-attitude 
maatstaven, wat duidt op discriminant validiteit. De 
psychometrische risico-attitude schaal doet het goed ten aanzien 
van de zelf-gerapporteerde maatstaven in tegenstelling tot de risico-
attitude maat verkregen met de loterij techniek en de intrinsieke 
risico-attitude verkregen middels het relateren van de nutsfunctie 
(verkregen middels de loterij techniek) met de waarde functie. De 
risico-attitude maat en de intrinsieke risico attitude doen het 
daarentegen veel beter dan de psychometrische schaal waar het gaat 
om de relatie met daadwerkelijk gedrag. 
Na meer inzicht te hebben verkregen in het risico-attitude 
construct, is het beslissingsgedrag van de ondernemer 
gemodelleerd. Belangrijke elementen in het beslissingsgedrag van 
de ondernemer waren: de mate waarin de ondernemer denkt dat hij 
zijn ondernemerschap beter of slechter kan uitoefenen door 
termijncontracten te gebruiken (vergeleken met andere prijsrisico 
managementinstrumenten), het begrip dat hij heeft van de werking 
van termijncontracten (vergeleken met andere relevante prijsrisico 
managementinstrumenten), en de prestaties van termijncontracten 
op het gebied van prijsrisico-reductie (vergeleken met andere 
relevante prijsrisico managementinstrumenten). 
Het blijkt dat het beslissingsproces van ondernemers een 
tweefasenstructuur heeft. In de eerste fase beslist de ondernemer of 
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termijncontracten een relevant alternatief voor hem zijn en derhalve 
tot het beleidsmstrumentarium behoren. In deze fase zijn de 
elementen ondernemerschap, begrip van termijnhandel en prestaties 
van groot belang. 
In de tweede fase van het beslissingsproces, als 
termijncontracten reeds tot het beleidsinstrumentarium van de 
ondernemer behoren, is het verschil tussen de psychologische 
referentieprijs van de ondernemer en de prijs in de termijnmarkt 
belangrijk voor het wel of niet deelnemen aan de termijnmarkt. De 
componenten ondernemerschap en prestaties zijn ook in deze fase 
van het beslissingsgedrag van belang, dit in tegenstelling tot de 
component begrip van termijnhandel, die geen rol speelt in fase 2. 
Door de structuur van de termijnmarkt heeft het informatie 
verspreidingsproces van termijncontact innovaties een belangrijk 
invloed op het welslagen van een termijncontract. Dit is onderzocht 
voor een informatie proces waarbij deze informatie via de makelaars 
van de beurs aan potentiële gebruikers van het termijncontract wordt 
doorgeven. 
Deel Ui van onze studie gaat over de mogelijkheid van 
termijncontracten voor rechten. Eerst wordt een overzicht gegeven 
en een taxonomie geïntroduceerd van de verschillende milieu- en 
productierechten binnen en buiten de landbouw. De prijzen van 
deze rechten weerspiegelen de productie "rent". We laten zien dat 
de specifieke karakteristieken van rechten de hedging effectiviteit 
vergroten. Vanuit dat gezichtspunt lijken rechtentermijncontracten 
dan ook een interessant instrument voor prijsrisico-afdekking. 
Verder laten we zien dat het gebruik van rechtentermijncontracten 
uiterst effectief kan zijn in "spreading" situaties waarbij de 
productie beperkt is door rechten. 
Door de marketing en finance benadering te integreren wordt 
het inzicht in de markt voor hedging services vergroot. Enerzijds 
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verbreedt dit onze kennis ten aanzien van bestaande markten 
(waarom zijn sommige markten succesvol en andere niet?) 
anderzijds verbetert de marketing-finance benadering het 
ontwikkelingsproces van hedging services. Door beide benaderingen 
te gebruiken komt men al snel op het spoor van mogelijke problemen 
dan wel mogelijkheden. Zo leert het onderzoek naar 
rechtentermijncontracten ons dat het vanuit een finance benadering 
bekeken, deze nieuwe termijncontracten zeer prettige eigenschappen 
hebben en derhalve een efficiënt instrument zijn om prijsrisico's af te 
dekken. Bezien we rechtentermijncontracten vanuit een marketing 
oogpunt dan zien we dat de potentiële gebruikers termijnmarkten als 
complex ervaren, waardoor termijncontracten niet als een alternatief 
prijsrisico managementinstrumenten gepercipieerd worden. 
De marketing-finance benadering is een integrale benadering 
welke alle relevante aspecten bevat om conclusies te trekken ten 
aanzien van de levensvatbaarheid van een termijnmarkt. De 
marketmg-finance benadering geeft inzicht in de beleidsmaatregelen 
die door de termijnmarkt kunnen worden genomen om een 
levensvatbare termijnmarkt te creëren en te behouden. In dit boek is 
veel aandacht besteed aan onderwerpen die betrekking hebben op één 
van de twee benaderingen en welke verdere verdieping vereisen om 
een vruchtbare integratie van beide benaderingen te bewerkstelligen. 
Verdere uitbouw van deze marketmg-finance benadering is van groot 
belang voor een doeltreffend en doelmatig beleid van 
termijnmarkten. 
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